Philosophy for Children

Practitioner Handbook

Edited by Maughn Gregory, Ph.D.

Philosophy for Children
Practitioner Handbook



Doctoral student Joe Oyler facilitates a discussion on ***Elfie*** with a second grade class.

by Maughn Gregory, with contributions by:

Nathan Brubaker
Stephanie Burdick
Pablo Cevallos E.
James Heinegg
Thomas E. Jackson
David Kennedy
Megan Laverty
Matthew Lipman
Joe Oyler
Alexandra Perry
Ann Maragret Sharp
Laurance Splitter
Wendy Turgeon
Marilyn J. Williams

ISBN 0916834409,

MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY

Philosophy for Children: A Practitioner Handbook

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Philosophy and Philosophy for Children

Introduction

This course, conducted by a Fellow of the **Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children** (IAPC), will introduce you to the practice of Philosophy for Children ("P4C") and to some of the theory behind it. The purpose of this course is not to make you ready to facilitate philosophical dialogue with children—something that requires a longer commitment of practice and study—but rather to give you enough of an experience with the program to enable you to decide whether or not to engage with the program further, for example by participating in the IAPC's Philosophy in Schools program, taking a course in Philosophy for Children or applying to a graduate degree program in Philosophy for Children at Montclair State University.

With this course you are embarking on a personal inquiry into the nature of philosophy and Philosophy for Children, and a journey of personal growth as a philosopher and a facilitator of philosophical dialogue. The activities of this course move back and forth between practice and theory. We will have our own experience of doing philosophy together, as adults, and we will have the opportunity to step back from that experience to think about what makes it worth doing and what makes it possible in classroom settings. You will be provided with numerous aides to the pedagogy of facilitating philosophical dialogue, but like all good teaching, it isn't something that can be reduced to a formula or checklist. The most important thing is for you to get the "feel" of doing philosophy: to develop an ear for philosophical questions and ideas, to see the big picture of an unfolding philosophical argument, and to notice how the moves of the facilitator reinforce the quality of the discourse and help it advance in the direction to which it tends.

You will probably have more questions at the end of the course than at the beginning (an important sign of growth), but there will be many opportunities for you to take your questions further—in your own study and in further participation with the IAPC. The IAPC's Practitioner Certification and Philosophy in Schools programs will be explained in this course, along with other opportunities to study and practice Philosophy for Children and associate with P4C teachers, scholars and communities around the world. Whether or not you choose to engage further with Philosophy for Children after this course, you will receive a certificate of completion for the course and, on request, a certificate of professional development hours from the IAPC with authorization by the New Jersey Department of Education.

This Handbook is designed for introductory workshops, seminars and courses in Philosophy for Children conducted by IAPC faculty and staff at the IAPC and in schools and universities around the world. These courses vary in length and organization, from periodic sessions extending throughout a school year to weekly Philosophy for Teachers sessions to ten-day retreats. Your course may not utilize all the materials in this Handbook. Your course instructor(s) will tell you how this Handbook will be used in your course.

What is Philosophy?

This is itself an important philosophical question; a question not easy to answer and one philosophers themselves have disagreed about for centuries. The word philosophy comes from ancient Greece, and is a combination of the roots *philos* (love of) and *sophia* (wisdom). Socrates (469-399 BCE) said that philosophy begins in wonder, and if we look into the literature of philosophy around the world from ancient times to the present, we see that philosophers are people who search out some kind of wisdom, truth or meaning.

If we look at the kinds of questions philosophers have thought about for thousands of years, such as …

- "What is justice?"
- "What is beauty?"
- "What is real?"
- "What is the right thing to do?"
- "How can I be sure of what I know?"

… we find that they are questions that many adults and children puzzle about today. This is probably because these ideas are especially meaningful or important. We need ideas like *justice*, *right and wrong*, *beauty*, *knowledge* and *reality* to make sense of our lives. We also notice that these questions are meaningful to most people, all over the world. In spite of the image some people have of philosophers as remote intellectuals or even recluses on mountain tops, most philosophical questions are questions most of us have wondered about from time to time—especially as children. Many people looking at a list of philosophical questions like the one above will recall that these are the kinds of questions they used to have when they were children.

Another thing we notice is that philosophical questions are not easy to answer. They are extremely puzzling, not just because so many opinions are possible about them, but because it's not easy to say what makes our own opinion worth holding on to. This does *not* mean there are "no right or wrong answers" in philosophy, or that philosophy is only a matter of opinion. It means it's not easy to get a large number of people to agree about them, and it's not easy to find answers that are enduringly satisfying, even to ourselves. To sum up, we might say that philosophy, among other things, is inquiry into the meaning of concepts that are:

- Central to our lives, rather than trivial
- Common to most people's experience; ordinary rather than esoteric, yet
- Contestable, or puzzling; not easy to agree on or settle once and for all[1]

… not that all philosophers would agree with this summing up!

Philosophy is also known for the cultivation of excellent thinking. One of the most ancient branches of philosophy is logic, which includes informal logic, or "critical thinking." More recent philosophers have drawn attention to the importance of creative thinking, and in Philosophy for Children we also emphasize something we call "caring thinking" (more about that later).

- formal logic
- informal logic / critical thinking
- creative thinking
- caring thinking

Philosophical inquiry includes careful thinking, including strategies for thinking critically, creatively and caringly. When

[1] See Laurance Splitter & Ann Sharp: *Teaching for Better Thinking* (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1995), 130.

we dialogue about philosophical questions we don't just exchange opinions. We challenge and test each other's beliefs. We extend and build on each other's ideas. We examine where ideas come from, and where they could lead. We see if our beliefs are coherent as a set. We watch out for who is benefited and who is hurt by an idea. Our dialogue is not a debate or competition where we try to defend our opinions no matter what. Philosophical inquiry is an honest search for greater truth or meaning, so we try to self-correct our views. That might mean finding stronger reasons to support our opinions, or it might mean changing our opinions about an issue, in part or altogether.

Your preparation in P4C will include practice in these kinds of thinking. But philosophy is not only an intellectual exercise. As philosophers—whether adults or children—we try to improve our thinking in order to better inquire into certain aspects of our experience so that we can make better judgments about them. Aspects such as …

- Ethical: right, wrong, good, bad, duty, compassion
- Aesthetic: beauty, art, value
- Logical: reasons, cause/effect, if/then relationships
- Epistemological: knowledge, opinion, truth
- Political: fairness, justice, power, government
- Metaphysical: real, unreal, time

Philosophy helps to wake us up to these aspects of our experience and offers us tools and methods for inquiring into the many questions that arise for us when we do. Inquiry has a trajectory, like the arc of an arrow, which begins with our questions and ends, if only temporarily, in a judgment about what to believe or value or do. In fact, many of the most important and controversial issues of our time are largely philosophical:

• War • Civil rights • The death penalty • Environmental conservation	• Feminism • Abortion • Funding for the arts • Religion in schools

Academic philosophy—the kind you may have studied in college—includes all the branches of inquiry above, as well as the application of these kinds of questions to particular fields, resulting in, for example:

- Philosophy of science
- Philosophy of history
- Philosophy of nature
- Philosophy of language
- Philosophy of art
- Philosophy of education

A more complete list of the branches of academic philosophy, and some of the questions taken up in each branch is given below.

Some philosophers who have studied certain questions at length have developed philosophical positions, programs or even schools, (the "isms") such as: idealism, realism, existentialism, pragmatism, Marxism, Buddhism, nihilism, relativism, determinism, and postmodernism. However, it is not the agenda of Philosophy for Children to familiarize children either with these "isms" or with the history of professional philosophy, in terms of names, dates and positions of philosophers. Rather, the agenda is to assist children and us adults who practice philosophy in inquiring into the questions we think are worth puzzling about.

Philosophy helps us learn to recognize, for instance, the ethical problems and possibilities in our daily experience—and then to think through

them carefully, make good ethical judgments and take appropriate action. This is why for thousands of years people have practiced philosophy, not only in universities but also in business offices, reading clubs, coffee houses, taverns and bathtubs.

Think it Over

- What philosophical questions have you wondered about in your life?
- What philosophical questions did you wonder about as a child?
- What philosophical questions do you wonder about now?
- If you've never wondered about philosophical questions, why do you think that might be?

Philosophy Branches and Questions

Aesthetics / Philosophy of Art:

- What is beauty?
- What is ugliness?
- Are things beautiful or ugly in themselves, apart from personal taste?
- What is art?

Epistemology & Philosophy of Mind:

- When is it reasonable to have an opinion? To believe something? To say I know something? Is there anything we can know for certain?
- What is a mind, and what kinds of things have minds?

Ethics & Moral Philosophy:

- How should we decide what's right and wrong?
- What does it mean to be a good person? To live a good life?
- Is there such a thing as evil?

Logic:

- (Why) are some reasons stronger than others?
- How can one idea "follow" from another?
- Is there such a thing as "good" thinking?
- Can emotions or actions be reasonable? What would that mean?

Metaphysics:

- What is real? Is there one reality or many? (How can we know?)
- What exists? What doesn't exist but could? What could not exist?
- What is time? Are there different kinds of time?

Political & Legal Philosophy

- What is justice (fairness) in this particular situation?
- How can justice be defined in general?
- Is justice compatible with other political values, and if not, how should such conflicts be resolved?
- How should power be organized in a community?
- Is there such a thing as political expertise or wisdom?
- How should the needs of individuals and communities be reconciled?
- Are there, or should there be political rights, and if so, what kinds of beings have or should have them?
- What is democracy?
- What is the proper role of local, national and international government?

Philosophy of Science

- How does science operate? What counts as science? What makes science different from non-science?
- What is science good for? What is it not good for?
- Are there (potential) conflicts among science, politics, ethics and religion? If so, how should such conflicts be resolved?

Philosophy of Nature

- How did the world come to be?
- Are humans part of nature?
- What is natural and unnatural?
- Does nature have purposes or innate values?
- Can and should nature be controlled? Do animals and eco-systems have rights?
- Do humans have rights, duties, obligations, etc., to nature?
- Can nature be cruel?
- (Why) is it bad for species to go extinct?

Philosophy of Body:

- Am I the same as my body? If not, what's the relationship between my body and myself? Body and personhood?
- What kinds of knowledge are available through the body?
- Are there any unnatural forms or uses of the body?
- What is health? Are there different kinds and degrees of health, and if so, how should they be valued?
- What is death?

Philosophy of Education:

- What is education? What are the proper purposes of education?
- What does it mean to teach and to learn?
- Who should be educated?
- How should people be educated? Why do we have schools?

Philosophy of Language

- Does my language limit and/or expand my experience? Do people with different languages think differently? Experience the world differently?
- Do words have power? If so, what kinds?
- Do words and symbols have meaning in themselves, or are they only tools for the expression of meaning by others?

Philosophy of Religion

- Is there a god?
- What is religious faith? Is it compatible with reason?
- Are there religious truths?
- What should be the relationship between religious beliefs and beliefs derived from other disciplines like science or politics?
- What should be the relationships among religions and governments?

Why "Philosophy for Children"?

Consider how many philosophical issues children as young as four or five typically encounter, as evidenced by their questions:

Children's Philosophical Questions

Children's Questions	Academic Philosophy
• Was that fair? • Who makes the rules?	**Political Philosophy**
• What does it mean to be good? • Is it possible to steal from yourself? • What makes someone a *best friend*?	**Ethics**
• Are thoughts real? • Why is time so slow sometimes? • Where did grandpa go when he died? • Is my doll a person?	**Metaphysics**
• Are some things beautiful to everyone? • What does it mean to be ugly?	**Aesthetics**
• What makes a good reason good? • What does it mean to jump to conclusions?	**Logic**
• How can I be sure of what I know? • Should I believe everything I see? • Are there some things no one knows?	**Epistemology**

The first reason to introduce children to the practice of philosophy, therefore, is that children already have philosophical experience. Children think constantly and reflect on their thoughts. They acquire knowledge and try to use what they know. And they want their experience to be meaningful: to be valuable, interesting, just and beautiful. Until recently philosophy was thought to be too difficult and uninteresting for children. Yet, the work of the IAPC since 1974 has shown us that children and adolescents are not only capable of doing philosophy, but need and appreciate it for the same reasons that adults do. The practice of philosophy offers children the chance to explore concepts like truth, beauty, goodness and fairness—concepts they need to make sense of their experience but that are not part of most school curriculum.

Secondly, the advent of Philosophy for Children coincided with the recognition that emerged in the third quarter of the 20th century that children are capable of thinking critically and creatively, and that a major aim of education should be to help children become more *reasonable*—the "fourth R". As reading and writing are taught to children through the discipline of literature, it makes sense to teach them reasoning and judgment through the discipline of philosophy. However, these benefits don't come from learning *about* philosophy or philosophers. Rather, as with reading, writing and arithmetic, the benefits of philosophy come through the doing—through active engagement in rigorous philosophical inquiry.

Finally, philosophy includes the discipline of ethics, and Philosophy for Children has also proven to be an ideal program for values education. Like adults, children's ethical experience is precarious. On the one hand, children's daily experience—on the playground, in the classroom, on the bus, and at home—is replete with ethical issues such as trust, loyalty, honesty, cruelty, fairness

and friendship—though they may be only dimly aware of this. On the other hand, through television, the internet and other media, children today are exposed to ideas and images which used to be reserved for adults. Like adults, children often perceive the world as a jumble of alternative possibilities. The response of some parents and schools is to dictate a set of prescribed values to children, and while it is important for children to learn these value traditions, it is equally important that they learn how to make sound ethical judgments for themselves. In ethics, as in every other school subject, the point is not just that children know the right answers, but that they understand what makes those answers right, and know how to arrive at those right answers. In philosophy ethics is a discipline, the goal of which is to get better at making sound ethical judgments. Philosophy for Children accomplishes this by engaging children in a process of sustained ethical inquiry that strengthens children's capacities to recognize the ethical aspects of their experience, to think and feel carefully, to consider sound alternatives and to self-correct their habits of belief, value and behavior. In addition, the "community of inquiry" pedagogy leads children to form habits of democratic interaction: to listen to each other carefully, to help each other articulate their ideas and questions, to criticize each other's ideas respectfully, to build on each other's ideas, and to identify the inquiry as the work of the group—all of which helps children to foster empathy and pro-social behavior as an essential basis for values education.

In summary, Philosophy for Children offers children the opportunity …

- To ask their own questions
- To explore important concepts
- To improve their thinking
- To learn from other points of view
- To learn from philosophical traditions

… and thereby …

- To make more sense of their world
- To better understand others and themselves
- To judge what is reasonable to believe and value
- To withstand peer pressure, advertising, and propaganda

Our children's abilities to make the latter kinds of judgments depend on their having the former kinds of opportunities to practice. The efficacy of Philosophy for Children to achieve these objectives is warranted by over thirty years of philosophical and empirical research conducted all over the world, with children of all ages. But the most enthusiastic proponents of Philosophy for Children are the children themselves!

How Does P4C Work?

In this section you will earn a basic format or "recipe" for conducting philosophy sessions with your students. Like all good basic recipes, it should be mastered first, before being varied. The recipe includes these seven steps:

Typical Philosophy Sessions

1. Students read or enact a philosophical story or novel episode.
2. Students raise questions for discussion and organize questions into a discussion agenda.
3. Students discuss questions as a community of inquiry. They think of possible answers and clarify and test their answers. An adult with philosophical training facilitates the dialogue and introduces relevant exercises from the manual. Discussion continues over subsequent philosophy sessions until the agenda for that reading is finished, or until the students agree to move on to next reading.
4. At the end of each session the facilitator leads the students in a group self-assessment of their philosophy practice.
5. Between episodes the facilitator conducts one thinking exercise and one directed philosophical discussion plan from the manual. Between chapters the facilitator leads the students in one non-dialogical philosophical activity (e.g. a research, action or art project) as part of the ongoing inquiry.

Step One: The Stimulus

Students begin philosophy sessions by reading aloud or acting out a philosophical story—typically, one that depicts fictional children discovering and exploring philosophical issues in life situations. Finding stimulus materials that provoke and support the students' philosophical work is one very important element of Philosophy for Children. The IAPC publishes a systematic curriculum for use in grades P-12, consisting of novels for students and manuals for teachers. Once teachers and students are competent in the tools and methods of philosophical inquiry, any stimulus material may be used, e.g. a thought-provoking piece of literature, a current event, an incident on the playground. In the mean time, while teachers and students are still learning to recognize philosophical issues and conduct philosophical dialogue, we recommend the use of the IAPC curriculum.

Step Two: The Agenda

After sharing a philosophical story or some other stimulus, students identify the issues they are interested to discuss, collaborating in the construction of the agenda or lesson plan. This is typically accomplished by making a list of discussion questions. It is important that the students understand that their questions should be not be about the story itself, but something the story has made them think about, or wonder about. The facilitator may need to help the students articulate philosophical questions, or turn their original questions into more philosophical ones, for example, by asking them to turn questions about the text into more general questions with the same focus.

Step Three: The Dialogue

For the remainder of the session and for the next few or several sessions, the students and teacher will deliberate on their questions as a community of philosophical inquiry. The community of inquiry is the central practice of Philosophy for Children, without which the most effective stimulus materials may be ineffectual. Participating in a

community of inquiry engages young people in important cognitive moves such as creating hypotheses, clarifying their terms, asking for and giving good reasons, offering examples and counter examples, questioning each other's assumptions, drawing inferences, and following the inquiry where it leads. But inquiry is also a social enterprise, which requires students to share their own perspectives, listen to one another, read faces, challenge and build on one another's thinking, look for missing perspectives and reconstruct their own ideas. This kind of meaningful classroom dialogue is something most students find irresistible: they can't help joining in, contributing their own reflections. In this way, cognitive and social skillfulness are acquired naturally and in context, rather than in isolated drills.

The Community of Inquiry

- We respect each other: We listen carefully to each other. We help each other express our ideas. Each person's views are taken seriously. We challenge other people's views respectfully. We make sure most of us are contributing most of the time.
- We practice many kinds of good thinking: clarifying our terms, giving good reasons, offering examples & counter-examples, identifying assumptions, making careful inferences, creating hypotheses, imaging consequences, look for missing perspectives, Building on each other's ideas
- We follow the inquiry where it leads
- We often think about our own thinking (meta-cognition)

Children who are new to philosophy need the help of an experienced facilitator. The P4C facilitator sees her/himself as a co-inquirer with the children, as interested as they are in exploring philosophical concepts, improving judgment and discovering meaning. However, when it comes to the procedures of inquiry the facilitator both guides the children and models for them: by asking open-ended questions, posing alternative views, seeking clarification, questioning reasons, and by demonstrating self-correcting behavior. It is through this kind of modeling and prompting that the children eventually internalize the procedures of inquiry.

P4C facilitators are taught to neither impose authoritative views on their students nor attempt to validate every student's opinion in a relativistic fashion. They view their role as helping children to understand and use the tools of philosophical inquiry so that children can construct and re-construct their own answers to philosophical questions. The children should see the facilitator as someone who respects them as persons, takes what they have to say seriously, doesn't think s/he knows everything, models self-correction and really loves ideas.

The Philosophical Facilitator

- Loves ideas; doesn't think she knows everything
- Sees herself as a co-inquirer with the children
- Models and prompts good inquiry: asks open-ended questions; poses alternative views; asks for clarification; helps make connections; challenges reasons; self-corrects openly
- Neither forces the inquiry to pre-determined ends nor attempts to validate every opinion
- Is pedagogically strong but philosophically self-effacing; isn't teaching *what* to think but *how* to think; exchanges content expertise for procedural expertise

- Respects children as persons, taking what they have to say seriously
- Draws out the philosophical significance of the children's contributions
- Expects students to internalize the procedures of good inquiry as they re-construct their own philosophical views

Step Four: The Assessment

The objective of classroom philosophy sessions is neither to find *final answers* to the questions that are raised, nor to reach *complete agreement* among the community. On the other hand, a genuine dialogue 'moves forward' in some sense that distinguishes it from mere lively conversation. Philosophy for Children seeks two kinds of objectives: progress in coping with the philosophical questions—which might include adapted beliefs, new hypotheses for experiment or even clarification of the question—and growth in the cognitive and social procedures of inquiry. With these objectives in mind, participants in the community of inquiry typically take stock of their own progress with questions such as:

- Are we giving each other reasons for our views?
- Did we scratch beneath the surface?
- Are we listening to each other?
- Are we able to stick to the point?
- Are we able to build on each other's ideas?
- Who is doing the talking?
- Do we correct each other with sensitivity?
- Was our philosophy time interesting or important?
- Were we willing to change our minds for good reasons?
- Did we get anywhere with our questions?
- What do we understand now about the questions that we didn't understand before?

Step Five: Philosophical Exercises and Activities

One of the strengths of Philosophy for Children is that it encourages students to be individually and collectively self-directive: in creating the discussion agenda, in contributing to and managing the dialogue, and in assessing their own progress. The philosophy facilitator must walk a fine line between being so directive that the students come to rely too much on her thinking skills and her sense of where the dialogue should move, and being so permissive that the inquiry dissipates into mere conversation or story time.

One way to increase the philosophical integrity of the students' work is for the facilitator to introduce philosophical exercises, discussion plans and activities. The IAPC curriculum includes manuals for each novel, with prepared exercises and discussion plans for each episode. Exercises give the students practice in making particular kinds of philosophical or thinking "moves." Discussion Plans lead them in the systematic exploration of a particular philosophical concept. The facilitator should find relevant exercises and/or Discussion Plans between sessions, to introduce in subsequent sessions.

In addition, when the agenda of discussion questions for the current reading has been exhausted, before moving to the next reading, the facilitator should:

- Conduct one additional thinking exercise from the manual;
- Conduct one discussion plan on an important philosophical concept from the current episode that was not discussed by the children; and

- Lead the students in one non-dialogical philosophical activity, the results of which should be discussed as part of the ongoing inquiry, e.g.:
  - A practical experiment with a philosophical idea
  - Interviews of family, friends and community members about philosophical questions
  - Library and internet research on philosophical controversies
  - An action project that implements new philosophical judgments
  - Creative expression—e.g. painting, photography or play writing—of a philosophical idea

What is the IAPC Curriculum?

The IAPC publishes curriculum materials in Philosophy for Children for use in grades P-12 (see Figure 9). The curriculum is designed to engage students in exploring the philosophical dimensions of their experience, with particular attention to logical, ethical and aesthetic dimensions. Since their publication over 30 years ago these materials have been translated into over 40 languages and are now used in over 60 countries. The IAPC curriculum consists of novels for students and manuals for teachers. Each novel is about 80 pages in length and is written in informal language, without technical terminology.

The IAPC Curriculum
Excerpt from *Elfie*: Chapter 1, episode 2, pp. 4-5

Today Seth said, "Elfie hardly ever talks. Maybe she's not for real!"

That just shows how wrong he can be! Maybe I don't talk much, but I think all the time. I even think when I sleep. I don't have fancy dreams. I just think, when I'm asleep, about the same things I think about when I'm awake.

Last night I woke up in the middle of the night and I said to myself, "Elfie, are you asleep?" I touched my eyes, and they were open, so I said, "No, I'm not asleep." But that could be wrong. Maybe a person could sleep with her eyes open.

Then I said to myself, "At this moment, am I thinking? I really wonder."

And I answered myself, "Dummy! If you can wonder, you must be thinking! And if you're thinking then, no matter what Seth says, you're for real."

Each manual is about 400 pages in length and contains conceptual explanations for teachers as well as thinking exercises, discussion plans and other activities that can be used to supplement the students' inquiry (see Figures 7 and 8). These manuals are indispensable for conducting dialogical inquiry with philosophical integrity.

Although any stimulus material can be used to prompt a philosophical inquiry, the IAPC curriculum has the following unique benefits, especially for teachers and students new to philosophy:

- IAPC novels model children having their own philosophical dialogue, with and without adults
- Philosophical concepts and issues are easily identified in the novels and further explained in the manuals, helping students and teachers recognize philosophical dimensions of their experience and develop a 'philosophical ear'
- Exercises and Discussion Plans in the manuals help students practice thinking moves and concept development skills
- Characters in the IAPC novels raise philosophical questions and ideas from the philosophical tradition so that children may consider these in their deliberations.

DISCUSSION PLAN:
On being beautiful
from *Wondering at the World*, Chapter 2, episode 1, p. 97

- What is the difference between an ordinary house and a beautiful house?
- What is the difference between an ordinary tree and a beautiful tree?
- What is the difference between an ordinary song and a beautiful song?
- What is the difference between an ordinary day and a beautiful day?

- Could you have very ordinary features, and still be beautiful?
- Could you have very unusual features, and still be beautiful?
- Could you be beautiful, even though lots of people think you aren't?
- Are there people you know who are beautiful in some ways but not in others?
- Is it possible that every person is beautiful in some ways?
- Is it possible that no person is beautiful in every way?
- Can a person do beautiful things? If so, can you give an example?
- Is a person who does beautiful things a beautiful person?
- Could you be a beautiful person if you did lots of things that weren't nice?
- Which meaning of the word "beautiful" does Gus think her mother means?

EXERCISE:
Same and different,
from *Looking for Meaning*,
Chapter 8, episode 3, p. 287

Say whether you think these sentences have the same or different meanings.

1. None but girls are in this class.
   This class contains only girls.
2. Only men and women are in this class.
   No boys or girls are in this class.
3. Some members of this class are boys.
   Some boys are members of this class.
4. Everyone in this class is a girl.
   Each person in this class is a girl.
5. If it's a member of this class, it's a boy.
   If it's a boy, it's a member of this class.

IAPC Curriculum:

Target Ages & Themes

The Curriculum for Early Childhood

- Reasoning about Personhood: *The Doll Hospital* (novel) and *Making Sense of my World* (manual)
- Reasoning about Language: *Geraldo* (novel) and *Discovering our Voice* (manual)

The Curriculum for Primary School

- Reasoning about Thinking: *Elfie* (novel) and *Getting our Thoughts Together* (manual)
- Reasoning about Nature: *Kio and Gus* (novel) and *Wondering at the World* (manual)
- Reasoning about Language: *Pixie* (novel) and *Looking for Meaning* (manual)
- Reasoning about Ethics: *Nous* (novel) and *Deciding What to Do* (manual)

The Curriculum for Middle School

- Reasoning About Reasoning: *Harry Stottlemeiers Discovery* (novel) and *Philosophical Inquiry* (manual)
- Reasoning in Ethics: *Lisa* (novel) and *Ethical Inquiry* (manual)

The Curriculum for Secondary School

- Reasoning in Language Arts: *Suki* (novel) and *Writing: How and Why* (manual)
- Reasoning in Social Studies: *Mark* (novel) and *Social Inquiry* (manual)

About the IAPC

Children and adults have surely pursued philosophical questions together since before written history, and the practice of formal philosophical dialogue between adults and youth is at least as old as Socrates. However, since 1974 the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Montclair State University and its affiliate centers have been largely responsible for the proliferation of Philosophy for Children programs in schools and other settings around the world.

The first Philosophy for Children novel, *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery,* was written in 1969 by Matthew Lipman, a philosophy professor at Columbia University in New York City. Troubled by the student riots at Columbia and elsewhere during the late 1960's, and by the lack of dialogue and dialogical ability among faculty and students, Lipman intended his philosophical novel to help pre-college adolescents learn to reason and dialogue. As *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* was piloted and found to improve critical thinking skills, Lipman became interested in writing more materials - specifically, novels for children and accompanying resource manuals for teachers.

In 1972 Lipman left Columbia University to pursue this work at Montclair State College (now University). At Montclair Lipman was joined by Professor Ann Margaret Sharp who shared his vision of bringing philosophy to children. The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children was established in 1974. Lipman and Sharp worked tirelessly on developing new philosophy curriculum materials, developing programs for teacher preparation, disseminating the program around the United States and around the world, and developing the theoretical dimensions of this new field.

Since its inception, the IAPC has pursued a three-fold mission:

1. *Inquiry into Educational Philosophy*. The Institute conducts, sponsors and advises theoretical scholarship and empirical research in teaching pre-college philosophy, and in educational philosophy, defined as the use of philosophy for obtaining educational objectives including multi-dimensional thinking, social inquiry, collective self-governance, emotional sensibility, and moral and aesthetic judgment.

    - The IAPC founded *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* in 1979
    - The IAPC conducts and collaborates in numerous academic conferences and workshops each year
    - IAPC Staff and Fellows conduct philosophical and empirical research, and are widely published in academic journals of philosophy and education
    - The IAPC collaborates with Montclair State University's graduate degree programs in P4C

2. *Philosophy for Children Programming*. The Institute provides systematic curriculum materials in Philosophy for Children, and offers a number of forums of teacher preparation in the use of this curriculum, with emphasis on the pedagogy of the Community of Inquiry.

    - The IAPC continues to develop new curriculum in Philosophy for Children and to revise existing curriculum
    - The IAPC conducts two intensive Philosophy for Children Seminars each summer in

Mendham, New Jersey: an Advanced Seminar in May and an Introductory Seminar in August
- The IAPC conducts Philosophy in Schools projects, working closely with teachers, administrators and children
- The IAPC conducts workshops, colloquia, courses, campus dialogues, school philosophy nights, and other events
- IAPC is a Classification-One Professional Development Provider for the New Jersey Department of Education

3. *Educational Reform*. The Institute contributes to initiatives of educational reform consistent with the educational commitments specified above. In addition to working directly with schoolchildren, members of the IAPC work with several constituencies, including professional and pre-professional educators, educational administrators and policy-makers, and faculty and students of education, philosophy and related disciplines.

    - The IAPC sponsors a Visiting Scholars program and is visited each year by scholars from around the world who come to do research, develop curriculum and observe our work in the schools
    - The IAPC collaborates with 75 affiliate centers in over 40 countries

The IAPC has been recognized with numerous awards and other distinctions. In 1986 Philosophy for Children was listed as an "Exemplary Program" by the National Diffusion Network of the US Department of Education, and was validated twice by that Department's Program Effectiveness Panel. In 1998 UNESCO's Division of Philosophy and Ethics held an international "meeting of experts" in Philosophy for Children and commended the program in a special report. And in 2001 the American Philosophical Association awarded the IAPC its prestigious Award for Excellence and Innovation in Philosophy Programs.

Philosophy for Children is now a field with academic and scholastic credentials. A growing body of empirical research demonstrates the programs' effectiveness for teaching multi-dimensional thinking, social interaction, and ethical judgment. By 1985, the Philosophy for Children movement had grown to such proportions that the International Council of Philosophical inquiry with Children (ICPIC; www.icpic.org) was inaugurated in Elsinore, Denmark with member organizations in over 20 nations (over 60 nations now). Today there are numerous approaches to engaging children in philosophical inquiry, some of which are not derived from the work of the IAPC. The IAPC welcomes this diversity and encourages cooperation among colleagues practicing different approaches.

Getting Involved with Philosophy for Children

There are many ways to become involved in the study, the practice and the global community of Philosophy for Children. Here are just a few:

- Visit the IAPC at Montclair State University: talk with faculty and graduate students, browse the IAPC curriculum, conduct research in the IAPC Archives, meet visiting scholars to the IAPC. To schedule a visit, contact the IAPC Director or Assistant Director, or any of the faculty listed on the IAPC website (www.montclair.edu/iapc).
- Attend an IAPC workshop, colloquium, Summer Seminar, conference or other event. Events are listed on the online IAPC News & Events Calendar, linked from the IAPC website.
- Attend a regional conference or workshop in your part of the world. These are also listed on the online IAPC News & Events Calendar, linked from the IAPC website.
- Contact your local or national Philosophy for Children organization. Contact information to all of these organizations is maintained on the IAPC website. Organizations listed under "The World of Philosophy for Children" are formally affiliated with the IAPC; organizations listed under "Philosophy for Children Links" are not.
- Enroll in a graduate-level Philosophy for Children course. The IAPC offers online courses that may be taken for university credit (toward the Graduate Certificate in Philosophy for Children) or professional development credit, and Montclair State University offers masters and doctoral courses in Philosophy for Children.
- Become a member of the International Council of Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC: www.icpic.org); a small membership fee brings you the ICPIC Newsletter, keeps you abreast of international developments in the field, and supports the global development of Philosophy for Children.
- Join the Yahoo Groups P4C Email Discussion List by sending an email to jen_p4clist@yahoo.com with the name you would like to use on the list, or by visiting http://groups.yahoo.com/group/p4c_list/.
- Join or begin a local philosophy reading or discussion group: ask your local library or bookstore if any are going on, or visit (join) the Society for Philosophical Inquiry (www.philoso-pher.org) to find a local Socrates Café or to learn how to begin one yourself.
- Begin a Philosophy in Schools program by contacting your local Philosophy for Children organization.
- Begin children's Philosophy Club with the help of your local P4C organization, or on your own, following the guidelines provided by the Society for Philosophical Inquiry.
- Do your own reading in Philosophy and Philosophy for Children: find the recommended articles at the end of each chapter here, and see recommendations under "Reading Philosophy" in the Appendix.
- Write an article and/or do some research, on your own or with the help of a local teacher or scholar, and submit it to one of the Philosophy for Children journals or ICPIC's Excellence in Interpreting Philosophy for Children essay competition.

Further Resources for Chapter 1

Articles for Chapter 1 in Appendix of Readings:

- Maughn Gregory: "Are Philosophy and Children Good for Each Other?" *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Volume 16, Number 2 (Fall 2002).
- Megan Laverty: "Philosophy for Children and/as Philosophical Practice," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy* 18:2 (2004), 141-51.
- Pablo Cevallos Estarellas: "Teaching Philosophy vs Teaching to Philosophise," *Philosophy Now*, Issue 63 (Sept/Oct 2007), 12-15.

Introductory and General Resources in P4C:

- *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* (http://cehs.montclair.edu/academic/iapc/thinking.shtml).
- *Analytic Teaching: The Community of Inquiry Journal* (www.viterbo.edu/-campnews/camppub/analytic).
- *Critical & Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education* (www.fapsa.org.au/-journal.php).
- *Childhood and Philosophy: Online Journal of the International Council of Philosophical Inquiry with Children* (www.filoeduc.org/childphilo).
- Robert Fisher: *Teaching Thinking: Philosophical Enquiry in the Classroom* (London / New York: Continuum, 2003).
- Joanna Haynes: *Children as Philosophers: Learning Through Enquiry and Dialogue in the Primary Classroom* (Oxford: RoutledgeFalmer, 2002).
- Matthew Lipman, et al.: *Philosophy in the Classroom* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980).
- Matthew Lipman: *Thinking in Education, Second Edition* (Cambridge: University Press, 2003).
- Matthew Lipman: *Philosophy Goes to School* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).
- Matthew Lipman, ed.: *Thinking Children and Education* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1993).
- Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, eds.: *Growing Up With Philosophy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977).
- Gareth B. Matthews: *Philosophy & the Young Child* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
- Gareth B. Matthews: *Philosophy of Childhood* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
- Ann Margaret Sharp: "Philosophy for children and the development of ethical values," *Early Child Development and Care* Vol. 107 (1995), pp. 45-55.
- Ann Margaret Sharp and Ronald E. Reed, eds.: *Studies in Philosophy for Children: Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
- Ann Margaret Sharp and Ronald E. Reed, eds.: *Studies in Philosophy for Children: Pixie* (Spain: Ediciones de la Torre, 1996).
- "Socrates for Six-Year-Olds," (1989) film documentary produced by the BBC for the series "The Transformers," available on DVD from The Society for Advancing Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education (SAPERE), U.K.



Chapter 2: The Community of Philosophical Inquiry

The Arc of Inquiry in Philosophical Dialogue[1]

Douglas Walton has argued that what makes an argumentative move reasonable is not merely its form but the context of the dialogue in which the argument is being constructed, and especially the purpose of that dialogue.[2] Walton identifies six normative dialogue types—persuasion, inquiry, negotiation, information-seeking, deliberation and eristic dialogue—each with a distinctive purpose and standard:

Six Normative Dialogue Types

Dialogue Type	Purpose	Standard
Information-Seeking Dialogue	To find information on a particular subject in order to solve a problem or to carry on some task	What will satisfy the information seeker
Negotiation Dialogue	To resolve conflicts of interest	What will satisfy others
Persuasion Dialogue	To resolve conflicts of opinion	What will convince others
Deliberation Dialogue	To decide what to do when confronted by a practical problem or conflict, or any need to take action	What will work
Inquiry Dialogue	To discover the truth	What is most reasonable
Eristic Dialogue (a quarrel)	To air complaints, let off steam and facilitate mutual understanding	What will appease oneself

What are the goals of philosophical dialogue in P4C? "Goals" here does not refer to the educational benefits of the program, like improved academic skills and social interaction, but rather the intended outcomes of each actual, particular dialogues that take place in the program. What are the immediate goals these dialogues that we think of as collaborative philosophical inquiries among school children? Is there a general, overarching goal? What counts as progress in such dialogues? These are the kinds of goals that determine the normative aspect of the dialogues – how they ought to go and how we can evaluate our work in them. In Philosophy for Children the ideal immediate goal of a dialogue is for the participants to arrive at one or more *reasonable philosophical judgments* regarding the questions or issues that occasioned the dialogue.

[1] This section draws from M. Gregory: "Normative Dialogue Types in Philosophy for Children," *Gifted Education International*, Vol. 22, Nos. 2/3 (2006), pp. 160-71, used with permission.

[2] Douglas Walton: *The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument* (University of Toronto Press, 1998).

We will briefly explain each of these terms in the context of P4C.

For a judgment to be *reasonable* in the context of P4C requires three things: it must be well-reasoned, well-informed and personally meaningful. We will explain each of these criteria briefly. Good reasoning is construed very broadly in P4C, and while the program is not tied to any particular conception or system of reasoning, Lipman's triadic construction of critical, creative and caring thinking as comprehensive categories of good thinking[3] has widely influenced P4C theory and practice. In any case, culminating judgments in P4C are meant to be justified in part by their reliance on sound arguments and good evidence.

For a judgment to be well-informed in the context of P4C means both that it has been informed by multiple and diverse perspectives, and also that it has survived the give and take of communal dialogue. Good thinking is a social phenomenon in two respects. First, the ability to think well is acquired by participation in a thinking community where one is both challenged and assisted to be clearer, more consistent, more imaginative, etc. Second, the most proficient individual thinking is still limited and capable of error, and so is likely to be strengthened by being made accountable to a community of peers.

One of the characteristics that distinguish P4C (in both theory and practice) from other conceptions of inquiry and curricula for teaching thinking is its emphasis on meaningfulness. Culminating judgments in P4C may be individual or collective, but in either case are meant to be meaningful to the person or persons making them. In this context, to be personally meaningful means both that the person making the judgment has found her own way to it – that it is genuinely felt; that it constitutes an occasion of self-correction rather than of external correction – and also that the judgment is expressive of aspects of her personhood; is relevant to her personal experience. This requires that the process of inquiry leading to the judgment be similarly relevant. Lipman, et al. explain:

> We can consider the criteria of good thinking and apply these to any form of discourse. But it is quite another matter to reflect upon and bring to utterance our own personal perspective. In this sense, thinking for oneself involves a reflection upon one's own experience and upon one's own situation in the world. It requires appraisal of one's own values and in effect of one's own identity…. One must have a clear perception of oneself and the contents of one's consciousness…. Finally, thinking for oneself—or making moral judgments—involves developing a sense of personal direction towards the goals that one foresees, however dimly, for oneself.[4]

These three criteria for reasonable culminating judgments in P4C are independent in the sense that a judgment could meet each to some extent without meeting either of the other two, e.g. be fairly reasonable without being very well-informed or personally meaningful. However, they are interdependent in the sense that none can be met to any great extent without meeting the other two at least to some extent. Indeed, the interdependence of personal meaningfulness, public accountability and cognitive excellence should be understood as one of the most important tenets of P4C, both as a curriculum and as a theory of reasonableness. It is for this reason we have used the term "reasonable" to refer

[3] See Lipman: *Thinking in Education*, 2nd Edition (Cambridge University Press 2003), chapters 10-12.

[4] Lipman, et al. 1980, 203-4.

to a judgment having all three of these attributes.

Judgments may be reasonable in the sense just described without being *philosophical*. The culminating judgments that constitute the dialogical goals in P4C are meant to be philosophical in content, e.g. ethical, aesthetic, political or metaphysical judgments. Philosophical inquiry is construed in P4C as inquiry into philosophical questions or problems or puzzlements recognized by the children. The philosophical children's novels published by the IAPC are meant to provoke such questions, but only insofar as the children can relate to them personally, i.e. by recognizing philosophically problematic aspects of their own experience. This pedagogy relies on the Deweyan proposition that "ethical," "aesthetic," "political," and other philosophical categories describe dimensions of most people's ordinary experience rather than intellectual or esoteric experiences segregated from ordinary experience. It further presupposes that children's experience is just as replete with these philosophical dimensions as is the experience of adults, which we take to be another of the most important tenets of P4C.

Lipman distinguishes "culminating judgments," such as "ethical, social, political, and aesthetic judgments" that directly address "life situations," and constitute some kind of "determination or settlement," from "mediating" judgments like judgments of identity, difference, inference, causation and relevance that contribute to culminating judgments. Because in P4C philosophy is understood as dimensions of human experience, the format of philosophical *judgments* tends to be propositions about what should be believed or valued or done with regard to those problems and opportunities. Mediating judgments like a distinction among motives derive their ultimate meaning by contributing to culminating judgments such as how to mend a friendship or improve health.

Reasonable

- well-reasoned
  - Critical thinking
  - Creative thinking
  - Caring thinking
  - Sound arguments
  - Good evidence
- well-informed
  - informed by multiple and diverse perspectives
  - made accountable to community of one's peers
- personally meaningful
  - genuinely felt; self-corrected
  - relevant to personal experience

Philosophical

- philosophical in content, e.g. ethical, aesthetic, political, meta-physical or epistemological judgments
- P4C texts provoke children to recognize philosophically problematic aspects of their own experience

Judgments

- What is the most reasonable thing to believe or to value or to do in this case?
- culminating and mediating judgments

Philosophical inquiry in P4C has a trajectory in the shape of an arc, beginning with some kind of problem or opportunity which gives rise to some form of the general philosophical question: What is the most reasonable thing to believe or to value or to do in this case? and which ends in some kind of satisfactory resolution or fulfillment in the nature of a judgment.

Arc of Inquiry

Experience with philosophical dimensions, e.g. logical, aesthetic, ethical, political	Philosophical problems and opportunities that pose the question, What is most reasonable?	Philoso-phical inquiry involving dialogue	Philosophical judgments that are well-reasoned, well-informed and personally meaningful	Experience that is more just, more beautiful, more reasonable, etc.

The next section outlines a process for facilitating inquiry dialogue in six stages. That process may be simplified as follows:

- We ask our questions and decide which ones to begin with.
- For each question, we come up with possible answers, and test them.
- We judge which answers are most reasonable.

As we will see, a dialogue that is structured as an inquiry is not only interesting and enjoyable, but also productive—of meaningful answers, solutions or ways of understanding things. It doesn't just open up myriad possible responses but also narrows down on the more reasonable of the responses. It requires not only good thinking moves but also a commitment to getting somewhere and a sense of direction.

Facilitating Classroom Dialogue[5]

The framework presented here is intended for structuring group discussions—construed as systematic, collaborative inquiries as explained in the previous section—across school subjects, in non-pedagogical contexts such as peer mediation, and across a range of ages and levels of expertise. The utility of this framework is first, that it translates that process into distinguishable stages that can serve as a simple roadmap for classroom dialogue; second it identifies a product to be produced or a task to be accomplished as the culmination of each stage; third, it specifies thinking moves that are particularly important to each stage; and fourth, it offers scripted facilitation moves to illustrate how a facilitator might prompt the kinds of work called for in each stage (see Figure 3).[6] Of course, expertise in facilitating dialogue is not a matter of following a checklist or rehearsing a script. The framework presented here is intended rather as a roadmap for teachers less familiar with the terrain.

Classroom dialogues may be highly democratic and evidence many kinds of critical and creative thinking, and yet be disorganized and haphazard, lacking direction and momentum, because of a lack of a shared framework for systematic inquiry. The framework presented here is not a substitute for the social and cognitive virtues that distinguish rigorous dialogue from other modes of discourse; it is intended to structure the exercise of those virtues so that they can reinforce and build on each other toward a meaningful resolution of the questions at hand. Regarding those virtues, the framework also functions pedagogically: students can learn the principles and the uses of argumentation and informal logic, as well as habits of democratic interaction, by engaging in this kind of dialogue with a strong facilitator who both models the virtues and evokes them from students through questions and observations.

The framework consists of six stages (see Figure 1). There is an order to the stages, but the order isn't lock-stepped: the dialogue can move back and forth between stages and even jump around among them, so long as the participants know where they are within the framework and which tasks have been accomplished (see Figure 2). All participants should be familiar with the stages, and paying attention to which tasks have been completed is a good way for the group to locate its position within the framework. Individual participants may find one or more of the stages difficult or uninteresting, given their experience and interests. Part of what makes dialogue so meaningful and efficacious for inquiry is that it is an intersection of the different inquiries and journeys of the participants; though the kind of dialogue described in the framework below is only possible if individual participants see themselves as partners in one collaborative inquiry: if they commit to a shared agenda of questions and to shared methods of pursuing those questions.[7]

The role of the facilitator is twofold: (1) to model and to call for good dialogue moves (cognitive and social), and (2) to help the participants keep track of how the dialogue progresses

[5] This section is adapted from M. Gregory: "Facilitating Classroom Dialogue," *Teaching Philosophy*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 2007), pp. 59-84, used with permission.

[6] Some of these scripted facilitations moves were adapted from the list of "Socratic questions," in Splitter & Sharp (1995), 56-7, and from Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan (1980), 112-24.

[7] We are indebted to Dr. Megan Laverty at Teachers College, Columbia University for this insight.

through the stages of the framework. In her role as pedagogue the facilitator should intervene with moves such as identifying assumptions overlooked by the group, identifying important alternative views not raised by the group, and nudging the group from one stage to the next. It is expected that these facilitation moves will be mimicked by the participants as they internalize the facilitator's insights, so that the facilitator's role becomes "distributed"[8] throughout the group, i.e. the group gets better at self-management and moving itself through the framework. In time, students should be making the kinds of facilitation moves scripted below with each other. Collective facilitation is an ideal that can't be forced, but that is likely to emerge when the initial facilitator is both effective and transparent in her interventions.

The following are suggestions for staging the dialogue:

- Whether the dialogue is scheduled or spontaneous it must be prompted by some kind of stimulus, e.g. a shared reading (e.g. an episode of the IAPC curriculum), a shared viewing of a film or play, the telling of an experience, a report of a current event, the voicing of a complaint.
- It is preferable that the participants are able to see and respond directly to each other, e.g. by sitting in a circle or by means of technology.
- Participants may take turns talking by raising hands for the facilitator, by calling on each other or by speaking up when there is an appropriate opportunity.
- The dialogue should be periodically self-evaluated by the participants, especially as to social and cognitive virtues and inquiry outcomes. The facilitator should conduct her own periodic evaluations of the progress of the group, e.g. by guided observations of video tapes, in order to diagnose strengths and weaknesses and to offer focused practice on areas of weakness. Instruments for facilitating these evaluation are included in Chapter 4 of this *Handbook*.
- The facilitator should not pressure the group to come to convergence of opinion. Dissent and even factions can be productive, so long as mutual respect is maintained. Each faction should use the same process to test its hypotheses.
- Inquiries taken through all six stages may take a few or even several class periods to complete, which realization puts a legitimate pressure on the community to choose its questions judiciously.

Figure 1: Stages of Dialogical Inquiry



[8] See Matthew Lipman: *Thinking in Education*, 2nd Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 139 and 157.



Stage One: Identify Issues Relevant to Purposes.

In classroom and professional settings alike, the community's ability to sustain the rigor of legitimate inquiry depends on the identification of some problem, opportunity or other issue meaningful enough to justify the effort. Issues ripe for inquiry may arise in any number of contexts, but in any case what counts as an issue worth pursuing depends on the purposes and interests of the community members, and so these should be consulted.

As David Hildebrand recommends, following Dewey, "In any situation where there is a problem, something is felt as well as known to be wrong…. That initial feeling is important because it can act as a guide later on. When evaluating an issue, it's important to try to empathize with what is distinctively *felt* to be problematic."[9] The kind of "thinking" involved in this stage includes emotional intelligence or "caring thinking,"[10] such as being aware of and articulating our personal and collective interests, desires and values, relative to possible issues to be explored. What aspects of our experience does the issue potentially illuminate? What kind of frustration are we facing? What stake do we have in dealing with our frustration? What do we want to know?

The product of this stage of the inquiry is an articulation of issues to be explored in the inquiry and the purposes for doing so. Individual and collective purposes can evolve throughout the inquiry, but an initial articulation is important, especially to guide the next stage of the inquiry: generating questions for dialogue. Once purposes are decided, it is possible to ask whether all significant aspects of the problem or issue have been identified, relevant to those purposes. It may be that purposes articulated for initial inquiries are so lasting and relevant to subsequent inquiries that Stage One need not be repeated for every dialogue. However, the importance of purposes should be kept in mind, and the community should be ready to re-visit and revise or identify different purposes at any time.

The following scripted facilitation moves for identifying issues and purposes are meant to be suggestive only:

- What feelings does this prompt, that call for resolution, e.g. frustration, confusion, curiosity, sensing something valuable?
- What did we find puzzling, interesting or confusing?
- What range of issues does this text / experience raise for us? What does it make us wonder about?
- (What) does any of this matter? (How) are the issues relevant to our experience? What aspects of our experience do the issues potentially illuminate? What's at stake for us regarding these issues, personally and collectively?
- What issues would be worth discussing? What do we want to

[9] David Hildebrand : "Analyzing a Philosophical Text as an Example of "Inquiry"," http://davidhildebrand.org/teaching/handouts/inquiry.php, accessed 9 November 2005.
[10] See Lipman 2003, chapter 12: "Education for Caring Thinking," 261-71.

know? What do we need to decide? What kinds of judgment seem called for?
- What will our purposes be in conducting an inquiry into any of the issues raised?
- Have we identified all of the significant aspects of the problems or issues to be explored, relevant to our purposes?

Stage Two: Formulate and Organize Relevant Questions

There are two different tasks to accomplish in this stage of the inquiry. The first is to generate a number of questions relevant to the problem identified. It's generally good to begin this task as an exercise in creative brainstorming: listing as many questions as occur to the participants without worrying too much about relevance or redundancy. The second task is to organize the questions into a sequence or another order that will structure the inquiry. A good way to do this is to look for relationships among the questions generated, such as logical priority, redundancy, and other relationships indicated in the facilitation moves listed below. Because discussion questions often arise in the course of establishing purposes, stages one and two may be accomplished more or less simultaneously.

Not all questions generated will be fruitful for dialogue. In general (with important exceptions), three categories of questions are not fruitfully answered by dialogue:

- Questions that we assume to have definitive answers already, e.g. that we could find in a database or by consulting experts;
- Questions that we assume we know how to answer, e.g. by calculation, observation or experiment;
- Questions that we assume can only be answered by means of privileged access to certain kinds of truth or insight, e.g. religious or mystical.[11]

It is useful to make these kinds of categorical distinctions when setting the dialogue agenda, and to make a plan for researching answers to empirical questions. The order to be imposed on the remaining dialogical questions should facilitate the purposes identified in the previous stage, and it is good to check the revised question set against the articulated purposes and make mutual adjustments. Because no actual situation of dialogue and especially no classroom dialogue can explore all relevant questions pertaining to all the issues and purposes that can be raised around a problematic text or experience, there is inevitably and legitimately an aspect of negotiation in the process of constructing the agenda of issues and questions. The group must come to an agreement about priorities.

Ordering the questions typically requires clarifying them to some extent. Walton warns that, "If the question is confused or badly stated, then the inquiry will go wrong from the very beginning because those involved lack a clear understanding of the problem."[12] Too much may be made of this caution, as much of the meaning of questions posed for dialogue is only *potential* and cannot be developed apart from the dialogue itself. Yet, it is undeniable that certain "questions lack sufficient clarity or specificity to be good problems to begin with in a well-directed inquiry," and that "deficiencies or obstructive failures [for inquiry] can occur … even during the very beginning phases of

[11] See Van der Leeuw's (2004) argument that "acceptance of the Socratic method excludes a doctrine of privileged access to philosophical truth or insight," at 20.

[12] Walton 1998, 90, paraphrasing and citing Monroe Beardsley: *Practical Logic* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), 522.

asking the question or formulating the problem."[13]

A well-ordered list of questions is the product that signals the end of this stage of the inquiry, though additional questions may be added to the list later on. This list of questions is the roadmap for the subsequent inquiry. It is important that participants be able to identify which question is being addressed at any point in the dialogue, and for that reason it is generally best to take up—i.e. to generate and test hypotheses to—one question at a time.

The following scripted facilitation moves for formulating and organizing questions are meant to be suggestive only:

- What questions does the text, situation, etc. raise for us?
- Do our questions cover all of the important aspects of the issue?
- Do any of these questions suggest other questions not yet asked?
- Can we think of a question that would highlight a different dimension of the issue?
- Is there redundancy among our questions? Could some of them be combined?
- Is there an over-all question here?
- Does this question have more than one part or sub-question?
- Are there any "Q-Q's" (questions inside questions)?[14] Does this question assume something that needs to be questioned itself?
- Is there a logical priority to some of our questions? Do some questions require or assume answers to others?
- Is there a priority of need or importance among the questions for us?
- What other relationships are there among our questions?

Stage Three: Formulate and Organize Hypotheses in Response to Questions

The end product of this stage of the dialogue is one or more hypotheses or possible answers to one of the questions. The thinking called for in this stage is includes inventing, exploring, imagining, supposing, synthesizing and other modes of creative thinking, which culminate in abduction: the informed generation of likely hypotheses.[15] As with the questions, it usually works best to brainstorm hypotheses without trying to critique them at the same time. Critiquing hypotheses is the next stage of the dialogue. If more than one hypothesis is suggested in response to a question, the hypotheses should be organized in order of how they will be critiqued. This order becomes a detail of the roadmap for the dialogue.

The following scripted facilitation moves for formulating and organizing hypotheses are meant to be suggestive only:

- What are some possible answers to the question?
- What's your opinion?
- Try to imagine what someone who thinks very differently might say.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Thomas E. Jackson: "Gently Socratic Inquiry," in Arthur L. Costa, ed.: *Developing Minds: A Resource Book for Teaching Thinking*, 3rd ed. (Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 2001).

[15] "An abduction is a method of forming a general prediction without any positive assurance that it will succeed either in the special case or usually, its justification being that it is the only possible hope of regulating our future conduct rationally, and that Induction from past experience gives us strong encouragement to hope that it will be successful in the future." Charles S. Peirce: *The Collected Papers (2): Elements of Logic*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), 270, electronic edition by InteLex.com accessed 15 November 2005.

- What kind of hypothesis is that? Explanatory? Predictive? Evaluative? Something else?
- Does that hypothesis respond to all or only part of the question?
- Does that hypothesis respond to more than one question?
- Can we try to see the issue from another point of view?
- Are any other beliefs on this subject possible?
- Is there redundancy among these hypotheses?
- (How) are these two hypotheses different?
- Is there a logical priority to some of our hypotheses?
- Are any of these hypotheses in tension or conflict with each other?

Stage Four: Clarify and Test Hypotheses, and Confirm, Revise or Abandon

This stage of the dialogue has three distinct tasks to be accomplished with regard to each hypothesis: first, to clarify it, second, to test it by means of arguments and evidence, and third to either confirm, revise or abandon it in light of the results of the testing. We will present thinking moves and facilitation moves for each task. Many of the kinds of thinking helpful for these tasks are operations of informal logic explained in Chapter 6. The end product of this stage of the dialogue is a list of hypotheses that have survived critique, in original or revised form.

Task 1. Clarify the Hypothesis. Two kinds of thinking moves are important to this task: clarifying meaning and detecting assumptions. Both are important throughout the dialogue and the scripted facilitation moves suggested for each may be used in every stage.

A. Clarifying Meaning. Peirce argued that concepts are inherently vague and that there is no such thing as clarifying the meaning of a concept completely or essentially, only clarifying it usefully enough to accomplish some purpose.[16] Though it is a common dialogical practice to attempt to "define our terms" before discussing substantive issues, the attempt commonly results in a proliferation of potential meanings that tend to encumber rather than advance the inquiry. Because clarification requires a context, requests for clarification should be made when an ambiguity has arisen, at which point divergent interpretations will have consequences for the direction of the inquiry. It is the content and movement of a particular dialogue that *makes* a particular term ambiguous, and that both reveals and constrains potential relevant meanings for it. To ask what the term should mean at *this* juncture of *this* dialogue (this new and tentative web of meanings) is more helpful than asking what it means in general.

Monroe Beardsley helpfully defines vagueness of hypotheses in terms of verifiability: a hypothesis is sufficiently clear for purposes of inquiry if it "refers to some possible experience that can be

[16] "A sign is objectively ***vague,*** in so far as, leaving its interpretation more or less indeterminate, it reserves for some other possible sign or experience the function of completing the determination…. No communication of one person to another can be entirely definite, i.e., non-vague…. [W]herever degree or any other possibility of continuous variation subsists, absolute precision is impossible. Much else must be vague, because no man's interpretation of words is based on exactly the same experience as any other man's. Even in our most intellectual conceptions, the more we strive to be precise, the more unattainable precision seems. It should never be forgotten that our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue, and though mostly in a lesser degree, is subject to almost every imperfection of language." *The Collected Papers (5): Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), 505-6, electronic edition by InteLex.com accessed 15 November 2005.

verified or falsified by the collection of data.[17] Empirical data is not always relevant to philosophical inquiry, but verifiability is no less a requirement of philosophical than of empirical hypotheses. To be meaningful, at least in the context of dialogue, philosophical hypotheses must be testable by argument or some kind of evidence. Again, however, whether and how a philosophical hypothesis is testable in dialogue may not be determinable in advance of the dialogue.

Thinking moves to be employed in clarifying the meaning of a hypothesis include defining, restating, making distinctions, using criteria, giving examples, qualifying and quantifying. The following scripted facilitation moves for clarifying meaning are meant to be suggestive only:

- What do you mean by _____? How are you using the word _____? How should we define _____?
- Are you saying that _____? I hear you saying _____.
- What would be another way of putting that?
- I didn't understand when you said _____.
- Is there something vague or ambiguous in this hypothesis?
- What criteria are you using?
- Do we need to be more specific?
- Can someone else say what you understand his point to be?
- Can you or someone else think of an example? How is that example relevant?
- Are you making a distinction between _____ and _____?
- How is _____ different from _____?
- Would you qualify your categorical statement with "all," "most," or "some"?
- What's the difference between what you're saying and what she said?
- How would we go about testing this hypothesis?

B. Detecting Assumptions.

Assumptions are hidden or unarticulated premises taken to be true without having been critiqued. There is no way to eliminate all assumptions from our intellectual work, or even to make them apparent to us.[18] Nevertheless, we can develop a knack for detecting assumptions or at least remember to be on the lookout for them. Assumptions we identify have the status of new hypotheses to be critiqued, i.e. clarified and tested. They should be added as sub-hypotheses to the list of hypotheses developed in Stage Three. The following scripted facilitation moves for detecting assumptions are meant to be suggestive only:

- Are there any hidden assumptions in this hypothesis?
- Are we assuming that …?
- What is being assumed here?
- Is that a reasonable assumption?
- Why are we assuming it must be either this or that?
- Why would someone make that assumption?

[17] Walton's paraphrase of Beardsley, 1950, without page citation. Walton, 91.

[18] Thomas C. Grey observes, "[N]o theory can ever be complete in the sense of stating all its own operative premises, [since] behind the articulated positions alleged to guide practice at any point, there is always a body of tacit beliefs." "What Good is Legal Pragmatism?" in Michael Bring and William Weaver, eds.: *Pragmatism in Law and Society* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 19. Similarly, Richard Shusterman writes that, "apart from the non-linguistic understandings and experiences of which we are aware, there are more basic experiences or understandings of which we are not even conscious, but whose successful transaction provides the necessary background selection and organization of our field which enable consciousness to have a focus and emerge as a foreground." *Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 127.

- Are there circumstances in which your view might be incorrect?

Task 2. Test the Hypothesis with Arguments and Evidence. The task of testing hypotheses is generally the most complex and lengthy stage of the dialogue. It involves a number of optional operations that interact in ways too complex and too context-specific to be mapped out in advance. We will not attempt to explain the reasoning involved in each operation (see Chapter 6), but will suggest scripted facilitation moves for each. Again, it is preferable to test hypotheses one by one.

A. Giving Reasons. Two broad categories of reasons are arguments and evidence, each of which is treated in more detail below. But with younger children it can be useful to elicit reasons without differentiating as to type. The following scripted facilitation moves for eliciting reasons are meant to be suggestive only:

- Why? What makes you think so? What are your reasons for saying that?
- Do you agree or disagree, and why?
- If someone wanted to disagree with you, what would she say?
- How many different reasons can we think of?
- Is that a good reason?
- Are any of these reasons stronger than others?

B. Deductive Arguments: Categorical Inferences. Older students will be able to offer reasons in the nature of arguments. There are many kinds of arguments that can be made for and against a hypothesis. Two commonly useful kinds of arguments are deductive and inductive arguments (also known as necessary and probable inferences, respectively). In this dialogical framework we include two kinds of deductive arguments: categorical and hypothetical inferences (or syllogisms). The task of the facilitator is not to try to elicit every type of argument about each hypothesis, but to help participants recognize the types of arguments they are offering and how each should be constructed and evaluated, and to suggest other useful types. The following scripted facilitation moves for constructing and evaluating categorical inferences are meant to be suggestive only:

- Is this a categorical statement / premise?
- Would you qualify your categorical premise with “all,” “most,” or “some”?
- Is it true that “all” / “no” / “some” _____ are _____?
- What follows?
- Are you making a categorical inference / syllogism?
- Does it follow? Is this inference valid?

C. Deductive Arguments: Hypothetical Inferences. The following scripted facilitation moves for constructing and evaluating hypothetical inferences are meant to be suggestive only:

- If so, then what? What are the implications?
- Is this a hypothetical (if-then) statement / premise?
- In what sense is it true that “if P then Q”? Is it a predictive hypothesis (a hypothesis of correlation)? A causal hypothesis? A categorical or definitional hypothesis?
- Does anything follow from this hypothetical premise?
- Are you making a hypothetical inference / syllogism?
- Is this inference valid? Does the conclusion follow from the premises?

D. Inductive Arguments. Inductive arguments make inferences to conclusions that are probable rather than necessary. In empirical studies, inductive reasoning is used to claim that what is true of a random sample is very likely true of the entire population from which that sample was drawn. The following scripted facilitation moves for constructing and evaluating inductive arguments are meant to be suggestive only:

- Do you think you might be jumping to conclusions in this case?
- How probable do the available reasons / evidence make this claim?
- Is the evidence strong enough to support that conclusion?
- Was the sample relied on to make this generalization randomly drawn?
- Was the sample relied on to make this generalization representative of the population? What are the relevant characteristics?
- How big was the sample relied on to make this generalization?
- Was a control group used?
- Are the risks of relying on this generalization reasonable in relation to the stakes?

E. Arguments by Analogy. An analogy is an arguments that since two things are alike in one way, they must be alike in another way as well. The following scripted facilitation moves for constructing and evaluating arguments by analogy are meant to be suggestive only:

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of that analogy?
- How are these two things or situations alike?
- Is it reasonable to think that because these things are alike in this way that they will also be alike in that way?
- Can we think of any counter-examples to this analogy?

F. Identify and Defeat Fallacious Arguments. Fallacies are unreasonable arguments made either mistakenly or deliberately and deceptively. It is important that dialogue participants watch out for each other's fallacies, especially because thinking mistakes are easier to notice in others than in oneself. The "distribution" of this alertness for fallacies among the entire group is one of the most important advantages of collaborative inquiry.

We concur with Walton that arguments are only fallacious relative to the goals and norms of particular and distinct types of dialogue.[19] What makes an argument fallacious is not its being an illegitimate form or type, but its illegitimate use or function in a particular dialogue. This means that the same argument may be fallacious in one stage of the framework and legitimate in another.[20] Therefore, the following scripted facilitation moves should be understood as examples of identifying and defeating arguments that would likely be fallacious in many of the stages of the framework:

[19] "In the traditional sense a fallacy is a general type of argument pattern or form that is presumed to be generically wrong. In the new dialectical sense, a fallacy is a particular instance of an argument that is, in principle, a legitimate kind of argument, but that has been used wrongly in a particular case, according to the normative standards of dialogue appropriate for that case." Walton, 257-8.

[20] The framework for classroom dialogue presented here involves what Walton calls "licit dialectical shifts" (200-201) among most of the normative models of argumentation he identifies. Walton's "negotiation dialogue," in which the purpose of argumentation is "to try to get a good deal," (100) is characteristic of stages one (identifying purposes and issues) and two (formulating discussion questions) of this framework. Stages three and four (formulating, clarifying and testing hypotheses) are each typified by Walton's "persuasion dialogue," "inquiry dialogue" and "information-seeking dialogue." These stages involve what Walton calls "mixed discourse … where two or more types of dialogue are both present over the same course of argument" (218).

- Is that source an appropriate authority?
- Are we sure we aren't supporting or rejecting a hypothesis because of who offered it?
- Are we sure we aren't supporting or rejecting a hypothesis because of peer pressure?
- Are you supporting that position just because it's a middle-of-the-road position?
- Isn't what you're saying now inconsistent with what you said earlier?
- Didn't that word mean something different when you used it earlier?
- (Why) does it matter how many people agree about this?
- Aren't you distorting the other person's position?
- Isn't that distinction really a false dichotomy?
- How is that relevant?

G. Evaluating Evidence. Evidence includes facts and expert opinion made relevant by means of an argument, i.e. as the premises of an argument. Part of the evaluation of all deductive arguments must be the evaluation of the truth of the premises, and part of the evaluation of all inductive arguments must be an evaluation of the quality and the quantity of the evidence in support of the generalization. In a classroom dialogue, participants are usually limited to searching for examples and counter examples from their own experience. This is an important means of keeping the inquiry relevant to their lives. But if important facts are at issue some research should be done. The following scripted facilitation moves for evaluating evidence are meant to be suggestive only:

- Can you or someone else think of an example? Are there other examples?
- We have a number of examples already; can anyone offer a counter-example?
- What would count as a counter-example to this generalization?
- (How) is that evidence relevant?
- Is that an established fact? How was it established?
- Is that true? Is it always true? Is it true everywhere? How do we know?
- Is this something that has to be determined by expert opinion? Where could we look for such opinion? What qualifies an expert to have an opinion about this? Is there agreement among qualified experts?
- Is this something that could only be established by empirical research? Where could we look for such research? Are we qualified to conduct it ourselves?
- Is this evidence strong enough, in view of what's at stake?

Task 3. Confirm, Revise or Abandon Hypothesis Hypotheses should be revised throughout Tasks 1 and 2 of this Stage, which involves further creative thinking that can incorporate developing arguments and evidence. At any point in the dialogue it may become clear that a hypothesis should be abandoned, but judgment that a hypothesis has been confirmed should be postponed until it has been tested thoroughly—thoroughness being relative to what's at stake. Confirmation at this stage of the dialogue means that the hypothesis is worth testing in experience outside the dialogue. The facilitator should urge participants toward judgments about their hypotheses with moves such as the following:

- Is that a reason to revise the hypothesis?
- Is that a reason to abandon the hypothesis?

- Are these arguments and/or this evidence sufficient to confirm this hypothesis?
- Have we sufficiently tested this hypothesis with our best thinking?
- Is there any other way this hypothesis might be mistaken?
- Has the meaning of this hypothesis changed? How can we clarify the new meaning?
- Looking at the surviving hypotheses, have we come closer to solving the problem or answering the question?

Stage Five: Experiment with Hypotheses in Experience and Warrant, Revise or Abandon

At some point in this stage of the inquiry dialogue is postponed while the fruits of the preceding dialogue—hypotheses that have survived dialogical critique—are given experiment in experience outside of the dialogue circle. New meanings of old concepts should be tested in a variety of discursive contexts, especially outside the classroom. New empirical propositions should be tested by observation and experiment. New value propositions such as kinds of health and friendship worth cultivating should be acted on and evaluated against the resulting qualitative experience. The lesson to be learned from this state of the inquiry is that hypotheses established successfully in collaborative dialogue are to be held as hypothetical and fallible until they are established meaningfully in the wider spheres of experience that were initially judged to be problematic. This stage is somewhat controversial, as not all philosophers would agree that experimentation—particularly in non-discursive contexts—is a proper part of philosophical inquiry. However, it is a necessary stage of philosophical practice understood as an art of living.[21]

The task of this stage of the inquiry is to contrive empirical experiments that will determine whether a hypothesis resolves the issue begun with and so deserves to be implemented by reconstructing our habits of behavior. Whether it does so will depend on the purposes articulated in Stage One. The principal kind of thinking involved in this stage is practical reasoning, which Walton describes as "goal-directed, knowledge-based, and action-guiding."[22] Following the experiment, the hypothesis is again abandoned, revised, or *warranted* (as opposed being confirmed by discursive testing). The following scripted facilitation moves for experimenting with hypotheses are meant to be suggestive only:

- How could we act on this hypothesis or put it into practice? How could we apply it to a current situation?
- How can we experiment with this hypothesis, i.e. test it in our experience outside the dialogue?
- How will we be able to tell if it resolves the issue we began with? What might we expect to observe? What kinds of consequences would count as confirming and disconfirming the hypothesis? What criteria can we use to evaluate our actions?
- If two or more live hypotheses are mutually incompatible, how can we test among them?

[21] As Thich Nhat Hanh observes, "Understanding can only be attained through direct experience. The results of [our] practice should be tangible and verifiable." Nhat Hanh, 7-8. Similarly, Richard Shusterman writes, "Working in philosophy … is not merely the work of thought, for philosophy's solutions to life's riddles are not propositional knowledge but transformational practice. *Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 25.

[22] Walton, 111.

- Are the risks of trying this hypothesis reasonable in relation to the stakes?
- Were the consequences of acting on our hypotheses satisfying?
- Has our experimentation given us reasons to revise, abandon or warrant the hypothesis?
- Do hypotheses further revised need to be re-tested in experience?
- If none of the hypotheses proved useful in experience, do our questions need to be changed?

Depending on the nature of the question or problem that has prompted the inquiry, it may be helpful and prudent to have students explore answers to the above questions in original stories, plays, poems, songs, films, paintings or other works of art, in argumentative essays or editorials, or in journalistic reports of relevant events or situations, before conducting experiments in real-world contexts.

Stage Six: Implement Warranted Hypotheses

In the previous section we suggested that the final outcome of a philosophical inquiry is an ethical, political, aesthetic or other kind of philosophical judgment.[23] Peirce insisted, however, that the ultimate meaning of a judgment is a habit of behavior and that the ultimate end of an inquiry is a reconstructed habit that ameliorates a problematic situation.[24] Peirce's insight is both an important innovation to current intellectualist philosophical practices and a recollection of the therapeutic uses of philosophy promoted by the ancients.[25] It is further controversial, in education, to suggest that children should not only learn to think for themselves and to make their own ethical, political, aesthetic and other philosophical judgments, but also learn to translate those judgments into action. The alternative, however, is to constrict the meaning of inquiry and judgment to the realm of intellectual curiosity, and to recommend that children capable of making sound judgments should not use those judgments to guide their conduct but instead be guided solely by authoritative persons and codes.

The stage of implementation involves further practical reasoning about how to derive individual and collective habits out of new philosophical judgments.[26] However,

[23] See also "Strengthening the Power of Judgment," chapter 13 of Lipman 2003, 272-93.

[24] "And what, then, is belief?… We have seen that it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a ***habit.*** As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought. That is why I have permitted myself to call it thought at rest …. The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise." *The Collected Papers (5): Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), 397-8, electronic edition by InteLex.com, accessed 15 November 2005.

[25] Pierre Hadot (2002) reminds us that for the ancients, philosophical discourse originated from an existential choice of a way of life tending toward wisdom and that it was not until the Middle Ages that philosophy was conceived as a purely theoretical activity (3-6).

[26] The implementation stage of the inquiry involves Walton's "deliberation, … a type of dialogue in which … parties reason together on how to proceed when they are confronted by a practical problem or conflict, or more generally, any need to consider taking a course of action. The most important kind of question posed in a deliberation is the 'how' question that seeks out a way of doing something …" (151). Walton demonstrates that in practical reasoning the textbook fallacy of *argumentum ad consequentiam* (appeal to consequences) is no fallacy, since what is at issue is neither the truth

both experimenting with and implementing philosophical judgments involve more than practical reasoning; they have an inescapable moral dimension. In asking how new philosophical insights can be acted on and what differences they should make in how we live, we are further reconstructing our view of an ideal self and an ideal world. Experimentation and implementation therefore necessarily involve these aspects of moral imagination.

Also, as Dewey explained, ends-in-view cannot be determined independently from means; the two must be mutually adjusted.[27] For this reason, though the stages of experimentation and implementation are in one sense post-dialogical, we include them as stages of the dialogical framework. In doing so we mean to draw attention to the interdependence of collaborative inquiry and individual reflection, of discourse and other modes of inquiry, and of inquiry and enjoyment as modes of experience. The ideal in all three cases is movement back and forth, through successive and ongoing inquiry.

The following scripted facilitation moves for implementing hypotheses[28] are meant to be suggestive only:

- What ought we to do about this?
- What are the implications of our new judgments for how we live? How should our new commitments be manifested?
- How can our new understandings / values be translated into action, especially in *this* time, in *this* place and under *these* circumstances?
- Are our current personal, institutional, communal and larger social habits consistent with our new judgments? If not, what adjustments should we make?
- How can we move this agenda forward in light of current realities?
- What criteria can we use to evaluate our actions?

Reconstructed habits are ultimate but not final ends to inquiry, since new circumstances, new evidence, newly-recognized assumptions and other kinds of reasons may surface that bring these ends into doubt. Doubt that is sufficiently uncomfortable or intriguing constitutes a problem that calls for the initiation of a new arc of inquiry.[29]

nor the validity of a conclusion but the practical consequences of accepting it (176).

[27] *Theory of Valuation* (University of Chicago Press, 1972), 24.

[28] Most of these facilitation questions were suggested by Dr. Jen Glaser of the Mandel Leadership Institute, Jerusalem, in her paper "Educating for Democracy and Social Justice," presented at the Austrian Center of Philosophy for Children 20th Anniversary Conference, Graz, October 2005.

[29] Compare Peirce: "A true doubt is accordingly a doubt which really interferes with the smooth working of the belief-habit. Every natural or inbred belief manifests itself in natural or inbred ways of acting, which in fact constitute it a belief-habit. (I need not repeat that I do not say that it is the single deeds that constitute the habit. It is the single "ways," which are conditional propositions, each general). A true doubt of such a belief must interfere with this natural mode of acting." *The Collected Papers (5): Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), 510, electronic edition by InteLex.com, accessed 15 November 2005.

Figure 2: Procedural Flow of Dialogical Inquiry



Figure 3: Reiteration of Dialogue Stages

Stage 1: Identify Issues Relevant to Purposes	
Product	**Facilitation Moves**
Articulation of issues to be explored in the inquiry and purposes for doing so	• What feelings does this prompt, that call for resolution, e.g. frustration, confusion, curiosity, sensing something valuable? • What did we find puzzling, interesting or confusing? • What range of issues does this text / experience raise for us? What does it make us wonder about? • (What) does any of this matter? (How) are the issues relevant to our experience? What aspects of our experience do the issues potentially illuminate? What's at stake for us regarding these issues, personally and collectively? • What issues would be worth discussing? What do we want to know? What do we need to decide? What kinds of judgment seem called for? • What will our purposes be in conducting an inquiry into any of the issues raised? • Have we identified all of the significant aspects of the problems or issues to be explored, relevant to our purposes?
Stage 2: Formulate and Organize Relevant Questions	
Tasks	**Facilitation Moves**
1. Generate questions 2. Organize questions into a sequence or another order	• What questions does the text, situation, etc. raise for us? • Do our questions cover all of the important aspects of the issue? • Do any of these questions suggest other questions not yet asked? • Can we think of a question that would highlight a different dimension of the issue? • Is there redundancy among our questions? Could some of them be combined? • Is there an over-all question here? • Does this question have more than one part or sub-question? • Are there any "Q-Q's" (questions inside questions)? Does this question assume something that needs to be questioned itself? • Is there a logical priority to some of our questions? Do some questions require or assume answers to others? • Is there a priority of need or importance among the questions for us? • What other relationships are there among our questions?
Stage 3: Formulate and Organize Hypotheses in Response to Questions	
Product	**Facilitation Moves**
One or more hypotheses or possible answers to one of the questions	• What are some possible answers to the question? • What's your opinion? • What kind of hypothesis is that? Explanatory? Predictive? Evaluative? Something else? • Does that hypothesis respond to all or only part of the question? • Does that hypothesis respond to more than one question? • Can we try to see the issue from another point of view? • Are any other beliefs on this subject possible?

	• Is there redundancy among these hypotheses? • (How) are these two hypotheses different? • Is there a logical priority to some of our hypotheses? • Are any of these hypotheses in tension or conflict with each other?
Stage 4: Clarify and Test Hypotheses, and Confirm, Revise or Abandon	
Tasks 1: Clarify the hypothesis	
	Facilitation Moves
A. Clarification of Meaning: defining, restating, making distinctions, using criteria, giving examples, qualifying, quantifying	• What do you mean by _____? How are you using the word _____? How should we define _____? • Are you saying that _____? I hear you saying _____. • What would be another way of putting that? • I didn't understand when you said _____. • Does there seem to be anything vague or ambiguous in this hypothesis? • What criteria are you using? • Do we need to be more specific? • Can someone else say what you understand his point to be? • Can you or someone else think of an example? How is that example relevant? • Are you making a distinction between _____ and _____? • How is _____ different from _____? • Would you qualify your categorical premise with "all," "most," or "some"? • What's the difference between what you're saying and what she said? • How would we go about testing this hypothesis?
B. Detecting Assumptions	• Are there any hidden assumptions in this hypothesis? • Are we assuming that …? • What is being assumed here? • Is that a reasonable assumption? • Why are we assuming it must be either this or that? • Why would someone make that assumption? • Are there circumstances in which your view might be incorrect?
Tasks 2: Test hypothesis with arguments and evidence	
	Facilitation Moves
A. Giving Reasons	• Why? What makes you think so? What are your reasons for saying that? • Do you agree or disagree, and why? • If someone wanted to disagree with you, what would she say? • How many different reasons can we think of? • Is that a good reason? • Are any of these reasons better than others?

B. Categorical Inferences	• Is this a categorical statement / premise? • Would you qualify your categorical premise with "all," "most," or "some"? • Is it true that "all" / "no" / "some" _____ are _____? • What follows? • Are you making a categorical inference / syllogism? • Does that follow? Is that inference valid? Does the conclusion follow from the premises?
C.Hypothetical Inferences	• If so, then what? What are the implications? • Is this a hypothetical (if-then) statement / premise? • In what sense is it true that "if P then Q"? Is it a predictive hypothesis (a hypothesis of correlation)? A causal hypothesis? A categorical or definitional hypothesis? • Does anything follow from this hypothetical premise? • Are you making a hypothetical inference / syllogism? • Is this inference valid? Does the conclusion follow from the premises?
D. Inductive Arguments	• Do you think you might be jumping to conclusions in this case? • How probable do the available reasons / evidence make this claim? • Is the evidence strong enough to support that conclusion? • Was the sample relied on to make this generalization randomly drawn? • Was the sample relied on to make this generalization representative of the population? What are the relevant characteristics? • How big was the sample relied on to make this generalization? • Was a control group used? • Are the risks of relying on this generalization reasonable in relation to the stakes?
E. Arguments by Analogy	• What are the strengths and weaknesses of that analogy? • How are these two things or situations alike? • Is it reasonable to think that because these things are alike in this way that they will also be alike in that way?
F. Identify and Defeat Fallacious Arguments	• Is that source an appropriate authority? • Are we sure we aren't supporting or rejecting a hypothesis because of who offered it? • Are we sure we aren't supporting or rejecting a hypothesis because of peer pressure? • Are you supporting that position just because it's a middle-of-the-road position? • Isn't what you're saying now inconsistent with what you said earlier? • Didn't that word mean something different when you used it earlier? • (Why) does it matter how many people agree about this? • Aren't you distorting the other person's position? • Isn't that distinction really a false dichotomy? • How is that relevant?

G. Evaluating Evidence	• Can you or someone else think of an example? Are there other examples? • We have a number of examples already; can anyone offer a counter-example? • What would count as a counter-example to this generalization? • (How) is that evidence relevant? • Is that an established fact? How was it established? • Is that true? Is it always true? Is it true everywhere? How do we know? • Is this something that has to be determined by expert opinion? Where could we look for such opinion? What qualifies an expert to have an opinion about this? Is there agreement among qualified experts? • Is this something that could only be established by empirical research? Where could we look for such research? Are we qualified to conduct it ourselves? • Is this evidence strong enough, in view of what's at stake?
Tasks 3: Confirm, revise or abandon hypothesis	
Facilitation Moves	
	• Is that a reason to revise the hypothesis? • Is that a reason to abandon the hypothesis? • Are these arguments and/or this evidence sufficient to confirm this hypothesis? • Have we sufficiently tested this hypothesis with our best thinking? • Is there any other way this hypothesis might be mistaken? • Has the meaning of this hypothesis changed? How can we clarify the new meaning? • Looking at the surviving hypotheses, have we come closer to solving the problem or answering the question?
Stage 5: Experiment with Hypotheses and Confirm, Revise or Abandon	
Task	**Facilitation Moves**
Contrive empirical experiments to determine whether the hypothesis resolves the issue begun with	• How could we act on this hypothesis? • How can we experiment with this hypothesis, i.e. test it in our experience outside the dialogue? • How will we be able to tell if it resolves the issue we began with? What might we expect to observe? What kinds of consequences would count as confirming and disconfirming the hypothesis? What criteria can we use to evaluate our actions? • If two or more live hypotheses are mutually incompatible, how can we test among them? • Are the risks of trying this hypothesis reasonable in relation to the stakes? • Were the consequences of acting on our hypotheses satisfying? • Has our experimentation given us reasons to revise, abandon or warrant the hypothesis? • Do hypotheses further revised need to be re-tested in experience? • If none of the hypotheses proved useful in experience, do our questions need to be changed?

Stage 6: Implement Warranted Hypotheses	
Product	**Facilitation Moves**
Reconstructed Habit	• What ought we to do about this? • What are the implications of our new judgments for how we live? How should our new commitments be manifested? • How can our new understandings / values be translated into action, especially in *this* time, in *this* place and under *these* circumstances? • Are our current personal, institutional, communal and larger social habits consistent with our new judgments? If not, what adjustments should we make? • How can we move this agenda forward in light of current realities? • What criteria can we use to evaluate our actions?

Course Community of Inquiry Sessions

There will be a number of philosophy sessions throughout this course (conducted online, face-to-face, or both), in which we will read and discuss selected episodes of the IAPC curriculum and other texts. In these sessions we will not pretend to be children or give responses we believe children would give. The philosophical issues embedded in the texts have been studied by philosophers for centuries, and should be challenging for us adults. Indeed, one of the primary benefits of doing philosophy with children is how much we adults can learn from the experience.

These philosophy sessions will follow the stages outlined in chapter 1. However, because of our limited time we will only be able to discuss one or two of the questions we generate. In an actual classroom context, dialogue about questions raised for one curriculum episode may continue over several subsequent philosophy sessions.

The main purposes of these course philosophy sessions are (1) to give us the chance to practice participating in a philosophical community of inquiry and reflect on that experience, and (2) to practice and reflect on the role of the facilitator in this kind of inquiry. To repeat from the introduction, these philosophy sessions are an opportunity for you to get the "feel" of doing philosophy: to develop an ear for philosophical questions and ideas, to see the big picture of an unfolding philosophical argument, and to notice how the moves of the facilitator reinforce the quality of the discourse and help it advance in the direction to which it tends.

If this is your first experience with philosophical inquiry or with structured dialogue, here are a few things to keep in mind:

- In philosophical dialogue, a slower pace is usually better.
- Try to give reasons for your ideas.
- Try to connect what you're saying to what has been said. We all need to pay attention to how the discussion is developing so that our contributions will be relevant and helpful. If you get lost or confused during the dialogue please say so! You probably aren't the only one, and it's good for the group to slow down and think about how the discussion is developing.
- Pay attention to others in the group so that everyone has a chance to participate. In general it is best to keep your remarks quite brief, and to wait until several others have spoken before you speak again.
- Please direct your comments to the entire group and not just to the facilitator.
- Please be brief!

The rest of this chapter contains a number of aides for participating in, facilitating, and reflecting on a philosophical community of inquiry:

- A "Philosophy Facilitation Guide" to help prioritize good facilitation moves
- A guided observation instrument for use in "Fishbowl" sessions
- A discussion plan on the Community of Inquiry
- A discussion plan on guiding a philosophical discussion
- A list of "Variations on Using the IAPC Curriculum"
- WRAITEC: The Good Thinker's Toolkit, to help participants make more thoughtful and more connected contributions

Philosophy Facilitation Guide

	Community		Inquiry	
	Connections	Inclusion	Reasoning	Structure
Priority 1	• Ask for agreement and disagreement	• Remind of and enforce procedures • Do not tolerate aggression or disrespect • Help kids be brief	• Name Moves • Ask for possible answers • Restate or ask a participant to clarify any confusing comments	• Ask participants how their comments are relevant • Focus on one hypothesis at a time
Priority 2	• Ask participants how their comments are related to the previous • Ask participants to identify who said what	• Let students pass • Ask for and prioritize new participants • Ask if anyone has a different idea	• Ask for reasons for and against the possible answer • Identify or submit alternative views • Ask if that is true	• Ask where we are • Identify or ask a participant to locate the direction of the line of reasoning
Priority 3	• Have students look at the person whose comments they are addressing	• Call on students who haven't spoken	• Ask what is being assumed • Ask for evidence in support of or against possible answers • Ask what follows	• Identify the location and direction of the line of reasoning
Assess-ment	Assess as a group (Listening, Building)	Assess as a group (Respecting, Participation)	Assess as a group (Critical Thinking, Creative Thinking)	Assess as a group (Organization, Progress)

The Community of Inquiry "Fishbowl"

The group divides into two and sits in concentric circles. While those in the inside circle dialogue, those in the outside circle take notes, using the Observation Guide below. Before switching places, the outside group reports on their observations. Alternatively, each outside observer may be paired with one member of the inside group, and the pairs may be given time to consult with each other after each dialogue. In either case, the reporting may take the place of a regular community self-assessment.

Fishbowl Observation Guide

Please take notes below when you see evidence of the following:

- Listening to others
- Responding to others
- Talking too much or too little
- Challenging others respectfully
- Challenging oneself or self-correcting
- Giving reasons
- Building on other people's ideas
- Bringing up a different point of view

Discussion Plan: The Community of Inquiry*

Are the following characteristics features of a community of inquiry? Why or why not?

		Yes	No	?
1	Criticizing the person who makes a remark, rather than what the person said.	☐	☐	☐
2	Giving reasons for opinions.	☐	☐	☐
3	Readiness to provide the evidence on which a "statement of fact" is based.	☐	☐	☐
4	Ignoring other people's views when they are inconsistent with one's own.	☐	☐	☐
5	Concern that inferences not violate the principles of logic.	☐	☐	☐
6	Concern that opinions not be expressed if they seem to be unpatriotic or irreligious.	☐	☐	☐
7	Concern to cooperate in finding out, rather than concern that the views of one side should triumph over the views of the other side.	☐	☐	☐
8	Offering to drop one's views if they are inconsistent with everyone else's.	☐	☐	☐
9	Suggesting ways in which one another's hypotheses can be tested.	☐	☐	☐
10	Avoiding offering counter-examples that might refute someone else's views.	☐	☐	☐
11	Trying to show others what their views take for granted and what their views imply.	☐	☐	☐
12	Welcoming all points of view, as long as no one present is offended.	☐	☐	☐
13	Having everybody question his or her most cherished beliefs.	☐	☐	☐
14	Respecting the opinions of everyone in the group.	☐	☐	☐

Discussion Plan for "Guiding a Philosophical Discussion"[30]

1. What are some of the educational objectives of P4C?
2. How would we describe a philosophical dialogue?
3. What is the role of the teacher/facilitator in classroom (philosophical) dialogue? (What kinds of metaphors are helpful, and what are their limits?)
4. How is what we're doing now, discussing this chapter, different from the way we use the P4C curriculum with the children?
5. In what ways is P4C "non-authoritarian" and "anti-indoctrinational"? In what ways is it "formative" or "educational"? How can anything be both?
6. Do we find the distinction between scientific, religious and philosophical discussions (pp. 106-8) helpful?
7. What insights or questions would you like to raise regarding the following strategies for "Fostering Philosophical Dialogue"? (pp. 110-28)
   - Eliciting Views or Opinions (p. 113-14)
   - Helping Students Express Themselves: Clarification and Restatement (pp. 114-15)
   - Explicating Students' Views (p. 115)
   - Interpretation (pp. 115-17)
   - Seeking Consistency (pp. 117-18)
   - Requesting Definitions (pp. 118-19)
   - Searching for Assumptions (pp. 119-20)
   - Indicating Fallacies (p. 120)
   - Requesting Reasons (pp. 121-22)
   - Asking Students to Say How They Know (pp. 122-23)
   - Eliciting and Examining Alternatives (pp. 123-24)
   - Orchestrating a Discussion (pp. 124-28):
     - Grouping Ideas
     - Suggesting Possible Lines of Convergence or Divergence
     - Moving Discussions to a Higher Level of Generality

[30] Chapter 7 of Lipman, et al.: *Philosophy in the Classroom* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980).

Variations on Using the IAPC Curriculum

Step One: The Stimulus

- We take turns reading 3-4 sentences around the circle, “round robin” with the option to say “pass”
- We take turns reading 3-4 sentences and each one calls on the next person to read, with the option to say “pass”
- The episode is read as a play, with certain community members reading the lines of each character, and someone reading as narrator
- We read the episode silently
- We read to each other in small groups
- We read aloud in unison
- One of us reads the episode while others follow

Step Two: The Agenda

- We put questions up individually and randomly, and then look for ways to group them
- We identify themes we want to explore and think of questions within each theme
- We divide into pairs or small groups to come up with questions
- Regardless of the variation used, it is important that the children have time to look over the episode and think about their questions

Step Three: The Dialogue

- We discuss our questions as one big group
- We discuss our questions in pairs or small groups and report on our thinking to the whole class
- We divide into an inner circle and outer circle—a “fishbowl” with the inner circle discussing a question and the outer circle making a guided observation

Step Four: The Assessment

- We assess our community of inquiry as a whole-group discussion
- We assess ourselves individually on a form or in a writing reflection
- We assess our community of inquiry anonymously, in writing, and the results are shared with the whole group
- We keep a philosophy journal of our questions and ideas
- We write short essays on what we thought was the most interesting question, our current opinion about that question and our reasons
- We write short-answer responses to questions prepared by the facilitator about ideas raised in the discussion

WRAITEC: The Good Thinker's Toolkit

WRAITEC[31] is an acronym; each of the letters represents a category of reasoning moves to be used in a community discussion (see next page). Typically, members of the community write and decorate the letters of the acronym on 3 x 5 cards, and hold a card up when they are making that kind of move or when they are asking for that kind of move.

Making the WRAITEC moves helps the community reason more carefully by making connections, drawing distinctions, uncovering assumptions, correcting faulty inferences, looking for evidence, etc. WRAITEC imposes a minimal rational structure on the dialogue. Often more reticent members use their WRAITEC cards to enter the discussion. It's easy to lift a card and ask, "Can you give me a reason?"

The WRAITEC categories can be used as criteria for evaluating the quality and intellectual rigor of a discussion session. An easy way to do this is to spend five or ten minutes at the end of the session to take each WRAITEC category and have the members vote on how well they thought the community performed that kind of reasoning, by putting their thumbs up or down or somewhere in between, and of course, by explaining. In this way the community members can identify their individual and collective reasoning strengths and weaknesses.

WRAITEC is also a "Good Writer's Tool Kit." After discussing an issue together, we may write short essays (individually or in small groups), using WRAITEC as a composition format: state a thesis, back it up with reasons, identify your assumptions and inferences, anchor your argument in "true" creditable sources, give examples, anticipate and defend against counter-examples. This format can be used to organize simple or complex idea clusters, such as are often generated by communities of inquiry.

- **WHAT**: to get/give explanation, definition, clarification: "What does *that* mean?" "What do you mean my room is still *messy*?" "I didn't understand." "What's the difference between imply and infer?" "When I say soon, I mean before Friday."
- **REASONS**: to get/give/evaluate reasoning: "Why?" "Why do you think that?" "What makes you think so?" "How can you say that?" "I agree with Jamal *because* ..." "Is that a good reason?"
- **ASSUMPTIONS**: always need to be uncovered: "What are you assuming?" "Are you assuming your female employees are not the main breadwinners in their homes?" "Why are we assuming that?"
- **INFERENCES**: how one idea *follows* from another, often in an *If ... then ...* pattern. "Does that follow?" "If all people are prejudiced in some way, then so am I." "Just because all men are thinkers, it doesn't follow that all thinkers are men." "If I'm related to you, and you're related to her, then I'm related to her." "That doesn't follow."
- **TRUTH**: "Is that true?" "That's not always true." "How do you know?" "How can we find out if that's true?"
- **EXAMPLES**: "For example, …" "Can you give me an example?" "What's the point of your example?" "Can anyone give a different example?"
- **COUNTER-EXAMPLES**: to undercut stereotypes and other generalizations: "Can we think of a counter-example?" "Are there any exceptions?" "But sometimes the opposite is true …" "What would be a counter-example to that claim?"

[31] A process developed by Thomas E. Jackson, University of Hawai'I at Manoa.

Further Resources for Chapter 2

Articles for Chapter 2 in Appendix of Readings:

- David Kennedy: "The Five Communities," *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 15, No. 1 (November 1994), pp. 3-16.

Resources on the Community of Philosophical Inquiry:

- Jen Glaser: "Thinking Together: Arendt's *Visiting Imagination* and Nussbaum's *Judicial Spectatorship* as Models for a Community of Inquiry," *Thinking* Vol. 14, No. 1 (1998), 17-23.
- Maughn Gregory: "Normative Dialogue Types in Philosophy for Children," *Gifted Education International*, Vol. 22, Nos. 2/3 (2006), pp. 160-71.
- Maughn Gregory: "Constructivism, Standards, and the Classroom Community of Inquiry," *Educational Theory* Vol. 52, No. 4 (Fall 2002).
- Maughn Gregory: *A Crash Course in Logic* (New York: University Press of America, 1999)
- David Kennedy: "The Role of a Facilitator in a Community of Philosophical Inquiry," *Metaphilosophy* Vol. 35, No. 5 (October 2004), 744-765.
- David Kennedy: "Hans-George Gadamer's Dialectic of Dialogue and the Epistemology of the Community of Inquiry," *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 11, No. 1 (November 1990), 43-51.
- David Kennedy: "Communal Philosophical Dialogue and the Intersubject," *International Journal for Philosophical Practice* Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 2004), 203-218.
- Walter O. Kohan: "Heraclitus and the Community of Inquiry," *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 17, No. 1 (November 1996), 34-43.
- Megan Laverty: "The role of Confession in Community of Inquiry: Self-revelation as Self-Justification," *Thinking* Vol. 16, No. 3 (2003), 30-35.
- Matthew Lipman: *Thinking in Education*, 2nd Edition (Cambridge University Press 2003), esp. chapters 4-5.
- Ronald F. Reed, ed.: *When We Talk: Essays on Classroom Conversation* (Forth Worth, Texas: Analytic Teaching Press, 1992).
- Ann Margaret Sharp: "What is a Community of Inquiry?" *Journal of Moral Education* Vol.16, No. 1, (January 1987), 37-44.
- Ann Margaret Sharp: "The Aesthetic Dimension of the Community of Inquiry," *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1997), 67-77.
- Karel Van der Leeuw: "Philosophical Dialogue and the Search for Truth," *Thinking* Vol. 17, No. 3 (2004), 17-23.

Chapter 3: Philosophy in Schools

Introduction

Philosophy in Schools is the model for partnerships among the IAPC and primary and secondary schools, consisting of several phases of increased commitment. Because Philosophy for Children is most successful when it becomes part of the culture of a school, the IAPC prefers to establish new relationships with cohorts of teachers within a school. In some instances, teachers from non-participating schools may join a nearby P4C cohort.

Phase One: Negotiating a new IAPC / School Relationship

- Our aim is to build strong cohorts of P4C teachers in a school.
  - The IAPC avoids pressuring teachers to participate and does not expect all to participate.
  - The IAPC provides awareness sessions to help teachers, parents and administrators gage their interest in P4C.
  - The IAPC expects participant teachers to commit to study and practice the program for at least one school year.
- Schools commit to:
  - A P4C teacher cohort of at least 5 teachers
  - Scheduling of, and payment for an introductory P4C workshop for P4C teacher cohort
  - Scheduling of philosophy sessions once or twice per week: 30 minutes for P-K, 45 minutes for lower grades, an hour for higher grades; not the first or last hour of the day
  - Purchase of P4C curriculum
  - Scheduling of and payment for follow-up workshops and/or "Philosophy for Teachers" (P4T) sessions
- The IAPC commits to:
  - Staffing teacher preparation workshops
  - Coaching of individual teachers' P4C classroom practice
  - Ongoing Supervision & development
  - Certify professional development credit

Phase Two: Introductory Training & Organization

- Orientation to the objectives and methodology of P4C
- Practice with the IAPC curriculum
- Modeling of philosophical inquiry with children
- Beginning inquiry into the theory of P4C
- Practical help with getting started, evaluation, etc.
- Explanation of transition model from Initial to Advanced Practice
- P4C Practitioner Handbook
- IAPC certification of professional development credit

Phase Three: Initial Practice

- Weekly philosophy sessions
- Each teacher assigned a Philosophy Coach from IAPC, who attends or monitors weekly philosophy sessions
- Philosophy Coaches participate in P4C Coaching Group at IAPC:
  - Discuss shared standards of practice
  - Show videos of philosophy sessions for group critique

- Teachers submit video segments to Coaches for feedback.
- Bi-weekly or monthly P4T sessions: exchange ideas & concerns, observe & discuss video tapes, read & discuss theory w/ participation of IAPC staff
- Professional development opportunities: follow-up workshops, IAPC Summer Seminars, IAPC colloquia, etc.
- Demonstrations for parents, PTA, board of education, etc.
- Annual IAPC evaluation surveys of students and teachers

Phase Four: Philosophy for Children Facilitator Endorsement

- Available for schoolteachers and MSU graduate students
- 25 hours of workshops, seminars, courses, P4T, etc.
- 25 hours supervised practice (= 2 university credit hours)
- Self-assessment and IAPC assessment (hours included in above)
- Official endorsement by IAPC as qualified facilitator (level 1)
- Professional development credit provided
- Facilitator Endorsement program may be taken for University credit (25 hours = 2 credit hours), which may be applied toward the Graduate Certificate in Philosophy for Children, which may be applied toward the M.Ed. in Philosophy for Children, which fulfills a pre-requisite for the doctoral program

Phase Five: Advanced Practice

- Teachers assume primary responsibility for philosophy sessions, with periodic visits from IAPC coaches
- Continued P4T sessions, professional development and program evaluation
- School serves as demonstration site for P4C investigators
- Experienced P4C teachers mentor teachers doing initial practice
- Teachers share their experiences at IAPC workshops
- The IAPC may invite experienced P4C teachers to collaborate with IAPC faculty in writing papers, conducting research, developing & field testing new curriculum, etc.

The rest of this chapter contains a number of resources for beginning a Philosophy in Schools program:

- A short article, “On Philosophy, Children and Taboo Topics,” to help school communities inquire toward a school policy on this important issue
- An explanation of how “Philosophy for Young Children” is practiced
- An article on “Teaching Philosophy to Adolescents”



On Philosophy, Children and Taboo Topics

When children are invited to inquire into philosophical questions, they sometimes venture into topics that are considered sensitive or even taboo, such as religion, politics or sexuality. Many schools have policy regarding this phenomenon, and some are obliged to follow relevant government regulation. This essay[1] explains the IAPC's position, which is that students should be allowed to discuss such topics so long as they are able to do so respectfully and with good reasoning. Teachers of students who are not prepared to discuss sensitive topics respectfully and reasonably, or who are not themselves proficient at facilitating philosophical dialogue should perhaps postpone the discussion of such topics, and invest in further study and practice with a view to helping their students and/or themselves become proficient. The IAPC does not dictate school policy regarding this phenomenon, but may elect not to work with schools with policies very divergent from its own.

The preference sometimes voiced by parents that their children not discuss issues like religion, sex and politics in school settings is usually based on two concerns: that certain substantive positions on these issues will be seen by the children to be endorsed by the school, and that children who are permitted to question or think critically about their own or their family's religious, moral or political beliefs, might end up abandoning those beliefs. The first concern is especially troubling to parents who believe that it is not the (public) school's business to shape children's beliefs about such private moral issues. The second concern is especially troubling to parents who believe in their own exclusive right to shape their children's moral beliefs.

Philosophy for Children (P4C) is in agreement with the first of these beliefs: Endorsement of particular religious, moral or political beliefs by a school is both politically and pedagogically misguided. The goal of helping children learn to "self-correct" through careful inquiry is impossible to achieve when teachers tell children what to think about such issues. For this reason, P4C facilitators must learn to direct children to think carefully, to consider each other's ideas fairly, and to follow the inquiry in the direction of the best evidence and strongest arguments, but without guiding them to pre-determined conclusions. In our experience, parents who are well informed about the practice and the materials of P4C find that far from being a potential vehicle of indoctrination, the program helps their children learn to *protect* themselves *from* indoctrination - including the lure of advertising and peer pressure - by learning to become, as Matthew Lipman wrote, "the guardians of their own virtue."

That brings us to the second concern: that children who learn to think critically and are given the opportunity for philosophical inquiry may come to disagree with the religious, moral or political beliefs of their parents. I will present five responses to this concern, based on our 30 years of engaging children in philosophical discussions all over the world. First is an empirical claim: the great majority of children who engage in philosophical inquiry do not change their basic value commitments - though they may learn to temper or enrich them - and in any case the children generally become more articulate about their own commitments

[1] This essay by Maughn Gregory first appeared in the Spring 2005 *Newsletter of The Society for Advancing Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education* (SAPERE, www.sapere.net), Oxford, United Kingdom.

and come to base them on sound reasons rather than on the fact that "my family believes this."

The second point is that the majority of parents see this as a *good* thing. It is just as important to that our children hold their religious, moral and political beliefs as their own, with personal conviction, as that their beliefs agree with ours. Most parents understand that personal conviction must be wrought in a process of honest, un-coerced inquiry, and that learning how to engage in this process is among the most important aspects of education. We want our children to acquire the tools of inquiry - critical thinking, democratic interaction, self-correction, etc. - in part so that our children will know that their value commitments can hold up and even become stronger, more meaningful in the process of inquiry.

Third, we believe it is important for children to learn about alternative views held by their friends and neighbors—including religious, moral and political views; and we believe there is no better context for this kind of understanding than a respectful, democratic dialogue characterized by inquiry and critical thinking. Indeed, we believe such an understanding of deep differences is part of the role of schools in democratic societies. Philosophy for Children does not aim at consensus, or in any way pressure the children to find agreement on contestable philosophical issues. It aims at helping children make sound personal judgments about such issues - judgments that are informed by the critical evaluation of alternative views.

Fourth, we know that children discuss religious, moral and political issues with each other in places where there is neither the structure of a philosophical inquiry, nor the guidance of a facilitator to shore up the fairness and reasonableness of the discussion. We know that children are bombarded with moral and political messages and images from the media and from peers, which only increases their desire and their need to critically inquire about these issues.

Finally, to restrict the scope of the children's philosophical questions undermines not only the Philosophy for Children program, but also the broader agenda of teaching for critical thinking and for democracy. To encourage our children to think critically and to ask penetrating questions about science and history, but not about religious, moral or political issues, gives the children confusing notions about the nature of thinking (e.g. that it only applies to certain topics) and the nature of these topics (e.g. that there is no such thing as holding religious, moral or political beliefs reasonably). It also conveys a lack of trust in our children's integrity, which is why we have seen children whose inquiry is artificially restricted from certain topics become resentful, and eventually lose their enthusiasm for thoughtful dialogue.

Parents who believe in their exclusive right to shape their children's moral beliefs will not find the above responses persuasive and should perhaps have the right to remove their children from philosophy sessions. But we believe that schools have a civic and a moral duty to try to persuade parents of the importance of open, rigorous philosophical inquiry, for their children's own sakes, as well as for the sake of our democratic society.



Philosophy for Young Children

Even young children have experiences with recognizable philosophical dimensions. They take delight in beauty, they feel concern and compassion for others, they resist what seems to be unfair, they play with language, they make judgments about good and bad. Engaging young children in philosophical activities and discussions is not, therefore, imposing something alien to their experience but a means to help them both enrich and make more sense of certain aspects of their experience. Traditional braches of academic philosophy have analogues in the experience of even young children:

Children's Questions	Academic Philosophy
• Is it beautiful? Is it ugly? Why? • Is it a good drawing? Why?	Aesthetics
• Is it good? Is it bad? Why? • Is it right? Is it wrong? Why? • Can a dog feel sad? • What is a friend? • Who is responsible? • What is love? What is hate?	Ethics & Moral Philosophy
• Is it real? Is it make-believe? How do we know? • What is a person? • What is life? What is death? • What is time? • Where do things come from? • What's the difference between boys and girls?	Metaphysics
• Do you agree? Does anyone disagree? Why? • What is a question? A reason? • How are things related? • What does it mean? • Can we imagine it differently?	Logic / Reasoning
• Is it fair? Is it unfair? Why? • Who should be in charge? • What belongs to me? • Who makes the rules?	Political & Legal Philosophy
• How do I know? • What is a mind? What kinds of things have minds? • What is true?	Epistemology & Philosophy of Mind

Moreover, through participating in thoughtful conversations, young children are quite capable of carrying out the basic logical operations of critical thinking such as:

- Asking a question
- Agreeing or disagreeing
- Giving a reason
- Offering a proposition, hypothesis or explanation
- Giving an example or counterexample
- Classifying/Categorizing
- Making a comparison:
  - Making a distinction
  - Making a connection
  - Making an analogy
- Offering a definition
- Identifying an assumption
- Making an inference
- Making a conditional statement ("if/then")
- Reasoning syllogistically
- Self-correcting
- Restating
- Entertaining different perspectives

(Each of these operations is explained in the essay "Helping children develop the skills & dispositions of critical, creative & caring thinking," in the Appendix of Readings.)

Nevertheless, for most groups of young children, philosophical inquiry must be somewhat different than it is for older children. Though Philosophy for Children does not subscribe to a particular psychological theory of children's development, it does recognize that children's cognitive and social capacities are in a process of development and habit formation and that children in any given P-1 classroom are likely to display a wide range of cognitive and social development. Philosophical engagement with young children should be playful and multi-sensory, and should aim to utilize or channel the children's impulsiveness toward cognitive and social growth.

In this section you will be introduced to a variety of materials for doing philosophy with young children so that you can select the materials and the approach most suitable to your children. The intention behind all of these materials is that young children be engaged with philosophical questions and develop habits of philosophical inquiry.

I. Standard P4C Texts for P-1

Curricula exists for establishing a standard community of philosophical inquiry in P-1 classrooms. These materials work best with children on a relatively high developmental level, i.e. children who are able to sit in a circle for 20-30 minutes at a time, take turns speaking, and ask each other questions.

- Ann Margaret Sharp: *The Doll Hospital* (novel) and *Making Sense of My World* (teacher manual) (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 2000).
- Ann Margaret Sharp: *Geraldo* (novel) and *Discovering Our Voice* (teacher manual) (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 2000).

Excerpt from *The Doll Hospital*, Chapter 1, episode 2, pp. 5-6

I talk to my doll all the time. Sometimes, when I'm unhappy, I go to my room and whisper to Roller. I explain to her what is happening, and she listens. After I've talked with her for a while, she understands. And I feel better too.

To me, Roller is like a real baby. She's my baby. She's a nice baby. She's a good baby. She's real. She's a real baby doll. She's real for me just like I am for my mother.

My sister doesn't agree with me. She says, 'You're always playing with that doll. Don't you know that dolls aren't real?'

'That's not true!' I yell. 'Dolls are real. Could I bathe her if she wasn't real? Could I name her if she wasn't real? Could I talk to her if she wasn't real? She's not just make-believe real. She's really real!'

My sister thinks she's so smart because she's ten years old. But a person could be ten years old and wrong.

Excerpt from *Making Sense of My World*, Chapter 1, p. 10
DISCUSSION PLAN: In what ways are dolls like people?

1. Can a doll take a bath?
2. Can a doll talk?
3. Can a doll cry?
4. Can a doll drink water?
5. Can a doll play?
6. Can a doll dance?
7. Can a doll be happy, or sad?
8. Can a doll be a friend?
9. Can a doll draw a picture?
10. Can a doll think?

11. Can a doll love someone else?
12. Can a doll have a pain?
13. Can a doll tell a lie?
14. Can a doll break a promise?
15. Can a doll be good?

II. Alternative P4C Texts for P-1

Thinking Trees & Laughing Cats. This curriculum consists of very short stories (one or two paragraphs) with accompanying discussion questions and philosophical activities. The stories are written with the understanding that they are to be used with puppets, which signal to children that they are entering a realm of wonder and imagination. Children are encouraged by this curriculum to engage in questioning (of themselves and of one another, as well as of the teacher) and giving reasons.

Excerpt from *Thinking Trees and Laughing Cats*
Story: Frog is my Friend
Concepts: Friends, living things

One day, Robin showed Sara a small green frog on his hand.

Robin said to Sara, "This frog is my friend."

Sara asked, "Why is this frog your friend?"

Robin thought a bit, then said, "Well, I played with this frog today. We hopped on the rock together. I think if we play together, we are friends—aren't we?"

"I'm not sure," Sara answered. "I played with a ball today. Does that mean the ball is my friend?"

Robin laughed and said, "How could a ball be your friend? Balls aren't alive!"

Sara said, "Do you think only living things can be friends?"

This made Robin stop and think. And after he thought, he said, "Yes, I think so. A thing can't be your friend if it isn't alive. Can it?"

Sara didn't answer right away. She looked down at the small green frog. She petted it gently.

"Well?" Robin said. Sara looked up at him. "I was just thinking about my doll, Harper," she said.

Things We Can Think About

Questions

1. Questions we can ask
   - We ask questions about the story.
   - We answer each other's questions.

2. Questions our teacher can ask
   - Can a book be my friend?
   - Can television be my friend?
   - Can an animal be my friend?
   - Can my mom be my friend?
   - Who is my friend?

Games We Can Play

1. Our teacher holds up a picture of a person/object and asks: "How can we make this our new friend?"
2. We go round the group and say: "That will be my friend if _____."
3. Our teacher can write our answers down.

We Draw and Paint to Show What We Mean

1. We all draw a picture of a friend.
2. We draw or say three reasons why it is our friend.

We Make Up a Story to Show What We Mean

1. Using the answers from Game I, we make up a story about how to make a new friend.
2. Once we have made up the story we draw pictures to go with it and make them into a picture book.
3. We retell the story using our picture book.

III. P-1 Philosophy Materials for Emergent Curriculum

Philosophy of Body Activity Kit. Schools using an emergent curriculum model can work philosophy into nearly any unit by finding ways to explore and discuss philosophical questions. IAPC faculty and students constructed a *Philosophy of Body Activity Kit* includes instructions and materials for activities involving movement, art, song and discussion, that explored questions such as:

Philosophy Branches	Application to Body
Aesthetics	• Are some bodies or parts of bodies beautiful/ugly? What makes them so? • Are the same bodies beautiful/ugly to everyone? • Can our bodies be art? • What do I hope my body will be like / able to do when I grow up?
Ethics & Moral Philosophy	• Are some bodies or parts of bodies good/bad? Why? • (How) should we take care of our bodies? • (How) should we respect our own bodies? • (How) should we respect others' bodies? • What is it good to do with our bodies? • What is it not good to do with our bodies?
Logic / Reasoning	• If we treat our bodies this way, what might happen? • What if my body were different? • If I had the eyes of a fly then …. • How is my doll's body different from mine? • Can you give me a reason for what you're saying? Is that a good reason?
Metaphysics	• Am I my body? • Does my body (cry, love, lie, imagine, get hungry, think, see, walk) or do I? • If I had a different body, would I be a different person? (If a person lost a leg, had a transplant, etc.) • Does everything have a body? • What can my body do on its own, and what does it have to learn to do? • Can part of a person's body be real and part be not real?
Political & Legal Philosophy	• Who is in charge of my body? • Does my body belong to me? • How many rules are there about my body? Are they good rules? Who made those rules?
Epistemology & Philosophy of Mind	• Are there things my body knows? Are they different from what my mind knows? • Can my body think? • Does everything that has a mind have a body? Does everything that has a body have a mind? • Where is my mind?

IV. Philosophy and Children's Literature.

Children's novels designed specifically for Philosophy for Children programs have the advantages of obvious philosophical themes and characters, including children, who model dialogue and inquiry. The IAPC recommends that parents, teachers and children new to philosophy or to dialogue begin with a philosophy curriculum. However, as sensitivity to philosophical themes and skill at philosophical dialogue are developed, other kinds of texts can be used, including stories the children bring to the classroom, current events, and children's literature. In choosing a children's book for use as a stimulus text for a philosophical discussion with young children, the following criteria are useful.

Theme: The book should present one or more philosophical themes such as those in the table above, whether directly or indirectly. Philosophical concepts are characterized by being *common* to all humans, *central* to human self-understanding, and *contestable*—i.e. not yielding one "right answer." A book could present one of these themes indirectly if it appears as an element in the plot, as present in the perspective of one or more of the characters in the narrative, or even as a passing element of dialogue within the narrative. All that is required is that it can be provoked and identified in some degree by reading and reflecting philosophically on the text. Since the concepts are contestable, they are typically provoked in the form of questions, since each concept represents, not so much a proposition as a question, or series of questions. The concept of knowledge, for example, suggests questions like: Is there a difference between knowing something and believing it? What is a fact? Are there different ways of knowing?

Dialogical Skills and Dispositions: A book has potential for stimulating philosophical dialogue if it contains elements of dialogue within it. These may be present in the plot, the characters, or the conversations within the narrative itself. Most effective for philosophical dialogue is a narrative which portrays two or more characters engaged in philosophical conversation. But dialogue can also be represented as between human and non-human characters, and even as non-linguistic interaction between humans and nature. The point is that there be some interaction which presents multiple points of view, in a way which models that interaction as neither avoiding contradiction nor presenting it as non-negotiable.

The list of further readings at the end of this chapter includes resources for using children's literature to engage young children in philosophical inquiry.

Teaching Philosophy to Adolescents

by Jacob Needleman[2]

The article excerpted here from Thinking *Vol. 3 reinforces the understanding of philosophy as a search for meaning, explains the special relevance of that search for adolescents, and outlines a number of important considerations for those engaging adolescents in philosophical inquiry. Additional resources are listed at the end of this chapter.*

In recent years, the crisis in American Education has been perceived in two fundamental ways. A great many critics, observing the apparent decline in the intellectual training of young people, have urged a movement "back to basics" in order to strengthen fundamental academic skills. Other observers have with similar urgency argued for a form of "character education," deploring the level of moral development in young people, their uncertainty and confusion about values and the meaning of living itself. All critics, however, agree in their anxiety about the preparation contemporary young people receive for life, as evidenced by the problems of drugs, cults, psychiatric disorders and crime.

Twenty years of teaching philosophy at the college level and nearly as many years studying the religious ferment of American youth, have convinced me that critics of modern education, almost without exception, have neglected an essential factor in their analyses: the role of philosophical ideas in both the intellectual and moral development of a normal human being. This neglect of the role of ideas in human development may be traced to the origins of modern psychology itself, which directed its attention almost exclusively to the emotional and sexual aspects of psychodynamics and which treated ideas as, in general, a by-product, result or even an epiphenomenon of what it took to be the more basic affective and instinctual components of the human structure.... But whatever the ultimate causes, ideas have not been considered essential to growth and human fulfillment.

I undertook the experiment of teaching philosophy to young people of high school age because my observation of college-age students, and other observations made under a variety of life conditions, convinced me that certain kinds of ideas correspond to a structural need in the human being. To put it in simple terms: there is an aspect of human nature, as organic and innate as anything postulated by modern psychology, that can only be nourished by the sort of "food" provided by universal ideas about [humanity] and [our] place in the cosmic scheme. Such ideas, when approached with the necessary guidance, support a specific activity of the human mind which might be characterized as "the need to ponder and question the meaning of human life and one's part in it." In the contemporary era, the lifting of emotional and sexual repression … has been accompanied by a hidden, but nevertheless effective repression … directed at [our] relationship to philosophical ideas.

One result of this repression … has been the turning of increasing numbers of young people to new religious movements, political ideologies and gurus of many kinds and many degrees of authenticity. Our system of education and social milieu has been turning out a nation of "philosophical illiterates," easy prey for teachings and teachers, ideologies and ideas, that come to them "from the street."… [T]he existence in young people of a deep need that has

[2] Excerpted with permission from *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4 (1982), 26-30.

gone unsatisfied in our culture … expresses itself in a particular sort of restlessness and vulnerability to ideas of all kinds dealing with ultimate questions.

I selected San Francisco University High School for my experiment…. Thirteen students registered for the course, the number that I suggested as a maximum to the administrative officers of the school. The class met three times a week at the end of the school day. Students were to be graded on a credit / no credit basis. I did not want grades to be an issue. I wanted the demand to come from the ideas themselves and the questions they evoked in the minds and hearts of the students…. Readings … included selections from Plato's Republic, … Schumacher's "Buddhist Economics," … and other brief readings. Numerous books were placed on library reserve and each student was asked to select one as his principle responsibility for the course….

From the outset of the course, and throughout the semester, I was struck by one overriding observation: philosophical questions come very naturally to young people of this age, but they do not recognize such questions as qualitatively distinct from all the other problems and questions which they face in their lives and in their academic work. I saw that it is not only fundamental ideas about [humanity] and the universe that are undervalued in our culture. Even more important is the corresponding failure of the social environment to honor the attitude of questioning that is normally evoked by such ideas.

What I therefore witnessed in these students was a process that takes place in every serious person at one time or another in his life, both in and outside of the academic environment: a process of intellectual separation in which one recognizes the asking of fundamental questions as the activity of one's own real self. In the contemporary academic environment, however, this process and this recognition is immediately covered over by premature demands to argue for points of view, solve problems, evaluate and construct theories, seek practical applications, or find conceptual and historical comparisons. In the non-academic environment it is also covered over by social and personal exigencies that demand immediate resolution, and indirectly through a cultural value system and implicit theory of human nature that emphasizes pleasure, achievement or conventional forms of service to others. The modern individual is irresistibly forced from an early age, to identify his "real self" with such elements of human nature as the need for affection, prestige, "belonging," etc. The subtle "taste" of philosophical self-interrogation, the sense that in some way this activity is the most intimate and authentic aspect of oneself, is obliterated….

The phrase "the meaning of life" is no joke to young people. There is a highly sensitive, delicate, but ineradicable yearning associated with this question. It is, however, easily bruised and suppressed by so-called "tough-mindedness" or by equally destructive "psychologizing" (as though the meaning of life had more to do with "getting along" than with why [humans] are on earth at all). This yearning has been severely suppressed in our culture and this suppression, as I have stated, is even more pathogenic than the suppression of sexual energy which the early psychoanalysts identified as the chief cause of neurosis …. There is a metaphysical neurosis that is more destructive than psychological neurosis, and more basic….

Very early on in the semester, I was able to communicate to my students that it was safe for them to ask ultimate questions. They were obviously helped in this by the perception that their instructor was also personally concerned with such questions. They eventually came to see the act of

philosophical pondering as a fully "grown-up" thing to do. At the same time, the ideas that were being presented—such as Plato's theory of the Forms, the Buddhist doctrine of the relativity of the ego, St. Augustine's distinction between time and eternity—were presented without much simplification. From the outset, therefore, students were faced with the juxtaposition of their own intimate questions about the meaning of life and a set of ideas of great power and difficulty. At first it was a struggle to keep the "question-making" aspect of the class from becoming a sort of personal rap-session. The presence of difficult and serious metaphysical ideas, however, had the ultimate effect of drawing the student's attention to the philosophical aspects of personal problems. Many were astonished to see that what they took to be personal problems were actually related to great issues that have been written about by great thinkers of all times.

My aim here was to instill in them a sense of participation in a larger scale of reality merely by the act of questioning at a certain level of humanly relevant abstraction. What is needed, I believe, in many of us, young and old, is a kind of faith in abstract reasoning—abstract, not in the sense of abstract mathematics or abstract logic, but in the sense that there are questions and ideas which abstract or separate out the perennial search for man for meaning, and which reflect the structural aspects of human nature which can be called "the love of wisdom."

Initially I took many wrong directions along these lines, however. For example, it took me quite a while to understand that the respect for philosophical questioning requires a very long time to take hold. Each day it had to be re-established practically from zero. There were many times when my effort to free the students from the "problem-solving" mentality resulted only in sort of amused passivity on their part. How to communicate the rigor of great ideas and great questions without at the same time provoking the psychological tension associated with fear of not succeeding according to external, social standards? … Eventually, I learned to measure their relationship to ideas on the basis of intangible factors such as postures, courtesy, tones of voice, silences—as well as on the basis of more obvious factors of individual content and work done on reading assignments. The love of wisdom does not always manifest itself through the instrumentality of the intellect.

Only after it was clear that, to some extent, the students were beginning to be "haunted" by philosophical questions did I begin to bring in questions of widespread current concern, such as the problem of war, ecology, the nature of the family, authority, sexuality, cults and drugs. By the term "haunted," I mean something very specific having to do with what I call the need to honor philosophical self-interrogation in our society. I wanted the students to be haunted by great ideas not in the sense of a debilitating or opinionated criticizing of life, but in the sense of an increased and expanded sensitivity of perception of themselves and their experience. In my opinion, great ideas are the first instrument of awareness; questioning of a certain kind is another word for awareness. As I see it, moral power begins with sensitivity of perception, and sensitivity of perception begins with real ideas that are brought to bear on the experiences of life. I do not think one can "teach virtue" in the contemporary world without encouraging the growth of perception…. I wanted these young people to be haunted by philosophy in the sense of being *attracted* more and more often to the feeling for great ideas and universal questions. I am not speaking here about merely thinking, intellectually, about abstruse issues. This kind of intellectualization has

shown itself to be morally powerless in human life and was justly derogated by modern psychology. On the other hand, the feeling for ideas and universal questions does, in my observation, have potentially immense moral power in an individual's life…. Egoistic impulses toward violence, fear, hatred, greed cannot be dissolved or mastered by the intellectual absorption of concepts, no matter how great …. Therefore, a [person] cannot become truly moral merely by amassing knowledge or by acquiring intellectual sophistication. A bridge is needed between the convictions of the intellect and the impulses of the body and emotions. This bridge is the feeling for truth which can be nourished by ideas that engender a certain quality of self-interrogation, of which the feeling of wonder is the most familiar example in our general experience.

Having repeatedly attempted to touch this feeling in the students—with respect to the relationship between great ideas and the details of personal life—I was ready to introduce discussion of issues of general widespread concern. In discussing the ecological crisis, for example, an extremely broad range of ideas was introduced—including the concept of nature as found in Christian thought, Platonic thought, Taoism, the Renaissance, Freud and modern science….

In short, the crises of the modern world were transformed from problems about what to do into questions about the understanding of reality and oneself. Seeing the questions behind the problems did not communicate a sense of helplessness. On the contrary, this effort tended to dissolve the subjective violence that accompanies the tense impulse to do something without deeply understanding the realities of a situation. I call that the beginning of a morality. A different sort of hope peeked through the surface from time to time: the hope that out of the work of serious questioning there could arise an understanding that could touch more of ourselves than the attractive theories and fashionable concepts which often prompt well-intentioned but hasty and immature action. Out of such an understanding, another quality of action might be possible, quieter but more effective because emanating from more of oneself….

It was the same with the problem of war. The tense urgency to engage in some action in order to "put an end to war," was balanced by pondering the awesome question of origins of war in human nature itself….

[A]ll these discussions [threw] considerable light on the need for a return to "gut-level" philosophical inquiry in the everyday life of contemporary [people]…. [T]his experiment in teaching philosophy in high school has proved to me both the possibility and the necessity for opening such issues to young people. I believe proposals by educators to introduce "values-clarification," or "character education" in the schools cannot go far without this component. In my judgment, the sense of wonder is the real, effective seed of moral perception and action. This sense of wonder needs to be nourished and developed because for most young people it, and it alone, represents the impulse toward truth and value that comes from within the depths of the individual him[- or her]self….

The sense of wonder grows not so much by the addition of information or theories, but by the awakening of questioning in the light of great ideas. Information about the world and [humanity] is necessary, but principally as material for pondering. Information and skills needed for functioning vocationally in the world must also be taught, but this aspect of education needs first to be separated to some extent from the aim of nourishing the seed of moral perception in the growing human being.

Further Resources for Chapter 3

Articles for Chapter 3 in Appendix of Readings:

- David Kennedy: "Helping children develop the skills & dispositions of critical, creative & caring thinking," *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 15, No. 1 (November 1994), 3-16.

Resources on Philosophy in Schools

- Eugenio Echeverra: "Teacher Education in Philosophy for Children," *Thinking* Vol. 18, No. 2 (2006), 19-23.
- Clinton Golding: "What is philosophy in schools?" *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2006).
- Lynne Hinton: "Reinventing a School," *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 11, No. 2 (October 2003).
- Laurance Splitter: "Teacher perspectives on Philosophy for Children – Part I," *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 2000).
- Laurance Splitter: "Teacher perspectives on Philosophy for Children – Part II," *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 8, No. 2 (October 2000).
- Michael Whalley: "Some Factors Influencing the Success of Philosophical Discussion in the Classroom," *Thinking* Vol. 4, Nos. 3-4 (1983), 2-5.
- Mary I. Yeazell: "What Happens to Teachers Who Teach Philosophy to Children?" *Thinking* Vol. 2, Nos. 3-4 (1981), 86-88.
- Thomas B. Yos: "Philosophizing with Mrs. Yoshida's Third Graders," *Thinking* Vol. 17, Nos. 1-2 (2004), 79-83.

Resources on Doing Philosophy with Young Children:

- Phil Cam, et al.: *Philosophy for Young Children: A Classroom Handbook* (Deakin West, Australian Capital Territory: Australian Curriculum Studies Association, Inc., 2007).
- Marie-France Daniel and Ann-Marie Michael: "Learning to Think and to Speak: An Account of an Experiment Involving Children Aged 3 to 5 in France and Quebec," *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* Vol. 15, No. 3 (2000), 17-25
- Joyce I. Fields: "Young children as emergent philosophers," *Early Child Development and Care* Vol. 107, No. 1 (1995), 57-59.
- David Kennedy: "Using 'Peter Rabbit' as a Philosophical Text with Young Children," in *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 13, No. 1 (November, 1992), 53-58.
- David Kennedy: "Young children's moves: emergent philosophical community of inquiry in early childhood discourse," in *Critical & Creative Thinking* Vol. 4, No. 2 (October 1996), 28-41.
- David Kennedy: "Young Children and Ultimate Questions: Romancing at Day Care," in Analytic Teaching Vol. 12, No. 1 (November, 1991), 59-64.
- Vicki Mackrill: "Philosophy for Children in Kinder and Prep," *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 3, No. 2 (October 1995).
- Gareth B. Matthews: *Philosophy and the Young Child* (Harvard University Press, 1980).
- Garreth Matthews "Thinking in Stories" column in *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children*, 1979 to present.
- Karin Murris: "Philosophy with Preliterate Children," *Thinking* Vol. 14, No. 4 (1999), 23-33.
- Schleifer, M., et al.: "The impact of philosophical discussions on moral autonomy, judgment, empathy and the recognition of emotion in 5 year

olds," *Thinking* Vol. 16, No. 4 (2003), 4-13.

- Peter Shea: "Offering a Frame to put Experience In: Margaret Wise Brown Presents Ideas as Opportunities to Very Young Children," *Thinking* Vol. 17, No. 3 (2004), 30-37.
- Laurance Splitter & Tim Sprod: *Places for Thinking* (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1999). This set of four picture books – On A Plain, In A Field, In A Tree, and On A Path – and accompanying teacher manual introduce philosophical thinking, dialogue and activities to children in the first four years of school.
- Tim Sprod: *Books into Ideas* (Melbourne: Hawker Brownlow Education, 1993). This book explains how to use children's literature as a basis for philosophical inquiry in primary to middle school classrooms.
- Barbara Tizard and Martin Hughes: "The Four Year Old Thinker," *Thinking* Vol. 6, No. 3 (1986), 1-21.
- Gerrard Vallone: "A Practical Guide to Fostering Critical Thinking in First Grade Through Graduate School Using Children's Literature, in Particular Picture Books," *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 24, No. 2 (April 2004), 78-85.
- "Philosophy for Kids" website by Dr. Thomas E. Wartenberg, Mt. Holyoke University contains philosophical questions sets for a number of popular children's picture books: www.mtholyoke.edu/omc/kidsphil

Resources on Doing Philosophy with Adolescents:

- Bertram Bandman: "The Adolescent's Rights to Freedom, Care and Enlightenment," *Thinking* Vol. 4, No. 1 (1982), 21-27.
- David Benjamin: "Philosophy in High School: What Does it All Mean?" *Thinking* Vol. 8, No. 4 (1990), 43-44.
- David A. Jopling: "The Coolest Subject on the Planet' How Philosophy Made its Way in Ontario's High Schools," *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 2001), 131-139.
- Louis Katzner and Frances Brent: "Philosophy and the Middle-School Student," *Thinking* Vol. 1, No. 2 (1979), 37-39.
- Sharon M. Kaye: "Dress Rehearsal for Life: Using Drama to Teach Philosophy to Inner-City High School Students," *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 2006) 1-7.
- May Leckey: "Philosophy for Children in the Middle Years of Schooling: Findings from a Year Seven Case Study," *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 2001), 106-126.
- Catherine McCall: *Thinking Adventures: A Book for High School Pupils* and *A Teacher's Guide to* Thinking Adventures (Scottish Executive Education Department 2006).
- Stephan Millett: "Philosophy in upper secondary school: an example from Western Australia," *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 14, No. 1 (May 2006).
- Jacob Needleman: "Teaching Philosophy to Adolescents," *Thinking* Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4 (1982), 26-30.
- Greg Smith: "An experience of introducing *Lisa* to secondary schoolteachers," *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 2, No. 2 (October 1994).
- Wendy C. Turgeon: "Reviving Ophelia: A Role for Philosophy in Helping Young Women Achieve Selfhood," *Thinking* Vol. 13, No. 1 (1997), 2-4.

- Mark Weinstein: “Teaching Ethics in Secondary School,” *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 4, No. 2 (November 1982).
- Mark Weinstein: “A Critical Thinking Framework for Democracy,” *The High School Magazine* (April 2000).
- John M. Whiteley: “Exploring Moral Action in the Context of the Dilemmas of Young Adulthood,” *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 20, No. 1 (November 1999), 4-25.



Chapter 4: Assessing Philosophy for Children

Introduction

Two kinds of assessment are important to the practice of Philosophy for Children: self-assessment conducted by communities of children and adolescents doing philosophy, and external assessment *of* those communities, conducted by teachers and by others who are not part of those communities. There are a number of reasons for conducting each kind of assessment, and the nature of a particular assessment activity should be determined by the specific purposes for which it is intended. In P4C assessment, form follows function.

External Assessment

Why should the community of inquiry be assessed by people external to it? There are two categories of external assessment, each having particular purposes. *Summative assessment* is conducted at the end of a program our course, to measure final outcomes. Final course examinations and workshop evaluations are examples. Hundreds of studies, including formal and informal or "action" research, have been conducted on classrooms that practice philosophy regularly, in order to measure the effectiveness of that practice for outcomes such as improved thinking skills, reading skills, social skills, and even grades. While some of this research has provided important insights that helped develop the theory and practice of Philosophy for Children, much of it has been conducted for the purpose of satisfying parents, administrators, legislators, community members, teachers and students that doing philosophy regularly is worth the time and effort it requires – an important purpose, to be sure. The IAPC regularly evaluates its work with particular schools, and collaborates with teachers and researchers in more extensive formative assessments of Philosophy for Children for both of these purposes.

Formative assessment is conducted in the midst of a program or course, to determine how well it is going (what the participants are gaining), and how it might be improved before it is finished. The practice of Philosophy for Children requires that facilitators periodically assess their students' abilities in philosophical inquiry, in order to reconstruct their own facilitation techniques and strategies, to better accommodate the students' growth. For instance, it may have escaped a facilitator's notice, until an assessment is conducted, that many of her students are struggling with a particular kind of reasoning, which she can help them to practice with targeted exercises.

The form of an external assessment should be determined by the purposes it's meant to fulfill, which are usually a clear indication of the value Philosophy for Children is seen to have in a particular setting:

- Should students be assessed individually or collectively, i.e. how they function as a community?
- Will the students be assessed as to their critical, creative and/or caring thinking?

- Will the students be assessed as to their civic, social, and/or emotional, character?
- What will be the consequences of a teacher's being assessed as a P4C facilitator?
- Is P4C being evaluated as a means to other educational ends such as subject competencies, grades, or performance on standardized tests?

The IAPC has designed a number of instruments (see below) for P4C facilitators to conduct external assessments of their students:

- Reflection on Philosophy Session
- Primary Grades Philosophy Guided Observation
- Middle & High School Philosophy Guided Observation

In addition to these assessments—which should only be conducted by people with knowledge and experience in Philosophy for Children—the IAPC has designed the following external assessment instruments, which require no special knowledge of P4C:

- New Jersey Test of Reasoning Skills (not included in this *Handbook*)
- Philosophy in Schools Evaluation Study (student and teacher surveys)
- P4C Workshop Evaluation

Self-Assessment

While external assessment is an important means of improving the quality of P4C practice, self-assessment is part of the practice itself. The community of inquiry is designed to facilitate individual and collective growth through self-correction, which requires that participants become aware of (assess) and improve their own inquiry skills and outcomes. Good inquiry involves taking the time to conduct meta-level inquiry (inquiry about the inquiry), to pay attention to the quality of the inquiry and to judge how to improve it. The IAPC has designed a number of instruments (see below) for students to conduct community self-assessments.

- Early Childhood Philosophy Self-Assessment
- Primary Grades Philosophy Self-Assessment
- Primary Grades "Fishbowl" Observation Guide
- Middle & High School Philosophy Self-Assessment

The ideal of self-correction is important for P4C facilitators as well – for those with many years of experience as well as for those new to the practice. Because it is nearly impossible to assess one's own facilitation strengths and weaknesses during an actual philosophy session one is facilitating, it is important for the facilitator to take time apart from these sessions to reflect on, and if possible observe her facilitation skills, e.g. by means of a video recording. A facilitator may discover, for instance, that while she is adept at helping her students draw out the assumptions and implications of their ideas, she often neglects to help them connect to each other's ideas. The IAPC has designed two instruments (see below) for facilitator self-assessment, both meant to be used in dialogue with a P4C coach or peer facilitator:

- Reflection on Philosophy Session
- Guided Self-Observation of Philosophy Facilitation

P4C Assessment Calendar

The IAPC recommends that external and self-assessments be scheduled with regularity in P4C classrooms:

- Weekly:
  - Philosophy self-assessment by students
  - Reflection on philosophy session by facilitator
- Monthly or Bi-Monthly:
  - Guided observation of philosophy session by facilitator
  - Guided self-observation of philosophy facilitation
- Yearly:
  - Philosophy in Schools Evaluation Study (student and teacher surveys) by P4C Center

Philosophy for Children Assessment Calendar and Instruments

		Instruments for Young Children	**Instruments for Primary School**	**Instruments for Middle & High School**
Weekly	**Student self-assessment**	Philosophy Self-Assessment for Young Children *pg. 52*	Philosophy Self-Assessment for Primary School; Primary School "Fishbowl" Observation Guide *pg. 53, 54*	Philosophy Self-Assessment for Middle & High School; "Fishbowl" Observation Guide *pg. 55, 54*
	Facilitator reflection on philosophy session	Facilitator Reflection on Philosophy Session *pg. 58*		
Monthly	**Facilitator observation of recorded philosophy session**	Pre- and Primary School Philosophy Observation Guide *Pg. 56*		Middle & High School Philosophy Guided Observation *pg. 57*
	Facilitator self-assessment	Philosophy Facilitator Self-Assessment Guide *pg. 59, 60*		
Yearly	**Student survey**	Philosophy for Children Student Survey *pg. 61*		
	Teacher survey	Philosophy for Children Teacher Survey *pg. 63 – 66*		
	External Evaluation study	(Instruments for data gathering to be determined according to purpose of the evaluation study)		

Philosophy Self-Assessment for Young Children

Choose two or three questions from the list of Formative Self-Assessment Questions to ask the class at the end of each philosophy session. Have them show thumbs up for positive response and thumbs down for negative, and ask them to comment. Choose at least one question regarding something the children have done well, and one regarding something the children need to work on. Repeat the latter question(s) for a few weeks in a row so that the children understand they are meant to improve over time.

Facilitate a longer self-evaluation about once a month using several of the questions from the list of Summative Self-Assessment questions. Ask the children to remember when they began having philosophy time and how it used to be or show a video of one of their first philosophy sessions so they can assess their progress.

Formative Self-Assessment Questions	Summative Self-Assessment Questions
1. Were we sitting in a circle today?	1. Are we better at sitting in a circle now than we were before?
2. Were we listening to each other today?	2. Are we listening to each other more now than we were before?
3. Did a lot of people get to talk today or only a few people?	3. Are more of us talking now than before?
4. Were we taking turns today?	4. Are we better at taking turns now than we were before?
5. Did we think a lot today?	5. Are we thinking more/better now than we were before?
6. Was our thinking interesting?	6. Is our thinking more interesting now than before? Do we think about more interesting things?
7. Did we give (good) reasons today?	7. Are we giving more/better reasons now than before?
8. How did we treat each other today?	8. Are we treating each other more kindly now than we were before?
9. Did we ask (good) questions today?	9. Are we asking more/better questions now than before?
10. Did we think something new today? Did we have any new ideas today?	10. Are we having more new ideas now than we used to?
11. Was our philosophy time today interesting/important?	11. Is our philosophy time more interesting/important now than it used to be?

Philosophy Self-Assessment for Primary School

Choose several questions from the list of Formative Self-Assessment Questions to ask the class at the end of each philosophy session. Have them show thumbs up for positive response and thumbs down for negative, and ask them to comment. Choose some questions regarding something the students have done well, and some regarding something they need to work on.

Facilitate a longer self-evaluation about once a month using several of the questions from the list of Summative Self-Assessment questions. Ask the students to remember when they began having philosophy time or show a video of one of their first philosophy sessions so they can assess their progress.

Formative Self-Evaluation Questions	Summative Self-Evaluation Questions
1. Were we listening to each other today?	1. Are we listening to each other more now than we were before?
2. Did most of us talk today or only a few people?	2. Are more of us talking now than before?
3. Did we think deeply today or did our thinking stay on the surface?	3. Are we thinking more deeply now than we were before?
4. Did we give good reasons today?	4. Are we giving more/better reasons now than before?
5. Were we respectful in our disagreements today?	5. Are we treating each other more respectfully now than we were before?
6. Did we ask good questions today?	6. Are we asking more/better questions now than before?
7. Did we make connections with each other's ideas today?	7. Are we connecting with each other's ideas more now than we used to?
8. Did we consider many different points of view today?	8. Are we getting better at considering different points of view fairly?
9. Were we able to stick to the point today?	9. Are we more able to stick to the point now than we were before?
10. Did we make any progress with our questions today? What do we understand now that we didn't before?	10. Are we making more progress on our questions now than we used to?
11. Did I change my mind or have a new idea today?	11. Are we more willing to change our minds for good reasons, than we used to be?
12. Was our philosophy time today interesting/important?	12. Is our philosophy time more interesting/important now than it used to be?

Primary School "Fishbowl" Observation Guide

The class is divided into two groups: an inner circle conducting a philosophical dialogue, and an outer circle observing them. When the dialogue is finished, the observers report their observations.

--Evaluate the Dialogue--

1. When did you see caring for others or respect for their opinions?

2. What were some examples of deep thinking taking place?

3. What were some thoughtful questions that were asked?

4. When did you see people making connections with each other's ideas?

--Evaluate Yourself--

5. Were you being a thoughtful, respectful observer?

6. Did you do your best? Yes No I'm not sure

Write any comments about the session here.

Philosophy Self-Assessment for Middle & High School

Select one or two questions from each category. Students may respond by showing thumbs-up or thumbs-down and giving reasons, or in writing. Alternatively, a group of students may be designated to observe the dialogue and report on these questions when the dialogue is finished.

Cognitive Dimension of Inquiry

- Were we reasoning well? (clarifying, asking for and offering reasons, making careful inferences, identifying assumptions, offering definitions, using criteria, making good distinctions)
- Were we thinking creatively? (making metaphors, using images, trying out other points of view, thinking of new possibilities, extending ideas, transferring old forms to new contexts)
- Did our discussion open up the topic? Was it deep or superficial? Did we construct a rich, complex understanding of the texts?
- Is there evidence of self-correction? (accepting criticism, correcting thinking mistakes, noticing missing points of view, changing one's mind, revising one's position)

Social Dimension of Inquiry

- Did we share control/management of the discussion, or did the teacher or a dominant clique control/manage it?
- Did most of us contribute to the conversation, or did a few people dominate?
- Did we work for inclusion—bringing in minority voices?
- Did we give all opinions equal intellectual consideration?
- Were we actively listening to each other? (looking at each other instead of the teacher, paraphrasing, asking follow-up questions, avoiding side conversations)?
- Were we responding to each other (rather than just taking turns speaking; relating what we say to what has been said before)?
- Were we respectful of each other? (responding, polite tone of voice and word choice, lack of aggression, insult and dismissal, avoiding making the discussion too personal, challenging others respectfully)
- Were we caring of each other? (helping a timid person make his point, getting to know each other well enough to know what is important to each of us)

Inquiry Outcomes

- Did the inquiry advance? What kinds of progress were there? (new connections, distinctions, definitions)
- Did we think of ways to test our hypotheses in experience?
- What have we learned?
- What new questions can we now ask, that we couldn't before?
- Was the discussion relevant and meaningful to us?

Pre- and Primary School Philosophy Observation Guide[1]

Student's Name _____ Grade____ Date_____

	With prompt	Without prompt
1. Asking a question		
2. Agreeing or disagreeing		
3. Giving a reason		
4. Offering a proposition, hypothesis or explanation		
5. Giving an example or counterexample		
6. Classifying/ Categorizing		
7. Making a comparison:		
Making a distinction		
Making a connection		
Making an analogy		
8. Offering a definition		
9. Identifying an assumption		
10. Making an inference		
11. Making a conditional statement (if/then)		
12. Reasoning syllogistically		
13. Self-correcting		
14. Restating		
15. Entertaining different perspectives		
16. Listening attentively to others		
17. Inviting others to speak		
18. Showing respect or care for others		
19. Accepting fair criticism		
20. Revising own opinion		

[1] Adapted from "Helping children develop the skills and dispositions of critical, creative and caring thinking," by Dr. David Kennedy, introduction to *Thinking Trees and Laughing Cats* © 2003 IAPC, reproduced in Appendix.

Middle & High School Philosophy Observation Guide

Class _____ Grade_____ Date_____

Cognitive Dimension of Inquiry	With prompt	Without prompt
1. Did the group reason well? (asking for and offering reasons, making careful inferences, identifying assumptions, offering definitions, using criteria, making good distinctions)		
2. Was the group thinking creatively? (Making metaphors, using images, trying out other points of view, thinking of new possibilities, extending ideas, transferring old forms to new contexts)		
3. Was the topic opened up? Was it deep or superficial? Was a rich, complex understanding of the texts constructed?		
4. Was there evidence of self-correction? (accepting criticism, correcting thinking mistakes, noticing missing points of view, changing one's mind, revising one's beliefs/values)		

Social Dimension of Inquiry	With prompt	Without prompt
5. Was control/management of the discussion shared, or did the teacher or a dominant clique control/manage it?		
6. Did most of the people contribute to the conversation, or did a few people dominate?		
7. Did the group work for inclusion—bringing in minority voices?		
8. Did the group give all opinions equal intellectual consideration?		
9. Was there active listening to each other? (eye contact, looking at each other instead of the teacher, paraphrasing, asking follow-up questions, without side conversations)?		
10. Did the group responding to each other (rather than just taking turns speaking; relating what we say to what has been said before)?		
11. Did the group respect each other? (responding, polite tone of voice and word choice, lack of aggression, insult and dismissal, avoiding making the discussion too personal)		
12. Was there evidence of caring for each other? (helping a timid person make his point, getting to know each other well enough to know what is important to each of us)		

Inquiry Outcomes	With prompt	Without prompt
13. Did the inquiry advance? What kinds of progress happened?		
14. Did the group construct ways to test hypotheses in experience?		

Facilitator Reflection on Philosophy Session

Name(s):_____ Grade: _____

School: _____ Date: _____

Curriculum used (novel, chapter & episode):_____

Please check one (or more) of the following steps of P4C methodology as the focus of this reflection and write questions for your philosophy coach / group (use extra space as needed).

☐ **Step One: The Stimulus** (reading or acting out the text)

☐ **Step Two: The Agenda** (Generating and organizing discussion questions)

☐ **Step Three: The Dialogue**

- ☐ **Social** (Safe place, collaboration, even participation)
- ☐ **Reasoning** (Clarifying, staying relevant, using arguments & evidence)
- ☐ **Tracking the Dialogue** (Knowing how we got here & where we're going)
- ☐ **Maintaining Philosophical Focus** (Concepts are common, central & contestable)
- ☐ **Using the Manuals** (Exercised, discussion plans, activities)

☐ **Step Four: The Assessment** (How did we do? What did we learn?)

Philosophy Facilitator Self-Assessment Guide

Directions: On the following page, make tally marks in each box next to the interventions described as you observe them in the recording of your philosophy. When you are finished, count the marks. Notice whether you are stronger at "community" interventions or "inquiry" interventions. Notice kinds of interventions you perhaps made too frequently, not frequently enough, or not at all. Discuss the results with your philosophy coach. Choose no more than a few kinds of interventions to work on next time.

Philosophy Facilitator Self-Assessment Guide

	Community		Inquiry	
	Connections	Inclusion	Reasoning	Structure
Priority 1	Asked for agreement and disagreement	Reminded of, and enforced procedures	Named Moves	Asked participants how their comments are relevant
		Did not tolerate aggression or disrespect	Asked for possible answers	Focused on one hypothesis at a time
		Helped kids be brief	Restated or asked participant to clarify confusing comments	
Priority 2	Asked how comments are related to the previous	Let students pass	Asked for reasons for and against the possible answer	Asked where we are
	Asked participants to identify who said what	Asked for and prioritized new participants	Identified or submitted alternative views	Identified the direction of the line of reasoning
		Asked if anyone had a different idea	Asked if that is true	
Priority 3	Had students look at the person whose comments they were addressing	Called on students who hadn't spoken	Asked what was being assumed	Identified or asked a particpant to identify the direction of the line of reasoning
			Asked for evidence in support of or against possible answers	
			Asked what follows	
Assessment	Assess as a group (Listening, Building)	Assessed as a group (Respecting, Participation)	Assessed as a group (Critical Thinking, Creative Thinking)	Assessed as a group (Organization, Progress)

Philosophy for Children Student Survey

1. What did you like best about philosophy?

2. What did you like least about philosophy?

3. Has philosophy made any difference in your thinking?

4. What have you learned in philosophy time?

5. Have you used anything you learned in philosophy outside of philosophy time?

6. How would you explain to a stranger what philosophy is?

7. What were some of the most interesting questions you discussed in philosophy?

8. What more would you like to learn about philosophy?

9. How did your teacher or philosophy coach help the class do philosophy?

10. Do you want to keep doing philosophy? Why or why not?

Philosophy for Children Workshop Evaluation

Please help us to improve our workshops for teachers in Philosophy for Children by answering the following questions:

1. What were the most helpful aspects of this workshop?

2. What were the least helpful aspects of this workshop?

3. How might this workshop have been improved so as to meet your needs better?

4. What interests you most about starting to practice Philosophy for Children in your classroom?

5. What are your biggest concerns about starting to practice Philosophy for Children in your classroom?

6. What else would you like to say about this workshop?

Philosophy for Children Teacher Survey

Instructions: *The purpose of this survey is to get your help in evaluating the IAPC's Philosophy in Schools program. For each of the open-ended questions, please type responses in the space provided. Use as much space as necessary for you to fully discuss your comments. Please follow instructions for other types of questions. You will need to save this document on your computer, complete it, and attach it to a reply email. Thanks in advance for your help.*

A. Describing your P4C experience.

Where did you practice P4C: what grade and in what context (e.g. whole class, pull-out group, after-school club)?

What IAPC curriculum and/or other stimulus material did you use?

In what ways was your IAPC coach helpful or unhelpful to your P4C practice?

Please describe a memorable incident that happened during your P4C practice, e.g. something a child said or did, that shows something positive or negative about the program.

B. Impressions about philosophy

5. How would you explain to a parent what philosophy is?

6. What would you still like to learn about philosophy?

C. Evaluation of the program

Instructions: Please put an **X** in the appropriate box for each item, and <u>type any comments</u> you have in the spaces provided.	**Strongly Disagree**	**Disagree**	**Neutral**	**Agree**	**Strongly Agree**
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
P4C helped me improve my own communication skills with my students.					
P4C helped me improve my own thinking skills.					
P4C was usually boring.					
P4C helped me explore philosophical issues for myself.					
P4C helped me discuss many topics with my students.					
P4C sometimes gives children the chance to bring up topics they should not discuss in school, e.g. sex & religion.					
The IAPC Curriculum is difficult to use.					
P4C helped my students improve their thinking and inquiry skills.					
My P4C Coach was effective with my students.					
My P4C Coach helped me learn how to practice P4C.					
P4C helped me get to know and appreciate my students better.					
P4C helped my students improve their social and communication skills.					
P4C is not that different from other curriculum programs.					
P4C helped my students find/make meaning, make more sense of their experience, etc.					
Comments:					

1. Would you say that your experience with Philosophy for Children has had any effect on the ways you work with children in other contexts? If so, please explain.

2. Has your practice of Philosophy for Children given you any different impressions or understandings about the children you work with, either individually or in general? If so, please elaborate.

3. What kinds of preparation or support did you not receive, that you would have wanted, in learning to practice Philosophy for Children?

4. What, if any, other effects (positive or negative) has your learning and practice of P4C had on you, personally or professionally?

D. Anonymous Self-Evaluation

Instructions: Please put an **X** in the appropriate box for each item, and type any comments you have in the spaces provided.	**Strongly Disagree**	**Disagree**	**Neutral**	**Agree**	**Strongly Agree**
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
I have a good understanding of the nature and purposes of Philosophy for Children.					
I have read most of the background reading on the program provided to me.					
I am able to facilitate philosophical dialogue with my students.					
I am able to help students create the agendas for our dialogues.					
I am able to recognize philosophical issues and to help my students focus on philosophical issues.					
I am able to help my students think critically and creatively during our dialogues.					
I am able to help my students appreciate multiple perspectives on the topics we discuss.					
Most students participate in the dialogue when I facilitate.					
I am able to help my students respond to each other and build from what others have said.					
I am able to use the IAPC Curriculum, including the novels and the manuals.					
I have taken full advantage of my P4C Coach in learning how to practice P4C.					
My students and I usually feel that we are getting somewhere or making progress in our philosophical dialogues.					
Comments:					

E. Interest in future participation

Instructions: Please put an **X** in the appropriate box for each item, and type any comments you have in the spaces provided.	**Strongly Disagree**	**Disagree**	**Neutral**	**Agree**	**Strongly Agree**
My willingness to continue participating in P4C is affected by the following factors:	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Personal interest; chance for personal development					
Release time from teaching or other responsibilities					
Ability to get books and other support materials					
University credit					
Professional development credit					
Encouragement from school administrators or colleagues					
Involvement of the IAPC staff or others with P4C experience					
Periodic refresher and enhancement workshops					
Other factors (please specify):					

What would you still like to learn about Philosophy for Children?

Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey, and for the opportunity to work with you and your students.

Further Resources on Assessing Philosophy for Children

- Felix Garcia-Moriyon, Irene Rebollo and Roberto Colom: "Evaluating Philosophy for Children: A Meta-Analysis," *Thinking* Vol. 17, No. 4 (2005), 14-22.
- Chinmei Lien: "Making Sense of Evaluation of Philosophy for Children," *Thinking* Vol. 17, Nos. 1-2 (2004), 73-78.
- Tock Keng Lim: "Evaluation of the Philosophy for Children project in Singapore," *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 2, No. 2 (October 1994).
- Tock Keng Lim: "How to evaluate Philosophy for children," *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 1998).
- Joseph Little: "Student Responses to a questionnaire about their philosophy program," *Thinking* Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4 (1982), 47-49.
- Kenneth A. Meehan: "Evaluation of a Philosophy for Children Project in Hawaii," *Thinking* Vol. 8, No. 4 (1990), 20-23.
- John Niklasson, Ragmar Ohlsson and Monika Ringborg: "Evaluating Philosophy for Children," *Thinking* Vol. 12, No. 4 (1996), 17-23.
- Reznitskaya, Alina; "Empirical Research in Philosophy for Children: Limitations and New Directions," *Thinking* Vol. 17, No. 4 (2005), 4-13.
- Virginia C. Shipman: "Evaluation of the Philosophy for Children Program--Final Report," Thinking Vol. 5, No. l (1983), 45-57.
- Mark Weinstein: "The Philosophy of Philosophy for Children: An Agenda for Research," *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 9, No. 1 (November 1989).

Chapter 5: Philosophy for Children Start-Up Kit

Introduction

by James Heinegg

Facilitating a P4C session can be deceptively difficult. While the facilitator does not bear the same burden of "filling up" the time that a lecturer does, the orchestration required in moderating dialogue among others can be daunting. The purpose of this "Start-Up Kit" is to provide P4C facilitators with exercises, discussion plans, and activities which focus on particular aspects of developing a new philosophical community of inquiry.

The Kit is therefore divided into three sections. **Philosophy**: Activities that would assist a group in understanding what philosophy is—e.g., what is a philosophical question as opposed to other kinds of questions?; **Community**: Community-building activities that do not necessarily have any explicit connection to philosophical dialogue—e.g., passing a Koosh or Nerf ball around just to generate interaction/interdependence among students; and **Inquiry**: Activities that help students understand what dialogical inquiry is (as distinct from debates, chats, etc.)

It may be that it is impossible to completely separate these elements—inquiry is to some extent tied into the notion of philosophy, for example—but the group may nonetheless profit from trying to work on one skill or concept without being concerned with the others. The Kit is designed as a resource for those times when a facilitator—novice or expert—chooses to work on a single aspect of the philosophical community of inquiry.

This Kit is a work in progress, so please give us feedback about what works, what suggestions you have, and what new activities you have created.

Section I: Philosophy

What is a philosophical question? This question itself, of course, is a philosophical question. One difficulty which P4C facilitators often encounter is how to help participants in a community of inquiry understand what makes a question philosophical.

One way of understanding this issue is that of Philosophy as the "Mother of the Disciplines." Philosophy is sometimes understood as the field in which we explore questions for which we do not yet have an accepted procedure for investigation. Once there is an established way of addressing a question, the question is now a part of another discipline—physics, psychology, etc. We have established scientific procedures for investigating and explaining what makes the sky appear blue to us, but the procedures for exploring whether an action is good or bad are still somewhat fuzzy and undefined.

While this may help us as facilitators, however, it is not clear how we might explore this with a P4C group. The following exercises are designed to help groups work on the skill of developing philosophical questions.

1. Exercise: "Question Types"

Author: Joe Oyler
Ages: Primary School (easily adapted for younger and older students)
Purposes: To help students recognize different types of questions.
Directions: Say what type of question you think each of the following questions is. Some of the different types you may come up with are, scientific, historical, personal, motivational, wonder, etc. It may help to think about what you would need to do to answer each question. Feel free to come up with your own types. Then think of which of the questions would be best for our Philosophy Circle.

1. How many miles can a car travel on a tank of gas?
2. What time is it?
3. Where are our thoughts?
4. Which way to the market?
5. May I have another?
6. Why do people dress differently?
7. Why do people get angry?
8. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it does it still make a sound?
9. Who was the first US President?
10. Are my dreams real?
11. How many languages do people speak in India?
12. What is the difference between a Cat and a Dog?

2. Exercise: "Philosophical Questions"

Author: Joe Oyler
Purposes: To help students recognize different types of *philosophical* questions.
Ages: Primary School (easily adapted for younger and older students)

Introduction (related to students):

There are many kinds of philosophical questions, but here are four of the most common kinds:

- Questions about meaning—about what things mean or what we mean
- Questions about right and wrong, or what *should* be the case
- Questions about how we can know things—about the difference between knowing, believing and thinking
- Questions about reality—what exists, what can't exist, what is real

Often questions that don't seem to be philosophical can be changed into philosophical questions, by asking, "Can this question be turned into a question about the meaning of something, or about what is right and wrong, or about how we can know something, or about what exists or what is real?"

For example, the question, "How many of us have sisters," can be changed to, "What is a sister?" or "What does it mean to be a sister?" The question, "Who owns that dog?" Can be changed to questions like, "What does it mean to own something?" "Are there things that can't be owned?" "Are there things that shouldn't be owned?" and "If I own a pet, do I own it in the same way I own a ball?"

Notice that philosophical questions usually apply to many cases or people, rather than to individuals.

Now you try. Change the following questions into philosophical questions:

1. What time is it?
2. Why did she hit her friend?
3. Is that true?
4. Why do you like him?
5. Is that real?
6. Why does she treat her pet like a person?
7. What's the rule about that?

3. Exercise: "What is a Question?"

Author: Stephanie Burdick
Ages: Pre-School and early Primary School
Purposes: To introduce the topic of questions and who can answer them; to help students practice asking questions of each other, rather than only of the facilitator; to help students practice taking turns speaking.
Directions: Facilitator has a list of all students' names. When she begins the lesson she says, "I have a story that I would like to tell you, are you ready to listen?"

One day (first student name) had a question and he didn't know the answer to it so he went and asked (second student name) but she didn't know the answer so she went and asked (third student name) she didn't know the answer either so she went and asked (fourth student name) and etc. until the entire class is finished.

Things to talk about afterwards:

- We think of questions as a group and ask them to one another
- What is a question?
- Who can answer our questions?
- If a person has one question and asks one person for the answer, how many answers will she get? If a person has one question and asks two people for the answer how many answers will she get? If a person has one question and asks three people for the answer how many answers will she get?

Modifications:

Students may enjoy asking their own questions (silly questions are OK). An easy way to do this is to have the 'question' be represented by a penny. As each student's name is read, she can hold the penny and when the story goes, "and she didn't know the answer so she asked, (next student name)" she can take the penny to the next student and ask a question aloud. The second student should answer and be given the penny to hold until the next student's name is read.

4. Exercise: "Ask Me a Question"

Author: Toby Yost
Ages: Pre-School and early Primary School
Purposes: To help students practice asking different kinds of questions; to help them practice taking turns.
Directions: Facilitator writes these words on pieces of paper or on the board: How, What, When, Where, Why, Who. Facilitator says, "I'm an elephant; ask me a question using these words." After some discussion, the facilitator says, "Now I'm a tree …." "Now I'm a rock …." Later the students may take turns saying "I'm a _____, ask me a question."

Section II: Community

While Cooperative Learning, Team Building, and Group Projects have been accepted to some extent into modern schooling, education is still seen to be primarily an individual venture. It is therefore sometimes worthwhile for a P4C group to focus on the community-building aspect of the philosophical community of inquiry. The following activities are designed to help students improve their ability to work together with others, and to rely on each other rather than expecting all of their activity to be mediated through the teacher.

4. Exercise: "What is Stu to Do?"[1]

Author: Stephanie Burdick
Ages: Pre-School and early Primary School
Purposes: To model correct community behavior in a community of inquiry.
Directions: Facilitator brings in a cardboard cut-out of "Stu the Philosophy Student" shown in a seated position. Stu is missing his ears, heart, eyes, mouth and arms. Facilitator has alternatives for these parts that can be affixed to Stu, as follows: open and closed mouths, open and closed eyes, open and closed ears, arm with hand up, arm with hand in lap, happy and sad hearts.

Facilitator reads this poem (younger students like it read again and again):

There once was a boy named Stu,
Who didn't know what to do.
He had so many parts—
Arms, ears, eyes, and heart.
His mouth was always—walking?
His arms were always—talking?
His ears just did not have a clue.
Oh what, oh what is poor Stu to do?

Facilitator then introduces Stu and students quickly begin saying, "Stu doesn't have eyes!" "Stu doesn't have ears!" Facilitator can then say, "If Stu was in a philosophy circle what kind of eyes would he have?" Students may need choices given to them or may say outright. Facilitator should ask why, and attempt to elicit a critical response. This lesson may be done part by part or (and this seems to work better) students 'build' Stu for the first lesson and then lessons afterwards can focus on specific parts and a more critical inquiry into ears, or eyes, or mouths. Stu can be a reference for much of the year as a model of good community behavior.

[1] Adapted from Thomas E. Jackson, et al.: "Philosophy for Children: The Pre-School Project," undated, unpublished manuscript.

5. Exercise: "Telephone"

Author: Stephanie Burdick
Ages: All ages
Purposes: To practice careful listening and reaching a community goal.
Directions: All participants should be seated quietly in a circle. Because the focus is on listening, stress the fact that everyone needs to be very still and quiet as the message travels around the circle (it's easy to get impatient during this game with a large group). The first few times this game is played, the facilitator should think of a message to begin the game (later, the students will want to come up with their own). It's best to begin with something simple and easy to remember, for example, "Alligators like alphabet soup." Cup your hands and whisper this message to the person seated next to you. It's OK for them to ask their neighbor to repeat the message—just make sure that no one whispers out of turn. The last one in the circle chain says the message out loud and then the community can compare it with the first message. If the message is incredibly jumbled or is totally different, perhaps you can have a dialogue about what happened as the message traveled around. If this happens, the students are usually excited to try it again. Adjust the level of difficulty accordingly or have the students make one up.

6. Activity: "One of Many"

Ages: All ages
Purposes: To practice cooperation.
Directions: This activity works best with groups of ten to fifteen players. Each group selects one to be the first player, who secretly chooses a group project and begins acting out an activity related to it. As other players think they

understand the nature of the project, they join in, one at a time, acting out other parts of the project. An example is planting a garden: first player rakes leaves into piles, second player hoes, etc. Notes:

- This group interaction should create flow and energy. Repeat the game until this takes place or end it if this does not happen.
- Players should not hesitate to take part for fear of being "wrong" about the project, since they will discover that many players had differing ideas about the nature of the group project.
- Even if the playing area is chaotic, with everyone moving and talking at once, refrain from trying to get an orderly scene. Early pleasure and excitement in the play is essential to the growth of the group.

Section III: Inquiry

"Inquiry," like "community," is a concept which is given considerable attention in educational theory but less attention in actual practice. Most of students' work in school is devoted to learning concepts and theories which have already been articulated by others. Actually investigating concepts, building upon the thoughts of others, developing insights, initiating and exploring hypotheses, etc., are much rarer activities.

Students may be familiar with group discussion situations where ideas are shared or debated, but it is important for them to learn the difference between these experiences and inquiring into issues with their classmates.

7. Activity: "Entering and Responding in Philosophical Dialogue"

Authors: Marilyn J. Williams and Joe Oyler
Ages: All ages

Purposes: To practice careful listening and reaching a community goal.
Directions: The following scripts for entering and responding in philosophical dialogue may be copied for each participant or printed on posters in the classroom. In either case the participants should make variations on these scripts and create new ones they find useful.

Entering a Philosophical Dialogue

- I (don't) think that _____ because _____.
- Maybe if _____ then _____.
- I've noticed that _____ and I wondered _____.
- I feel _____ because _____.
- I want to say / ask something but I'm not sure how.
- I don't know if this is always true, but _____.
- Sometimes I wonder _____ because _____.
- I think I'm lost in this dialogue. Can someone tell me where we are?

Responding in a Philosophical Dialogue

- I dis/agree with _____'s idea that _____ because _____.
- That's a good point, but I think ____.
- What do you mean when you say _____?
- Aren't you assuming that _____?
- I don't quite understand. Are you saying that _____?
- Why?
- I understand what you're saying, but I think _____ because _____.
- I (don't) think that _____, because _____.

8. Exercise: Making Connections

Author: Maughn Gregory
Ages: Younger primary grades

Purpose: To guide children in connecting what they say to what has already been said, which is the essence of dialogue, and different from taking turns making individualistic statements.
Directions: Prepare a poster of cues students can use to connect to other people's statements, such as:

- "I agree / disagree that ____, because _____."
- "I can give an example / counter-example of that: _____"
- "What you said makes me wonder _____."
- "What you said makes me want to ask you this question: _____"
- "I didn't understand it when you said: ____"
- "I wonder if you're assuming that _____"
- "I know of some evidence to support / challenge what you said: _____"

Prepare a list of simple statements, e.g.:

- Strawberry is the best flavor of ice cream.
- It's important to learn math.
- A friend is someone who shares things with you.
- It's wrong to kill animals to eat them.

For this exercise, read one statement and go around the circle, inviting each student to make a statement that responds to, or "connects with" your statement, using the cues on the poster, if that helps them.
Variation: Students take turns making statements and making connecting responses, in pairs or in small groups.

9. Exercise: "Connecting with Licorice"

Author: Stephanie Burdick
Ages: Middle primary grades (may be modified for younger grades)
Purposes: To have a physical model of what it means to connect ideas as a community.

Directions: The facilitator should have introduced the idea that in a community of inquiry ideas connect with, and build upon one another. For this activity, the facilitator brings out a bag of rope candy (licorice, something to suggest connection) and says that the group as a whole will have the chance to win the whole bag of candy during the lesson. The way the group earns each piece is to make a connection.

Example: Fareed says, "I think the mind is only a physical thing of neurons and nerves and blood." Carmen says, "Well, I am going to connect with Fareed and agree that it seems like the mind is only physical, but I have a question: how come it seems like there are pictures in my mind? Is there a TV up there that all the nerves are connected to?" This is one connection which earns the group (not the student) one piece of licorice. The facilitator should make it clear that the student has to note how their idea connects to someone else's idea and then make it clear that the connection should be justified. (And that might elicit some procedural questions throughout the inquiry). At the end, the teacher can ask how the group should divide the licorice (which can be an entire discussion in itself).

Younger students may find this difficult at first and the facilitator may choose to prompt them with the question, "Carmen, who did your idea connect to?" Older students may elect one of the classmates to decide which connections are justified well enough to warrant a piece of licorice.

Candy should not be used as a punishment or reward for behavior throughout the session. The candy only symbolizes connections or bridging.

Further Resources for Activities on Philosophy, Community and Inquiry

The IAPC curriculum includes the following instructional manuals that contain dozens of discussion plans and exercises useful for developing students' understanding of, and skill in philosophy, community and inquiry:

- Matthew Lipman & Ann Margaret Sharp: *Getting Our Thoughts Together, 2nd Ed: Instruction Manual to Accompany* Elfie (Montclair, New Jersey: IAPC, 2004).
- Matthew Lipman & Ann Margaret Sharp: *Looking for Meaning: Instruction Manual to Accompany* Pixie (Montclair, New Jersey: IAPC, 1982).
- Matthew Lipman & Ann Margaret Sharp: *Wondering at the World: Instruction Manual to Accompany* Kio & Gus (Montclair, New Jersey: IAPC, 1986).
- Matthew Lipman & Ann Margaret Sharp: *Deciding What to Do: Instruction Manual to Accompany* Nous (Montclair, New Jersey: IAPC, 1996).
- Matthew Lipman, et al.: *Philosophical Inquiry: Instruction Manual to Accompany* Harry Stottlemeir's Discovery (Montclair, New Jersey: IAPC, 1984)
- Matthew Lipman & Ann Margaret Sharp: *Ethical Inquiry: Instruction Manual to Accompany* Lisa (Montclair, New Jersey: IAPC, 1995).
- Matthew Lipman & Ann Margaret Sharp: *Writing: How and Why: Instruction Manual to Accompany* Suki (Montclair, New Jersey: IAPC, 1980).
- Matthew Lipman & Ann Margaret Sharp: *Social Inquiry: Instruction Manual to Accompany* Mark (Montclair, New Jersey: IAPC, 1980).

Additional Resources:

- Augusto Boal: *Games for Actors and Non-Actors*, 2nd Edition, trans. Adrian Jackson (London: Taylor & Francis, Inc., 2002).
- Philip Cam, et al.: *Philosophy for Young Children: A Classroom Handbook* (Deakin West, Australian Capital Territory: Australian Curriculum Studies Association, Inc., 2007).
- Thomas E. Jackson, et al.: "Philosophy for Children: The Pre-School Project," (undated, unpublished manuscript).
- Thomas E. Jackson: "Philosophy: A Guide for Teachers," (2000; unpublished manuscript).
- Thomas E. Jackson: "The Art and Craft of 'Gently Socratic' Inquiry" in Arthur L. Costa, ed.: Developing Minds: A Resource Book for Teaching Thinking, 3rd Edition (Alexandria, Virginia: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 2001), 459-65.
- Matthew Lipman: "Philosophical Discussion Plans and Exercises" *Analytic Teaching: The Community of Inquiry Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April 1996), 3-14.
- Viola Spolin: *Theater Games for the Classroom: A Teacher's Handbook* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1986).



Chapter 6: Introduction to Logic

Introduction

This chapter[1] is a brief introduction to some of the most basic kinds of logical reasoning. While most teachers will have encountered some these kinds in their study of critical thinking, this chapter does not assume any prior knowledge of logical structure. As just one unit in a course in Philosophy for Children, this chapter is not meant to take the place of an introductory course in logic. It is meant to prepare P4C facilitators to begin to recognize the logical structures written into the IAPC curriculum novels and those that emerge in their students' dialogues, to use the logical exercises in the IAPC curriculum manuals with their students, and to begin their own, ongoing study of the nature and uses of various kinds of reasoning.

In Chapter 2 we stated that the goal of inquiry is reasonable judgment, and that to be reasonable means, in part, that a judgment relies on good arguments. Logic is the study of what it means to make good arguments, or to reason well. One of the most important roles of the P4C facilitator is to help children learn to recognize the logical structures that emerge in their dialogues, to help each other build stronger arguments in support of their ideas and avoid mistakes and weaknesses in their reasoning, and to learn how to follow the inquiry in the direction of the strongest arguments and evidence, i.e. toward the most reasonable conclusions. Chapter 2 also explained how facilitators can help a community to move through the stages of dialogical inquiry, all the while helping the participants pay attention to their own thinking and to where that thinking is taking them. The kinds of arguments introduced in this chapter are useful for both testing and defending the possible answers that community members come up with in response to their own questions.

Before having a chance to study it, many people think of logic as highly complicated—and therefore intimidating—and only useful for highly technical inquiry—and therefore irrelevant to most of their own thinking. However, as we will see, the most common logical structures are both very simple and widely applicable to ordinary thinking. Like mathematics and grammar, logic consists of principles and rules that become very important to us as we learn to use them to do things that are meaningful for us—like cooking, building bridges, learning new languages, writing love poetry or changing laws. One of the most immediate ways that logic is useful is in helping us to withstanding many kinds of manipulation, like commercial advertising, political rhetoric and peer pressure. The majority of the tricks that people play in commercial and political speech are very simple, and the logic presented in this chapter is enough to see through them.

Another important use of logic is to help ourselves and our students participate more meaningfully in public discourse, in electronic and print media as well as in face-to-face discussions. The patterns of reasoning introduced here have become more or less standard among thinkers, writers and decision makers in all segments of society, so that we need to be able to use them well in order to participate in those segments. There are two good reasons for this. One is that careful reasoning leads to better results, across all the types of discourse presented in Chapter 2. The other is that the democratic goal of using persuasion rather than force to accomplish

[1] This chapter is adapted from Maughn Gregory: *A Crash-Course in Logic* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999).

our projects requires that we agree on methods for answering questions and solving problems. (The problematic side of this commitment is that we typically use force rather than persuasion on people we can't reason with: animals, children, uneducated people, and mentally challenged people.)

One of the most import uses of logic is to help ourselves and our students cultivate our personal intuitions, questions, insights and desires. Too often, our students' bright ideas and passionate concerns do not become part of our classroom inquiries because the students are unable to say what they mean clearly—even to themselves—or to think through that meaning carefully. Logic can help us to become more conscious of our intuitive ideas so that we can articulate them, examine and critique them, reconstruct them in more reasonable and more potent forms, and bring them into the realm of public discourse and action, where they can both have effect and be affected. Of course, acquiring more reasonable habits of mind is a goal we share with our students.

In the IAPC curriculum, children are introduced to principles of logic system-atically and in natural contexts. The curriculum novels depict children noticing logical forms in ordinary thought and speech, wondering about these forms, and testing out their usefulness in their own experience. The intent, of course, to help actual students begin to do the same. The curriculum manuals contain numerous exercises that help students practice making the kinds of logical moves they have discovered, and to reflect on them.

Some of the examples in this chapter are taken from the IAPC curriculum, but others are designed for you, the adult reader, and some of these may not be appropriate for children. Many of the examples are simple and common-sensical, some are nonsensical, intended to force attention to their logical structure, and some are political and cultural, intended to illustrate how logic can inform public discourse.

What is an Argument?

Logic is the study of what it means to make good **arguments**. In logic, "argument" doesn't mean "quarrel"; it refers to a group of statements that include a number of reasons, called **premises**, that support the final statement, called the **conclusion**. The conclusion comes last to show that the premises are leading to it, or building up to it. There is *movement* in an argument: from premises to conclusion.

> Premise 1. Premise 2. (Etc. . . .) So, conclusion.
>
> Max is a dog. All dogs are animals. So, Max is an animal.
>
> Max is a beagle, and barks a lot. Ollie is a beagle, and barks a lot. Eddie is a beagle, and barks a lot. So, beagles bark a lot.

This move is also called an **inference**: we *infer* the conclusion from the premises. The argument about dogs and animals is an example of a deductive argument; the argument about beagles barking is an example of an inductive argument. We will learn how to make good arguments of both kinds, but in both cases, to make an argument is just to give reasons (premises) for some statement (conclusion). We say that the conclusion "follows from" the premises, and the whole question of logic is: does the conclusion really follow the premises? Some other ways to ask that same question are:

- Are the reasons good enough?
- Do the premises really support (justify, entail) the conclusion?
- Is the move / inference from premises to conclusion justified?
- If we are sure of the premises, does that mean we can be sure of the conclusion?
- If we believe everything in the premises, are we bound to believe the conclusion?

- If we accept all the premises, do we *have to* accept the conclusion?
- Is there any way that all the premises could be true and the conclusion still be false?

Example:

> He has children and works outside the home, so he's not a good father.

In this argument, the conclusion is the phrase, "he's not a good father." Does that conclusion follow from the premise that, "he has children and works outside the home"? No. In order to get to this conclusion from that premise, we would need the additional premise: "Anyone who has children and works outside the home is not a good parent."

Give it a Try. Each of these arguments has a conclusion and one or more premises. Figure out which statement is the conclusion, and whether or not it follows from the premises. If it doesn't, is there another premise that would make it work? (The answers are at the end of the chapter.)

1. Amrita is taller than Sheila, therefore Amrita is taller than Roberto.
2. She burns American flags, so she's un-American.
3. All ladybugs are insects, because ladybugs are beetles and all beetles are insects.
4. I haven't enjoyed any of his films, so I'm sure I won't enjoy the new one.
5. Since he's an atheist, he can't be a good teacher.

Truth vs. Validity

Notice that all the premises and conclusions we use in making arguments have to be statements of the kind that can be either **true** or **false**. They can't be questions or commands, for instance. But an argument *as a whole* is neither true nor false. Deductive argument are either **valid** – which means logically correct – or **invalid**. To say that an argument is valid is just to say that its conclusion really follows from the premises. One more time:

PREMISES & CONCLUSIONS:	The ARGUMENT they make up:
TRUE or FALSE	VALID or INVALID

Truth is one thing; **validity** is something else. A valid deductive argument is said to be **truth-preserving**, meaning that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion is guaranteed to be true as well! Truth preservation makes deductive reasoning a very powerful tool for thinking and persuasion. (Try not to use it as a weapon.) If you want to convince someone (parent, spouse, teacher, boss) of something, and you can find something that person already believes, and show that your conclusion follows from that belief in a valid argument, the person is logically bound to accept your conclusion! And to be logically bound means that either the person accepts your conclusion (because they see the logic) or they disqualify themselves as a reasonable person, to whom you would ordinarily need to justify yourself.

We call an argument that is valid *and* contains only true premises, a **sound** argument. So whether you are using an argument to persuade someone, or someone is trying to persuade you, remember that the **validity of the argument** has to be judged independently from the **truth or falsehood of each premise**. Your tight logical reasoning isn't going to convince me if I don't believe your premises in the first place.

Think about this argument:

> P. All Republicans are socially conservative.
> P. Miko is a card-carrying Republican.
> C. So, Miko is socially conservative.

This argument is valid, meaning that it is perfectly logical. But it would also be perfectly logical to reject the conclusion as

false, if you think one or both of its premises is false. Think about what it would take to show these premises are true.

To judge the truth of the statements we find in arguments, we have to use our own experience or rely on an expert or some kind of authority. Deductive logic will not help us.

Since truth and validity are judged independently, an argument with false premises and/or a false conclusion can still be valid, and vice versa: an invalid argument may have all true premises and a true conclusion. (It's being invalid would only mean that the conclusion doesn't follow from those premises.) Look at this argument:

Honolulu is the capital of New Jersey.
The capital of New Jersey is located in Utah.
So, Honolulu is located in Utah.

That's a valid argument. (Can you see why?) But remember, validity only means the logical structure is right. It has nothing to do with truth. Now look at this one, which has all true statements, but which is invalid:

Honolulu is the capital of Hawai'i.
The capital of Hawai'i is on the island of Oahu.
So, Salt Lake City is located in Utah.

Class Syllogisms

Deductive logic comes in systems sometimes called games, with rules for how to play. One easy logic game is the categorical or class syllogism. A syllogism is a deductive argument with two premises and one conclusion. The argument we began with is a class syllogism:

Max is a dog. All dogs are animals. So, Max is an animal.

The argument is that since Max belongs to the category or class of dogs, and the *entire* class of dogs belongs to the class of animals, it follows that Max also belongs to the class of animals. Class syllogisms can be illustrated by Venn diagrams, in which we drawing circles that represent classes, and X's that represent individuals:



This diagram also makes it easy to see why this syllogism *doesn't* work:

P. All dogs are animals.
P. Gertrude is an animal.
C. So, Gertrude is a dog.

All dogs are animals, but not all animals are dogs, right?

Standardization

Language doesn't capture the complexity of reality, and logical systems don't capture the complexity of ordinary language. For instance, when you play the class syllogism game, there are only three quantifiers you can use: "all," "some," and "no." "Some" means anything more than zero, including as few as one, and as many as all. So: "many," "almost all," "quite a few," "only a few," "almost none at all," "a very few," must all be translated or standardized into the logical quantifier "some." A generalized statement such as "cats chase birds," will be standardized as "all cats chase birds," or even "all cats belong to the class of things that chase birds." And "dead men tell no tales," will be standardized as "no dead men tell tales," or "no dead men belong to the class of things that tell tales." In an inquiry dialogue it's important to notice the generalizations we make, like "philosophers are so dense" and

ask each other if we mean "all …," or only "some …," – even if "some" means "most."

How would you draw circles to illustrate the following sentences? (See the way they are drawn at the end of the chapter.)

1. All As are Bs.
2. All Bs are As.
3. Some As are Bs.
4. Some Bs are As.
5. No As are Bs.
6. No Bs are As.

All and Only

"All" and "only" don't mean the same thing, in language or in logic. Take these two sentences:

- All people are mortal.
- Only people are mortal.

You could easily believe one of these sentences to be true and the other false, so "all" and "only" can't mean the same thing. Think about what "only" means:

- Only natural-born citizens can be President.
- Only students who have passed pre-calculus are eligible to register for calculus.

It turns out that "only" statements can be converted into "all" statements, but not by substituting the word "all" for the word "only." Can you think how to do it? Try it on the two "only" sentences just given: (Check your answers at the end of the chapter.)

1. "Only natural-born citizens can be President," means the same as, "All

   _____

   _____."

2. "Only students who have passed pre-calculus may register for calculus," means the same as, "All _____

   _____

   _____."

So, the Only/All conversion rule is: class statements that begin with "Only" can be converted to statements beginning with "All," but you have to switch the order of the classes. Now, with that in mind, you can find the conclusions to class syllogisms like this:

3. P. Grandma Francesca is a senior.
   P. Only seniors get the discount.
   C. Therefore, ...

Be careful! Don't treat this as if the first premise read, "All seniors …." Convert the "only" statement into an "all" statement, and *then* do the logic. What happens to Grandma?

There is such a thing as the phrase "all and only," used in odd sentences like, "All and only men are male adults," which means that, "All men are male adults," and also that, "Only men are male adults." In that case you don't have to convert the "only" statement into an "all" statement—do you see why?

4. How would you draw the circles to illustrate that statement?

Valid Argument Patterns

For each kind of syllogism there are a limited number of valid argument patterns, or legitimate ways of moving from premises to a conclusion. If an argument follows one of the patterns, it is valid; if it doesn't, it's invalid. Look at the argument patterns for class syllogisms in Table 1 below, and see if they agree with your intuitions. (If it confuses you at this point to look at A's and B's, apart from complete sentences, then don't look too long at these patterns!)

Table 1: DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT PATTERNS

Class Syllogisms	
Valid Patterns	Invalid Patterns (Formal Fallacies)
P. All As are Bs. P. C is an A. C. Therefore, C is a B.	P. All As are Bs. P. C is a B. C. Therefore, C is an A.
P. All As are Bs. P. C is not a B. P. Therefore, C is not an A.	P. All As are Bs. P. C is not an A. C. Therefore, C is not a B.
P. All As are Bs. P. All Bs are Cs. C. Therefore, All As are Cs.	P. All As are Bs. P. All Cs are Bs. C. Therefore, All As are Cs.
P. All As are Bs. P. Some Cs are As. C. So, some Cs are Bs.	P. All As are Bs. P. Some Cs are Bs. C. So, some Cs are As.
P. No A is a B. C. Therefore, no B is an A.	P. All As are Bs. C. Therefore, all Bs are As.
P. No A is a B. P. C is a B (or is an A). C. Therefore, C is not an A (or is not a B).	P. No A is a B. P. C is not a B (or not an A). C. Therefore, C is an A (or a B).
	P. Some As are Bs. P. C is an A. C. Therefore, C is a B.
	P. Some As are Bs. P. C is not an A. C. Therefore, C is not a B.
Hypothetical Syllogisms	
Valid Patterns	Invalid Patterns (Formal Fallacies)
P. If P, then Q. P. P. C. Therefore, Q.	P. If P, then Q. P. Q. C. Therefore, P.
P. If P, then Q. P. Not Q. C. Therefore, not P.	P. If P, then Q. P. Not P. C. Therefore, not Q.
Other Deductive Syllogisms	
Valid Patterns	Invalid Patterns (Formal Fallacies)
P. A or B. (Either A or B is true.) P. Not A. C. Therefore, B.	
P. A or B. P. If A then C P. If B then C C. So, C.	P. A or B. P. If A then C C. So, C.
P. A is more X than B is. P. B is more X than C is. C. Therefore, A is more X than C is.	

First Exercises

(See answers at end of chapter)

Illustrate the following premises with Venn diagrams, and then say what, if anything, follows:

1. All whales are mammals, and all mammals are animals.
2. Some redheads are philosophers, but no blockheads are philosophers.
3. Macho men are paranoid, and Zeek is a macho man.

What, if anything, follows from these premises?

4. Every cat is a reincarnated peacock. Alexis is a reincarnated peacock.
5. Clairvoyants cannot be rehabilitated. Jennifer can be rehabilitated.
6. Every vampire is an undead person. Stanislas is dead.
7. Every ventriloquist is my friend. Haily isn't my friend.
8. Only a supremacist would talk like that. Phoebe may be a bigot but she's no supremacist!

Fill in the missing premises:

9. She's a war veteran, so she must be patriotic.
10. Every philosopher uses logic, so Nietzsche must have used it.
11. She's an ecologist, so she must be a liberal.
12. He calls women "girls," so he sees them as infantile and easily controlled.

Hypothetical Syllogisms

If-then syllogisms are called hypothetical syllogisms. Look at this one:

P. If it's raining, the street is wet.
P. It's raining.
C. So, the street is wet.

The premise, "If P, then Q,"[2] means that P is a sufficient cause or condition of Q, which means that P is one thing—but not necessarily the only thing—that will make Q happen. That is, P is *enough* to make Q happen, but there might be other causes that would also be enough to make Q happen. For instance, the premise above is perfectly consistent with a number of other, similar premises:

P. If it's snowing, the street is wet.
P. If the river is flooding, the street is wet.
P. If the dam has broken, the street is wet.

All of these are *sufficient* causes; any of them is *enough* to make the street wet, and it only takes one of them to do so.



Another example: Suppose one morning I tell you, "If I get this promotion, I'll be able to buy that house. On the other hand, if I win the lottery, or if I inherit from grandma, I'll be able to buy that house." And suppose that same afternoon I tell you, "I just won the lottery!" You may safely conclude that I am able to buy the house.

Now, suppose you know that one of the sufficient causes has *not* happened, but you don't know whether or not any of the others has happened:

P. If it's raining, the street is wet.
P. It's not raining.
C. So, ...

Is the street wet? We can't say. We know it's not raining, but we don't know if it's

[2] Here, "P" and "Q" don't stand for classes, but for propositions—statements of fact like, "It's raining."

snowing, or the condition of the river or the dam. Here is what we know:



It's not raining, but the street might be wet anyway, because the river might be flooding, etc. So nothing follows from the last two premises. Keep this in mind: without knowing whether *each* of the sufficient causes happened, we can't conclude whether or not the effect happened.

Similarly, think out what follows from these premises:

P. If it's raining, the street is wet.
P. The street is wet.
C. So, ...

Be careful! We've already established that, "If P, then Q" only makes P a *sufficient* cause of Q, which means that there could be other causes. So we can't conclude here that it has rained. The logical conclusion here is: nothing follows. Consider this figure again:



Since we know that the effect happened, we also know that *one or more* of the sufficient causes happened, but we don't know *which*. The only cause mentioned in our premises was rain, but it was given as a *sufficient* cause (it was part of an *if-then* sentence), which *always* means there might be other causes, and that means we can never know if the sufficient cause mentioned in the first premise was the one that caused the effect mentioned in the second premise. So again, the answer is that no conclusion follows from the last premises.

There's only one more syllogism we can wring out of this example:

P. If it's raining, the street is wet.
P. The street is not wet.
C. So, ...

What follows? Again, think in terms of cause and effect. If P is a sufficient cause of Q, that means P *always* causes Q—you can't have P happening without Q happening too. If that's so, and if we know that Q didn't happen, we can conclude that P must not have happened either. Because if P *had* happened, Q would *certainly* have happened also. That's what "If P, then Q," means. So, what follows from the two premises above is that *it didn't rain*. One last time with this figure:



In fact, if we know that everything on the left is a sufficient cause of the street being wet, and we know that the street is not wet, several conclusions will follow: it's not raining, it's not snowing, the river isn't flooding, and the dam hasn't broken.

We have seen four patterns of hypothetical syllogisms: two valid, and two invalid. Here they are again.

If it rains, the street will be wet.	If it rains, the street will be wet.	If it rains, the street will be wet.	If it rains, the street will be wet.
It's raining.	It's not raining.	The street is wet.	The street is not wet.
The street is wet.	Nothing follows.	Nothing follows.	It's not raining.

See also the argument patterns for class syllogisms in Table 1 above.

Only If

"If" and "Only if " don't mean the same thing. Look at these two sentences:

- If it rains, the street will be wet.
- Only if it rains will the street be wet.

The premise "Only if P, then Q," means that P is a *necessary* cause or condition of Q, which means that if P does *not* happen, Q will not happen. Again, it may take more than P to make Q happen (there may be more than one *necessary* cause) but in any case, without P, Q will not happen. Take this example: "Only if my mother dies will I marry you; *and* only if you get that job in New York will I marry you; *and* only if my divorce is final by New Years will I marry you."

Necessary Causes Effect



None of these conditions is *sufficient* for the marriage. All are *necessary*, meaning that *all* of them *must* happen if the marriage is to happen. So think about this: if later on we find out this marriage did happen, what can we conclude? That all three of those conditions happened. In other words, it turns out that, "Only if P, then Q," means the same as "If Q then P."

Try it out: (Check your answers at the end of the chapter.)

1. "Only if Allen were left-handed, could he have painted this daisy," means the same as, "If _____, then _____."

2. "Only if I get a least a B+ in this class will I maintain my 3.0 GPA," means the same as, "If _____, then _____."

So when you get a hypothetical syllogism like this:

3. P. Only if a boy believes in God can he be a Boy Scout.
   P. Kazu is a Boy Scout.
   C. So, ...

Be sure to convert the first premise into a regular *If-then* sentence, and then just do the logic. (So what follows about Kazu?)

There is such a thing as the phrase "if and only if …," used in legalistic sentences like, "I will hire you here if and only if you quit your job with that ecologically irresponsible corporation." That means that quitting the job there is *both* a necessary *and* a sufficient cause for being hired here. Logically, the premise, "P if and only if Q" is the equivalent of *both* of the premises: "If P then Q" and "If Q then P." In other words, if it's true that,

> I will hire you here if and only if you quit your job with that ecologically irresponsible corporation,

then both of these statements are also true:

> If I hire you here, you must have quit that ecologically irresponsible corporation;

and,

> If you quit that ecologically irresponsible corporation I will hire you here.

The "if and only if" inferences work like this:

P. P if and only if Q.	P. P if and only if Q.
P. P.	P. Q.
C. Therefore, Q.	C. Therefore, P.

Now, just for fun: Since, "P if and only if Q," means both "If P then Q," and "If Q then P," and since "If P then Q," means "Only if Q

then P," if follows that "P if and only if Q" also means "Q if and only if P."

Second Exercises

(See answers at end of chapter)

What, if anything, follows from these premises?

1. If I don't get this job, my fiancé will leave me.
   I didn't get the job.
2. If Kent makes a fool of herself, she will lose the election.
   Kent won't make a fool of herself.
3. I'd have to be drunk or crazy to go out with you. I'm not crazy, and I only get drunk on Wednesdays.
4. No Sharks are Jets. Tony is a Jet.
5. Only a bigot would walk in that parade, and you walked in it!
6. Some cowgirls need good rope.
   Randy is a cowgirl.

Fill in the missing premises:

7. They think there's more than one kind of legitimate family, so they don't have family values.
8. She's a resistor, so she can't be a collaborator.
9. Some cats are calicos, so some felines are calicos.
10. Tattooing should be respected because it's an ancient Polynesian art form.
11. He said, "Trust me," so I don't trust him.

12. How many conclusions can you draw from these premises?
    1. If Marjorie is a neuro-physicist, then pigs fly.
    2. It's ten p.m. Thursday right now.
    3. No one who believes in UFOs will eat pesto sauce.
    4. I eat pesto sauce every Thursday at 10 pm.
    5. If Willam has a pony tail then I believe in UFOs.
    6. Every folk singer has a pony tail.
    7. If Willam isn't a folk singer then pigs don't fly.

Inductive Reasoning

Deduction and Induction

Everything we have done so far is a kind of logic called deduction. Compare examples of deductive and inductive arguments:

Deductive:

P. All Utahns speak with an accent.
P. Sophia is a Utahn.
C. So, she speaks with an accent.

Inductive:

P. Sophia is Utahn and speaks with an accent.
P. Marco is Utahn and speaks with an accent.
P. Every other Utahn I've met speaks with an accent.
C. So, I'd guess all Utahns speak with an accent.

Do you see the difference? One way of thinking about deductive reasoning is that it often moves from at least one general premise to a particular conclusion. For example, in the deductive syllogism above, we conclude that a particular person, Sophia, has a certain characteristic (speaks with an accent) because we know that Sophia belongs to a certain class (Utahns), and we know that everything in that class has that characteristic.

One way of thinking about *inductive* reasoning is that it moves in the opposite direction: from particular cases to a generalization. Look again at the inductive argument above, and sort the premises from the conclusion.

Another way to tell deductive and inductive inferences apart is that deductive conclusions are guaranteed to be true, provided that all the premises are true and that the arguments are valid. Deduction is

actually just a way of "unpacking" the meaning of the premises you start with. Deductive conclusions add no new information. A weakness of deductive reasoning is that it can be used with so few real-life situations.

Inductive reasoning is risky: even if you only use true premises, and you are very careful to follow good inductive guidelines, there is no guarantee that your conclusion will be true. The most you can say about an inductive conclusion is that it is *likely* or *probable*. Therefore, instead of calling inductive arguments valid or invalid, we call them strong or weak: some inductive conclusions are very probable, some barely probable. Look at this one:

P. Every Nesbit child I've met has had red hair.
P. Agnes (whom I haven't met) is a Nesbit child.
C. So, I suppose she has red hair too.

Do you see why this conclusion isn't guaranteed to be true? But do you also see the sense in this reasoning? Doesn't the fact that Agnes Nesbit comes from a family of red heads make it more likely that she has red hair, than if she didn't come from such a vibrant family? In other words, the fact that there are many red heads in her family is *relevant* to whether or not she is a red head. For an inductive argument to make any sense, the premises must be relevant to the conclusion.

Generalizing and Over-generalizing

Look again at that last argument:

P. Every Nesbit child I've met has had red hair.
P. Agnes is a Nesbit child.
C. So, I suppose she has red hair too.

There's actually a step missing: the generalization, "I suppose all the Nesbit children have red hair." Inductive reasoning is all about making generalizations: from individuals to groups, from small groups to big groups, from past events to future events. To generalize is to move beyond what we know, to make predictions about what we don't yet know for certain.

The biggest danger in playing with induction is that we will over-generalize, or make a "hasty generalization". One kind of over-generalization we're all familiar with, unfortunately, is stereotypes. They come in many forms.

> I've known a few really dysfunctional Dalmatians in my time; and now my roommate is buying one. I'm considering moving.

Did you catch the over-generalization? In order *not* to do this, you should ask yourself these questions:

1. What is the relevance of the premises to the conclusion (of the data to the new warrant)?
2. How big is the sample of the population you are generalizing from? 2%? 50%? 90%? Example: How many dalmations have you known?
3. Is the sample you are generalizing from representative of the whole group you are generalizing to? Example: major medical research institutes have published recommendations for certain medical condition, geared to the general public, only to have it disclosed later that no women were studied in their research.
4. Was there a control group? When you generalize that a certain cause brings about a certain effect in an experimental group of subjects, because you have observed it do so, it makes your argument stronger if you can also show that a group of subjects that are like the experimental group in all relevant ways, except that they did not experience the cause, did not show the effect.

Causation and Correlation

When two things seem to always happen together, we say they correlate.

Here are sets of things that typically correlate:

- Heavy rain fall and the river rising (positive correlation).
- Increase in altitude and decrease in air pressure (negative correlation).
- Increase in a car age and decrease in its trade-in value.
- Increase in temperature and increase in ice cream sales.
- Smoking and lung cancer.

When there is correlation between two things, X and Y, there are four causal possibilities:

1. X causes Y
2. Y causes X
3. Both X and Y are caused by something else, Z.
4. There is no causation going on; the correlation is just a coincidence.

So knowing that two things correlate is not the same as knowing why. Of course, in some cases, it is obvious which thing causes the other: the rising river doesn't make it rain, and roosters don't cause the sun to rise. But even in these cases, it isn't the mere correlation of the events that tells us which causes which. If *all* we knew about roosters and sunrise was that roosters crow at sunrise, we wouldn't be able to say which caused which, or if something else caused them both to happen together, or if it were only a coincidence. Some unfortunate historical examples of faulty causal inference are the blaming of witches for crop failures and other mishaps, and the blaming of immigrants for a slow economy.

Third Exercises

(See answers at end of chapter)

Are the following inferences inductive or deductive?

1. Every vegetarian I've met has been very healthy, so I suppose they all are.
2. He's stood me up the last two times we agreed to meet, so I doubt he'll be there tonight.
3. Cross-country skiers get lots of exercise. So, if I took up cross-country skiing I would get exercise too.
4. I've never seen male hula dancing, so there must not be any such thing.
5. All babies get colicky once in a while, so yours will be no different.
6. Jazz guitarists are musicians and musicians are artists and artists are visionaries, so jazz guitarists are visionaries.
7. All flame eaters get indigestion once in a while, and anyone with indigestion is hard to live with, so since you insist on becoming a flame eater, I don't think I want you for a roommate any longer.

Deductive Inferences: What follows?

8. P. If it keeps snowing like this, we'll never get out.
   P. It will keep snowing like this.
9. P. If it keeps snowing like this, we'll never get out.
   P. We'll never get out.
10. P. If it keeps snowing like this, we'll never get out.
    P. We will get out.
11. P. If it keeps snowing like this, we'll never get out.
    P. It won't keep snowing like this

12. How many conclusions can you draw from these premises?
    1. If Johann is not a street vendor, I'm a cosmonaut.
    2. One dollar buys seven rupees.
    3. No one who eats fish is a street vendor.
    4. I love fish.
    5. I have two dollars.
    6. No one who can buy fourteen rupees is a cosmonaut.

Fallacies

A fallacy is a mistake in reasoning, though as we stated in Chapter 2, arguments are only fallacious relative to the goals and norms of particular types of dialogue. The fallacies presented here are almost always mistakes or tricks in the context of inquiry dialogues.

There are two broad categories of fallacies in inquiry dialogue: formal and informal. Formal fallacies are invalid patterns of deductive argument, like those outlined on Table 1 above. Informal fallacies can be divided into two groups: fallacies of relevance, in which the premises are logically irrelevant to the conclusion, and other fallacies, that are wrong for other reasons. Since there are infinite ways that thinking can go wrong, there are an infinite number of fallacy categories as well. The ones explained here are particularly common in popular discourse.

Fallacies of Relevance (premises irrelevant to conclusions)

1. **Appeal to Force:** making some kind of threat to *coerce* (rather than persuade) acceptance of your conclusion. A lobbyist does this when she reminds a legislator that she represents so many thousands of voters in the legislator's constituency, or so many potential contributors to campaign funds. Some people just use weapons.

2. **Argument Directed to the Person:** Attacking the person rather than her argument. "Are you going to listen to that _____?" "You can't trust anything she says! She's a _____." (e.g. communist, republican, scientologist, philosopher.)

3. **Appeal to Ignorance:** The argument that something must be true, since no one can prove that it isn't. "There must be ghosts / a God, because no one can prove otherwise." "I say my new drug is working, since you can't prove that it isn't."

4. **Appeal to Pity:** Trying to get people to accept your conclusion out of pity for someone, rather than because of the merits of your argument. Defence lawyers do this a lot.

5. **Argument to the People (the mob):** The attempt to win popular assent to a conclusion by arousing the feelings and enthusiasms of the crowd. This happens a lot at school pep rallies, religious services and political campaigns.

6. **Appeal to Authority:** appeal to an authority who isn't one, especially appealing to the admiration some people have for a famous person, even though the person is not an authority on the subject being discussed. "Former president Bush hated broccoli, so it must be bad."

7. **Accident:** applying a general rule to a particular case whose "accidental" circumstances make it the exception to the rule. "I told the Nazis where the gay couple was hiding because 'honesty is the best policy.'"

8. **Hasty Generalization:** the inductive fallacy: your sample is too small or biased in some way. "My mother drank herself to death, so all alcohol is harmful." "Marijuana eases pain and stress for people with certain types of diseases, so it's good for everybody."

9. **The Causal Fallacy:** x follows y in time, so y must cause x. "It was very hot yesterday, so I had a few beers, and got the worst headache! Come to think of it, once last week it was hot, and I had a few beers and got a bad headache. Hot weather sure gives me headaches!"

10. **Begging the Question:** assuming (as a premise) what you are trying to prove. "Doctors shouldn't commit euthanasia because doctors should always preserve life." "Women shouldn't be priests because

the things a priest does should only be done by men."

11. **Red Herring; Irrelevant Conclusion:** This is arguing a point most people agree with, but pretending to argue a more controversial point. For instance: a legislator who talks about how bad homelessness is, and concludes that her colleagues should vote for her bill (when she didn't explain well how her bill will effect homelessness); or an advocate of prayer in public schools who uses all her time to talk about the importance of prayer. (Most people who are against prayer in public schools are people who pray at home.)

12. **Faulty Analogy:** If two things are alike in one way, they must be alike in another way. "He's a deer hunter, just like my cousin, so I'll bet he drinks just like my cousin too!" Of course, not all analogies are faulty. There may be a good *reason* to suppose that two things that are alike in one way would be alike in another way: "She's a feminist, just like my mother, so she's probably against this sexist company policy like my mother is." (This is a form of inductive reasoning.)

13. **Jumping on the Bandwagon:** To show that a belief is popular, as a reason that it should be accepted. Bandwagon reasons are of this kind: "Everybody knows that." "Ask anyone!" "Most people surveyed agree!" This is a fallacy because ordinarily the popularity of an idea or a product is irrelevant to its merits.

14. **Slippery Slope:** Slippery slope arguments line up actions in a continuum, with relatively little difference between them, and assert that since each step is so similar to the next, there is no way to justify the first without justifying the last. P is bad only because P will lead to Q, and Q is bad. Also called "the nose of the camel under the tent," and "the thin edge of the wedge." Example: "If we make polygamy legal, we'll have to allow gay marriage, and then incest!" An appropriate response to that argument would be, "So you have nothing against polygamy itself?" Most slippery slope arguments are fallacious because it is actually easy to distinguish the items being strung together, in such a way that reasons for justifying one of them would not apply to the others.

15. **Straw Person:** distorting your opponent's position into something that is easier to attack. Appropriate response: "That's not what she actually said."

16. **Appeal to Tradition:** It's worth believing or acting a certain way because you or the community has done so for a long time. Clearly, tradition alone does not justify the perpetuation of a practice: "This college has always had a 20% failure rate, so …." "America was founded by Christian slave owners, therefore ..." Of course, sometimes there are good *reasons* behind a tradition. If so, just appeal to those good reasons instead of to the fact that it is a tradition, and you have a sound argument.

Fallacies of Ambiguity or Clearness
(arguments that contain ambiguous words or phrases, whose meanings shift and change in the course of the argument)

17. **Equivocation:** Shifting between different meanings of a word. The premise uses one meaning, and the conclusion uses another. "He said he didn't chain his dog up because he wanted it to be free. So I took it and didn't pay him anything for it." "Your organization works to improve the living conditions of animals, and humans are animals, so what will your organization do to improve my living conditions?"

18. **Accent:** The meaning of a statement changes as different parts of it are emphasized: "We should not speak ill of our friends." Does that mean that it's ok if *others* speak ill of our friends? If we speak ill of *other people's* friends? If we *work* ill on our friends?

19. **Composition (part to whole, member to class):** Concluding that what is true of the parts of something, must also be true of the whole. "Since every part of this machine is light in weight, the whole machine must be light."

20. **Division (whole to part, class to member):** What is true of a whole or a class must be true of each of its parts or members. "This machine is heavy/ complicated/valuable, so each of its parts must be the same."

Miscellaneous Fallacies

21. **Contradiction:** two or more of the premises contradict each other. "Premise 1. Some computers cost less than $2,000.... Premise 6. All computers cost more than $2,000." "A fetus is a person with a right to life, so abortion is morally wrong, unless the pregnancy was caused by rape or incest." A few years ago a famous television evangelist stated publicly that a recent earthquake in Los Angeles was God's punishment on an evil society. A few weeks later there was devastating flooding in the Midwest and the same evangelist publicly asked the nation to pray to ask God to intervene in the course of nature. Is that a contradiction? What does it depend on?

22. **Fallacy of Moderation or Compromise:** Extremes are necessarily wrong, and the mid-point (mainstream) is more likely to be true or good than either extreme. In the first place, the word "extreme" must always take its meaning from the context of its use. It simply means "too much," which is a relative notion: you can't say anything is too much unless you know, "too much for what?" And if you know that, you can give reasons for your answer. So, in the second place, there are sometimes good *reasons why* something extreme is wrong or harmful, in which case you should simply give the reason rather than use the word "extreme" to scare people into agreeing with you. For instance, we know *why* eating too much or too little is unhealthy, so it would be silly to argue that eating too much or too little are wrong just because they are extremes.

23. **Complex Question:** A question with a built-in assumption: The question, "Where did you hide the evidence?" assumes that you answered yes to the previous question, "Did you hide the evidence?" Watch out for them: "What makes this a great nation?" "Which religion is the right one?" Of course, you may indeed believe the built-in assumption, but to ask someone a complex question is to lay a trap for them because you are deliberately hiding that assumption from them.

24. **False Dichotomy, False Dilemma, Either-Or Fallacy:** Making it seem as though there are only two options or two possible positions, when actually there are many options, or many possible positions between the ones presented. "If you're not for us you're against us." "Are you married or single?" "America: Love it or leave it!" "What's more important, the economy or the environment?"

What fallacious arguments have you heard or read recently?

Exercises on Fallacies

(See answers at end of chapter)

Say what kind of fallacies these are, or if any is not a fallacy:

1. I use the toothpaste Julia Roberts uses, of course.
2. We can't allow the neo-Nazis to hold a parade in our town! It would be shameful! We have to show these hate-mongers our community values!
3. As my students, you are free to disagree with me, but as your teacher, of course, I'm free to grade you accordingly.
4. Guns don't kill people; people kill people.

5. There can't be any truth to the science of evolution, since most people who believe it are atheists.
6. I don't see how snowfall could make my roof collapse. Snowflakes weigh practically nothing!
7. The federal agency couldn't determine the cause of the accident, so I have to assume the cause was supernatural.
8. Dear professor, please don't grade this paper too harshly, as I had to have my dog put to sleep the week I wrote it.
9. Before he became psychotic, I promised my brother I would return his .38 caliber pistol. So of course I returned it to him; after all, a promise is a promise.
10. The priest said it was wrong to teach our children to hate, so we'll have to teach each *other's* children to hate.
11. Scientists cannot agree on how to disprove life-after-death experiences, so these experiences must be genuine.
12. Fred: "My boyfriend is so intelligent; and he practices yoga." Wilma: "My exams are next month. I wonder if it's too late to find a yoga class."
13. Women are paid less than men, so the female CEO of a multi-billion dollar company gets paid less than the male janitor who cleans her office.
14. I'm afraid this new college I'm attending is a very sexist institution. I'm taking two courses, and neither of them is taught by a woman.
15. Fred: "I've only dated two Canadians before." Ethel: "Really? Did you split the bills three ways, or just take turns paying for each other?"
16. Where did you put the fins you took from my swim bag?
17. Making alcohol illegal was a boost for organized crime, which caused more deaths and other problems than alcohol ever did. The same is true of illegal drugs today: if we legalize them, people will still abuse them, but drug-related crime will diminish.
18. Mapplethorpe's homoerotic photography isn't art because it's obscenity.
19. A witness states that on the night of the murder she heard the accused and the victim fighting outside her bedroom window. When asked why she did not answer her telephone that evening, she states that she and a few friends had spent the night listening to loud music.
20. A: "I would never burn the flag, but I believe the constitution protects flag burning as a form of political speech." B: "My opponent doesn't think there's anything wrong with burning the flag."
21. Magazine advertisement: "Millions of Americans are turning back to religion to help them solve personal problems. Maybe it's time for you to find religion again too."
22. Of course I'm against cruelty to animals, but I'm not going to stop eating meat. That would just be taking the whole issue too far.
23. If assisted suicide becomes legal, doctors who perform it will eventually lose some of their respect for human life, and they will become less conscientious in their work.
24. If you steal this money you'll burn in hell.
25. If you steal this money you'll be hurting yourself and others in a lot of ways.
26. My sister dropped out of school and got involved with a guy who ended up beating her. I told her something like this would happen if she quit school!
27. You can't marry him! No one in our family has ever married outside the faith! Besides, it would kill your grandmother! Where did you get such an idea? Probably from that hippie friend of yours—the one who can't keep a job! Your cousin Marva married outside the faith, and look how she ended up! Marriage is too important a decision to be taken this lightly! So, you marry this man and then what? You stop coming to services? You disown your family? An inter-faith marriage is like a car with two steering wheels. Ask anybody! I can't believe a child of mine would turn her back on God!

28. Make up some interesting or funny fallacious arguments of your own.

Answers to Logic Exercises

Give it a Try (p. 97)

1. The conclusion, “Amrita is taller than Roberto,” doesn’t follow, without the additional premise that, “Sheila is taller than Roberto.”
2. The conclusion, “she's un-American,” doesn’t follow, without the additional premise that, “people who burn American flags are un-American.”
3. The conclusion, “all ladybugs are insects,” follows from the premises.
4. The conclusion, “I won’t enjoy the new one,” doesn’t follow deductively, but may be a reasonable inductive inference, depending on how many of the filmmaker’s films the speaker has seen, relative to how many have been made.
5. The conclusion, “he can’t be a good teacher,” doesn’t follow, without the additional premise that, “Atheists are not good teachers,” or “nobody who is an atheist can be a good teacher.”

Standardization (p. 99)

1. All As are Bs.



2. All Bs are As.



3. & 4. Some As are Bs; Some Bs are As.



5. & 6. No As are Bs; No Bs are As.



All and Only (p. 99)

1. “Only natural-born citizens can be President,” means the same as, “All people who can be President are natural-born citizens.”
2. “Only students who have passed pre-calculus may register for calculus,” means the same as, “All people who may register for calculus are people who passed pre-calculus.”
3. Only seniors get the discount

   This premise converts to:
   All people who get the discount are seniors.
   Grandma Francesca is a senior.
   Therefore, nothing follows.



   We know that Grandma is a senior, but that doesn’t automatically make her a person who gets the discount. Which **X** represents Grandma? The premises don’t give us enough information to decide, so nothing follows.

4. “All and only men are adult males,” means both:
   “All men are adult males,” and
   “All adult males are men.”



So in this case, the two circles overlap completely, making one circle:

First Exercises (p. 101)

1. All whales are mammals, and all mammals are animals. Therefore, all whales are animals.



2. Some red-heads are philosophers, but no block-heads are philosophers. Nothing follows. The premises don't tell us about the relationship between redheads and block-heads, and so we are left with three possibilities (all, some and no), and not enough information to choose between them:



3. Macho men are paranoid, and Zeek is a macho man.



4. Nothing follows.
5. Jennifer is not a clairvoyant.
6. Stanislas is not a vampire. (Assuming nothing can be both dead and undead.)
7. Haily isn't a ventriloquist.
8. Phoebe doesn't talk like that.
9. All war veterans are patriotic.
10. Nietzsche was a philosopher.
11. All ecologists are liberal.
12. All people who call women "girls" see them as infantile and easily controlled. (Don't they?)

Only If (p. 103)

1. "Only if Allen were left-handed, could he have painted this daisy," means the same as, "If he painted this daisy, then Allen was left-handed."
2. "Only if I get a least a B+ in this class will I maintain my 3.0 GPA," means the same as, "If I maintain my 3.0 GPA, then I will have had at least a B+ in this class."

3. Only if a boy believes in God can he be a Boy Scout.
   This premis converts to:
   If a boy is a Boy Scout, then he believes in God.
   Kazu is a Boy Scout.
   So, Kazu believes in God.

Second Logic Exercises (p. 104)

1. My fiancé will leave me.
2. Nothing follows. (She could loose for other reasons.)
3. Nothing follows; or, I'd only go out with you on a Wednesday.
4. Tony is not a Shark.
5. You are a bigot.
6. Nothing follows.
7. Anyone who thinks there's more than one kind of legitimate family, doesn't have family values; or, No one who thinks there's more than one kind of legitimate family, has family values.
8. No resistors are collaborators.
9. All cats are felines.
10. *There are several premises that would make this syllogism valid:*
    - All ancient Polynesian art forms should be respected.
    - Everything ancient and Polynesian should be respected.
    - All Polynesian art forms should be respected.
    - All ancient art forms should be respected.
    - Everything ancient should be respected.
    - Everything Polynesian should be respected.
    - All art forms should be respected.

    It doesn't matter logically which premise you pick. But it might matter practically. When you have a choice, you should always base your conclusions on the premises that are easiest to prove (get people to agree to), or the least controversial. Among other considerations, you should determine which premises make smaller claims, because those will usually be easier to get agreement on. In the above list, the first premise makes the smallest claim.
11. *Again, more than one premise would work:*
    - I don't trust anyone who says, "Trust me."
    - I don't trust anything *he* says.
    - I do the opposite of whatever he tells me to do.
12. *The following conclusions can be drawn:*
    8. I'm eating pesto right sauce right now. (from 2 & 4)
    9. C: I don't believe in UFOs. (from 3 & 4)
    10. C: William does not have a pony tail. (from 5 & 9)
    11. C: William is not a folk singer. (from 6 & 10)
    12. C: Pigs don't fly. (from 7 & 12)
    13. C: Marjoire is not a neuro-physicist. (from 1 & 12)

Third Exercises (p. 106)

1. Inductive. (The phrase, "I've ever met," indicates inference from a part of the group to the whole group, and the phrase, "I suppose," indicates uncertainty.)
2. Inductive. (Judging future cases from past cases.)

3. Deductive. (Unless the premise, “Cross-country skiers get lots of exercise,” is not taken to mean “All ….”)
4. Inductive. (And there is such a thing.)
5. Inductive
6. Deductive
7. Deductive.
8. We’ll never get out.
9. Nothing follows.
10. It won’t keep snowing like this. (Don’t be confused by the negatives. “We will get out,” is “not B”, because “B” in the warrant was, “We’ll never get out.”)
11. Nothing follows.
12. *The following conclusions can be drawn:*
    7. C: I can buy 14 rupees. (from 2 & 5)
    8. C: I am not a cosmonaut. (from 6 & 7)
    9. C: Johann is a street vendor. (from 1 & 8)
    10. C: Johann does not eat fish. (from 3 and 9)

Exercises on Fallacies (p. 109)

29. appeal to authority (except that Roberts is known for her big smile)
30. argument to the people (the mob)
31. appeal to force
32. equivocation (a play on the ambiguity of the word “kill,” which can mean “cause death,” or “intentionally put to death”)
33. argument to the person
34. composition
35. appeal to ignorance
36. appeal to pity
37. accident
38. accent
39. appeal to ignorance
40. causal fallacy
41. division
42. hasty generalization
43. equivocation (the phrase, “dated two Canadians” is misconstrued (presumably!))
44. complex question
45. no fallacy, or faulty analogy, depending on the details of the analysis
46. false dichotomy and begging the question
47. contradiction
48. straw person
49. jumping on the bandwagon
50. fallacy of moderation
51. slippery slope
52. appeal to force, if hell is not what the speaker is really worried about or doesn’t believe in hell; otherwise, no fallacy, as made more obvious in the next item.
53. no fallacy
54. causal fallacy
55. 1) appeal to tradition 2) appeal to force 3) argument to the person 4) causal fallacy 5) red herring 6) slippery slope 7) faulty analogy 8) jumping on the band wagon 9) straw person

Further Resources for Chapter 6

Theory of Logic, Critical Thinking and Cognitive Skills

- Julian Baggini and Peter S. Fosl: *The Philosopher's Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003).
- Matthew Lipman: *Thinking in Education, 2nd Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- Ronald F. Reed, et al.: "On the Relation Between Logic and Thinking," *Thinking* Vol. 5, No. 1 (1983), 27-34.
- Dale Cannon and Mark Weinstein: "Reasoning Skills: An Overview," *Thinking* Vol. 6, No. 1 (1985), 25-26.
- Laurance Splitter: "On Thinking for Yourself," *Thinking* Vol. 6, No. 3 (1986), 23-24.
- Matthew Lipman: "Critical Thinking: What Can It Be?" *Educational Leadership*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (September 1988), 38-43.
- Mark Weinstein: "Reason and Critical Thinking," *Informal Logic* Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 1988).
- Jen Glaser: "Reason and the Reasoners," *Thinking* Vol. 10, No. 2 (1992), 23-29.
- Matthew Lipman: "Some Generic Features of Critical Thinking," *The Long Term View*, Volume 2, No. 3 (Summer 1994), 39-44.
- Christina Slade: "Reasoning and Children: The Wide Glare of the Children's Day," *Thinking* Vol. 13, No. 2 (1997), 2-7.
- Claude Gratton: "Precision, Consistency, Implication and Inference," *Thinking* Vol. 15, No. 1 (2000), 30-37.

Pedagogy of Logic, Critical Thinking and Cognitive Skills

- Henry Frankel: "Can We Help Children Think?" *Thinking* Vol. 1, Nos. 3-4 (1979), 76.
- Mark Weinstein: "Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines," *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines* Vol. 2, No. 3 (November 1988).
- Christina Slade: "Logic in the Classroom," *Thinking* Vol. 8, No. 2 (1989), 14-20.
- Nina S. Yulina: "Teaching People How to Reason: The Philosophical Strategy of Philosophy for Children," *Thinking* Vol. 13, No. 4 (1998), 8-19.
- Carol Collins & Sue Knight: "Cultivating reason-giving: an alternative paradigm," *Critical and Creative Thinking* Vol. 13, Nos. 1-2 (2005).



Appendix of Readings

Reading Philosophy

We recommend that along with practicing philosophical dialogue with colleagues and students, you find a way to study philosophy. You may be able to attend lectures or take a course, but in any case we recommend that you also read philosophy on your own. Reading philosophy is typically challenging and rewarding in equal measure. It's a new kind of reading for many people: one that requires a lot of thinking and a pretty slow pace. Don't be intimidated if you find a text difficult to understand. If it keeps your interest, stay with it and struggle through. Get as much meaning out of it as you can, and enjoy the process of stretching yourself and growing into this new capacity. A good dictionary or encyclopedia of philosophy will help, and you can always talk to your IAPC coach about what you're reading. Teachers doing philosophy in the same school often begin philosophical reading groups.

Here are some options for beginning your reading in philosophy:

- Identify a philosopher that you are interested in and would like to read in depth, such as Arendt, Aristotle, Augustine, Berkeley, Descartes, Dewey, Freud, Hegel, Heidegger, Hume, Husserl, James, Jung, Kant, Kierkegaard, Locke, Nietzsche, Marx, Montaigne, Peirce, Plato, Plotinus, Sartre, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, or Wittgenstein.
- Identify a sub-discipline of philosophy that you would like to explore, such as aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, feminism, logic, metaphysics or political philosophy, or philosophy of education, of nature, of gender, of religion, of science, etc.
- Identify a particular issue in philosophy that piques your interest, such as art funding, the death penalty, euthanasia, women's rights, war, stem cell research, religious freedom, or children's rights.
- Read an introductory philosophy text, or a theoretical book about Philosophy for Children from the list on page 18.
- Browse in a library or bookstore with a good philosophy section and find something that catches your interest.

Reading Reflections

- What were two of the most important claims (propositions, ideas) the author made, and what were some of the reasons s/he gave for each?

- What part(s) of the reading did you have trouble understanding? What questions do you have about them?

- Choose one of the author's claims that you agree or disagree with and say why.

- Share one question that this reading raised in your mind, or that you would like to discuss.

Reading Reflections

- What were two of the most important claims (propositions, ideas) the author made, and what were some of the reasons s/he gave for each?

- What part(s) of the reading did you have trouble understanding? What questions do you have about them?

- Choose one of the author's claims that you agree or disagree with and say why.

- Share one question that this reading raised in your mind, or that you would like to discuss.

Are Philosophy and Children Good for Each Other?

by Maughn Gregory[1]

I. What is Philosophy?

The answer to the question in the title partly depends, of course, on our conceptions of philosophy and of children. Philosophy, like religion and science, is many things to many people. It is all at once (though not for all concerned) an academic profession, an amateur hobby, and an attitude. I will explain a little what I mean by offering six different answers to the question, "What is philosophy?"

To begin with, philosophy exists at its most general as an attitude, which may be described as a genuine sense of wonder. Almost any object or event may prompt this wonder, but the wonder is always directed toward meaning, in the sense that we might wonder about what the object or event means, or means for us. Philosophical wonderment is more intense than idle curiosity. It is a strange combination of excitement and discomfort. There is an element of yearning in it: a yearning for greater meaning, where 'greater' might mean clearer, expanded or more profound. This kind of yearning toward meaning is reflected in the word 'philosophy' which translates from the Greek as 'love of wisdom' (keeping in mind the erotic connotations of love). Philosophy as a kind of love—an experience of yearning toward meaning--isn't something we can turn on and off, though we can cultivate our susceptibility to it.

Second, and more particularly, philosophy is a field of inquiry into a family of perennial questions such as, "What is justice?" "What is beauty?" "How can I be sure of what I know?" "What is the right thing to do?" and "What is real?" This notion of philosophy follows quite naturally from the one we began with, if we consider that these kinds of questions might be described as questions of ultimate meaning. Philosophers disagree about whether there are any final criteria for what should be meaningful for human beings; however, it is safe to generalize that for most people, certain questions are more meaningful than others. I find very useful the description offered by my friends Ann Sharp and Laurance Splitter, that most philosophical questions approach ideas that are of *central* (rather than peripheral) concern to our lives, *common* (rather than idiosyncratic) in human experience, and *contestable* (rather than settled or pre-ordained) in status.[2]

Next, philosophy is a kind of practice—a method of inquiry into the kind of content I have described. What that method is or should be is itself a contestable philosophical issue. In fact, this concern for method—this inquiry into its own means of inquiry—has typified philosophy from the beginning.

I will very briefly describe the method of philosophical inquiry that is practiced in Philosophy for Children. This method has cognitive and social dimensions. 'Cognitive' refers to thinking, though many of us believe that thinking is something done with the entire body, and that it is a social as well as an individual activity. Philosophy has always included the pursuit of good thinking, where 'good' might mean nothing more than 'efficacious' in struggling with questions of a certain kind. We may never come up with a set of thinking moves, skills or dispositions that is definitive in that it corresponds to the contours of Truth, or Nature or the human mind. But we should recognize that thinking tools have been evolved that can help us cope meaningfully with different kinds of experience. To this end, facilitators of Philosophy for Children model many kinds of good thinking strategies, engage students in practicing good thinking moves, and in reflection on what it means to think well in various contexts. And we tend to evaluate our philosophical thinking, not against the standards of logic, but against the results of our inquiry: did the kinds of thinking we engaged in help us construct greater

[1] *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Volume 16, Number 2 (Fall 2002).

[2] See Laurance Splitter & Ann Sharp: *Teaching for Better Thinking* (Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1995), 130.

meaning—help us satisfy our philosophical longings?

The social dimension of philosophical inquiry is traceable to Socrates' practice of dialogue, and to the more recent observation of American philosopher Charles Peirce that philosophy flourishes in a certain kind of environment that he called (and that we in Philosophy for Children still call) the 'community of inquiry.' People in a community of inquiry work together to collectively advance their thinking around questions of common concern, by carefully considering, challenging, and building on one another's ideas and reasons. The community of inquiry makes possible two kinds of what Peirce called 'self-correction.' Individuals self-correct when they replace some of their previously-held ideas or values with ones they have found—through the give-and-take of inquiry—to be more adequate (meaningful). To self-correct is to reconstruct our own conceptual, moral or aesthetic judgments, rather than having them corrected by an external authority. Communities also self-correct, in the sense of reconstructing shared understandings (knowledge) and values that can become the bases of collective action.

The history of philosophy is more or less a record of men and women animated by intense wonder to inquire into questions of ultimate meaning for them. The fourth answer to the question "What is philosophy?", then, is that philosophy is a category of world literature that records centuries of this kind of inquiry. In academic philosophy we sometimes think of philosophy as a canon of thinkers and writers (some of whom, let us not forget, were also warriors and lovers, engineers and poets, as well as philanderers, drunks, Nazis and sociopaths). However, there is quite a bit of controversy among professional philosophers about who, and what belongs to this canon, and even the non-controversial core of the canon is astounding in its multiplicity.

The remaining two answers to "What is philosophy?" are different contexts in which the practice of philosophy as takes place. Fifth, philosophy exists as an academic discipline: a field of academic study, a category of professional literature, and a rather exclusive professional community. The purposes of this discipline include the preservation of the philosophical canon, the perpetuation and improvement of the method of philosophical inquiry, and the rigorous practice of philosophy itself, i.e. the pursuit of questions of ultimate meaning.

Sixth, however, outside of the profession philosophy also exists as an amateur hobby, a shared enthusiasm, an individual and social pastime for millions of people. There are countless informal, grass-roots reading clubs, discussion groups, and Socrates Cafés[3] all over the world devoted to philosophical practice. Even more informally, philosophy happens among friends and family, at dinner tables, in taverns, and on road trips. And of course, philosophy is something many of us do in solitude: in the woods, in reading chairs and in bathtubs. The familiarity of non-professionals with the canon, and their ability to utilize the professional literature that surrounds it, is often weak. But if non-professionals take up genuine questions of ultimate meaning and if they are able to inquire carefully into those questions, giving some attention to method, and in particular if they belong to a philosophical community that pays attention to regulating its own practice, then these inquiries are genuine instances of 'philosophy' and I should be surprised if they did not often find the meaning they sought. This latter claim, of course, applies to children as well as adults.

II. Are Philosophy and Children Good for Each Other?

The claim that philosophy is good for children will seem audacious if it is assumed to rests on a teleological conception of children that explains what they are meant to become, what they lack now, and what is conducive making them grow in that way. In fact, I do not have such of a conceptualization of children or 'childhood'. The claim I make is that philosophy is good for children in just the way it is good for adults, or, put another way, the benefits (and perils) that philosophy offers to people apply to children as well as adults. Having said that, I will continue to refer to children, so

[3] See, e.g. Chris Philips: *The Socrates Café* (Norton, 2001), and The Society for Philosophical Inquiry at www.philosopher.org.

that my remarks might be more easily applied to educational contexts.

Very simply, the ways I believe philosophy is good for children correspond to the prescription I gave above for the practice of philosophy. First, the study and practice of philosophy provides an education in standard tropes of good thinking, dialogue and judgment making, as well as initiation into ongoing inquiry about the nature of these. Whether or not we take these tropes to be trans-cultural, trans-historical truths, we will find them eminently useful and in that regard, worth knowing. Like most tools, we acquire skill in using them only through practice, and I know of no better practice for thinking than the practice of philosophy.

Second, philosophy as I have described it offers children the experience of collective inquiry: of sharing responsibility for the inquiry with a group of their peers; of relying on one another to maintain the integrity of the inquiry, of making the community intellectually safe for the exploration of multiple viewpoints, of practicing democratic interaction, and of constructing the kind of common understandings and shared interests that make collective action possible. The political implications of enculturating children into such a social practice are profound.

Third, philosophy provides children the opportunity to pursue meaning for themselves, and so to experience and satisfy that special yearning for meaning. Children, like adults, are impressionable, and this raises the concern that exposing them to logic and to the ideas of other philosophers (or of their teachers or peers) will lead them to appropriate other people's meaning rather than construct their own. These are important concerns, but they need to be balanced against the concern that a lack of exposure to a historical dialogue of ideas, and to a variety of tools of thinking will leave children less able to pursue their yearning for meaning.

Like all prescriptive definitions, the one I have offered for philosophical inquiry harbors the dual dangers of being too narrow—and so excluding other legitimate methods—and of being too broad, and so including illegitimate methods. What's at stake in distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate methods is whatever we value about the practice of philosophy. I am not a relativist about these three things I value in the practice of philosophy, so I don't shrink from the claim that they are good for children. In our dealings with our children I take it that we are unable to be value-neutral: to avoid interacting with them in a way that will impose some of our values on them in ways they are powerless to escape. We owe it to them, therefore, to be as careful as we can in educating them. We owe it to our children to share with them both the goals and the means we have evolved for living well—e.g. with health, peace, justice and beauty—though we should expect them to reconstruct those goals and means in light of their own experiences. In this regard, education is always a kind of formation, but it can be a formation that liberates, that opens up more possibilities for our children, that facilitates their cognitive, emotional and social intelligence. The practice of philosophy does this.

Finally, philosophy needs children in order to self-correct. The practice and the content of philosophy are precious enough that we should attempt to preserve and cultivate them, but at the same time we should be liberal enough to allow them to change and grow, and we need children to do both. Let me suggest only three ways that children are good for philosophy. The first is simply that philosophy needs good practitioners, and children very often make excellent practitioners. This is an empirical claim substantiated by a growing field of research. Second, insofar as philosophy involves constructing meaning from common and central human experience, and since so much of our experience is shared with the children in our lives, it would be irresponsible for us to inquire into the meaning of that experience without including our children's perspectives: the details they notice, the injustices they feel, the imaginative possibilities they see. To dismiss their input from our inquiry would simply be bad philosophical method. Third, I will hazard a generalization that children on the whole are more susceptible than adults to philosophical wonder, perhaps because children are comparatively less socialized. In any case, I have found that in practicing philosophy with children adults are sometimes able to rekindle their own sense of wonder.

The notion of self-correction implies that our most meaningful philosophical judgments are provisional and fallible. We need children to philosophize with us, to help us reconstruct not only our philosophical concepts, but our notions of what philosophy is and what it's for. In these inquiries adults and children won't always be able to yield to one another's visions; but being able to do so sometimes is an essential aspect of practicing philosophy.

Philosophy for Children and/as Philosophical Practice

by Megan Laverty[1]

The phrases, 'philosophy for children' and 'philosophical practice' have both general and specific meanings. Their general meanings are straight-forward for 'philosophical practice' refers to philosophy as an activity – something one engages in – so that all philosophy is in a sense philosophical activity; and 'philosophy for children' refers to the practice of doing philosophy with children, so that broadly construed, 'philosophy for children' is also a form of philosophical practice. Although the generic meaning of the phrase 'philosophical practice' includes traditional philosophical scholarship, over the last twenty years it has come to be used in a contrastive way, referring to the adaptation of philosophy for popular contexts, which has both a theoretical and a practical dimension. Theoretically speaking, it has lead to such developments as feminism, environmentalism, queer theory and applied ethics, as individuals use and construct philosophical theories around topical concerns, social injustices, determining matters of policy and so on. These largely theoretical developments have resulted in an expanding body of scholarly literature, the proliferation of new university courses, and the advancement of recent debates on the nature of philosophy. All of these testify to the analytical and conceptual strengths of academically trained philosophers, although we are yet to evaluate their actual impact upon society-at-large.

On the practical side, philosophy is being used in contexts beyond the academy - most notably philosophy cafés, hospitals, healthcare and social welfare organizations, counseling centers and corporations - on the assumption that philosophers can usefully assist individuals, groups, corporations and professions in problem-solving and decision-making processes. Rather than the philosopher devising a solution for the specific problems, she assists others to become more aware of their own thinking so as to improve the means by which they solve problems for themselves. This process is dialogical. It allows the philosopher to respond to the thinking of the individuals with whom she is in conversation and by means of that engagement, model good thinking for them. The principal result of such work is the popularization of philosophy: there are now philosophy magazines intended to be read by philosophers and non-philosophers alike; books on the philosophy of baseball, film, *Seinfeld*, *the Matrix* and so on; and books written for non-philosophers introducing them to the tradition of philosophy. Increasingly people come to see that having the opportunity to philosophize, either on their own or with other people, is a traditional, albeit unrecognized, human entitlement.

It is fair to assume that the entitlement to philosophize extends, in principle, to children, and if not, then at least as something that will benefit them in virtue of the expertise that philosophical study provides and allow them to better exercise their entitlement upon adulthood.[1] This expertise is essentially threefold. It consists in a disposition to be skeptical which results in the ability to reflect on competing points of view; it is the ability to evaluate relationships between ideas; and finally it is knowledge of metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic theories foundational to our responses to such questions as: 'When am I obligated to share?', 'Should I lie in the interests of protecting a friend?'; 'By what criteria do I judge this landscape to be beautiful?'; 'When is it right to terminate a life?' and so on. Philosophy gives students an opportunity to reflect upon their thinking as they inquire together about the Big Questions and, thereby, become acquainted with their intellectual heritage.

European countries - and more recently Australia and Canada - have made the study of philosophy available to students in their senior years of secondary study, but more often as an elective or as a program of extension. As these units of study are modeled generally on university courses, they are tied to classical philosophical texts

[1] Excerpted with permission from *International Journal of Applied Philosophy* 18:2 (2004), 141-51.

and sub-divided into ancient philosophy, modern philosophy, ethics and epistemology for example. Thus conceived, doing philosophy with children, or at least young adolescents, has had a reasonably long tradition. Philosophy for Children is one of the few programs that has endeavored to implement the teaching of philosophy into all schools and at every age level.

Philosophy for Children

Philosophy for Children originated a little over thirty years ago, transposing philosophy from its university setting to secondary and elementary education. In 1970 Matthew Lipman, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, designed a curriculum, based on a novel called *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*, that would expose young adolescents to the central concepts and principles of philosophy in such a way that they could learn how to reason cooperatively, build on each other's ideas, and construct theories that would help them to make sense of their worlds.[2] In *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* a group of school-age children discover the principles of inquiry and basic logic as they consider issues that matter to them. The characters discuss questions of beauty, justice, truth and education for example, implicitly enlisting a variety of arguments drawn from the (Western) philosophical tradition. The value of philosophical reasoning is reinforced by way of its practical application in the context of the character's lives.

Lipman hoped that *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* would be read by students over the course of a semester or year and serve as a stimulus for their own philosophical inquiry. This inquiry would be conducted dialogically and facilitated by a teacher with sufficient philosophical expertise to be able to draw out the philosophical themes and arguments of the text, as well as guide and encourage the students as they learn to philosophize: to give and evaluate reasons, identify assumptions, consider implications, ask probing questions, think analogically etc. As *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* was piloted and found to improve critical thinking skills, Lipman became interested in writing more materials, specifically, novels for children and accompanying resource manuals for teachers, both as chronological successors and predecessors of *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*.[3] In 1974 he left Columbia University to establish the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) at Montclair State University. Before long he was joined by Professor Ann Margaret Sharp who shared the vision of bringing philosophy to children. The two worked tirelessly to develop new materials for younger children, disseminate the program in many countries around the world, and build up a cadre of experienced teachers and teacher trainers.

By 1985, the movement had grown to such proportions that the International Council of Philosophical inquiry with Children (ICPIC) was inaugurated in Elsinore, Denmark with a membership of over 20 nations. Today over 60 nations are represented in ICPIC and Philosophy for Children has grown into an international curriculum that spans from early childhood until the senior years of high school. The movement has spawned three journals, numerous theoretical and instructional books, and has been adapted for other disciplines and programs, including mathematics, language arts, social studies, science as well as civics education, violence prevention and sexuality education. In 1984, a Masters Program in Philosophy for Children was initiated at Montclair State University by the IAPC and over the last twenty years it has been adapted in Nigeria, Australia, Canada, Mexico and Brazil. In 1994, the first doctoral program in Philosophy for Children was inaugurated at Iberoamericana University in Mexico City. Its first graduates are now world leaders in the reform of education in their respective countries: Mexico, Korea, Canada, Brazil, Argentina and the United States. A second doctoral program began in 1999 at Montclair State University. The culminating degree of this program is an Ed.D, rather than a Ph.D, to underscore the role of Philosophy for Children in improving pedagogy for children and teachers in all subjects and at all levels.

With the growth of Philosophy for Children, practitioners in a variety of national and cultural settings have adapted Lipman's original model to fit their own contexts, while striving to retain its central elements. This balancing act has not always been harmonious, but it reflects a growing maturity and depth which is characteristic of

a discipline - in this case, pre-college philosophy - as it grows beyond the initial vision of its creators. Philosophical and empirical research on, and new curriculum materials in Philosophy for Children published in the last three decades reflect the international and the scholarly diversity in the field, and evidence a number of important developments. One development concerns the program's early derivation from American pragmatism, contrasted with the plurality of current theory. It is no surprise given Lipman's involvement in pragmatism (having corresponded with Dewey, having been supervised by John Herman Randall, having had a long association with Justus Buchler, a Deweyan naturalist) that Philosophy for Children was originally conceived and defended on the basis of pragmatist philosophy - particularly in the way it conceived of philosophy as an endeavor of collective inquiry beginning with problematic experience and leading toward warranted judgments. While some scholars in the field continue to develop this tradition, there has also been a proliferation of theoretical frameworks through which Philosophy for Children has been understood and practiced, including not only Western and Eastern philosophies, but also feminism, post-modernism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. The integration and exchange of plural discourses ensures the ongoing relevance of the program and the continual diversification of emphases in pedagogy and curriculum.

Another development also concerns a diversification on the part of the program's self-conception and self-actualization, but with respect to its elements. The program began as an effective means by which to teach children reasoning: *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* was modeled on University philosophy courses (as the best available models of reasoning courses), and it was taught using a discussion, inquiry based approach (as the most conducive approach for teaching reasoning to children). Since that time, it has been acknowledged that Philosophy for Children is much more than a 'critical thinking skills' program. Other significant dimensions include: the encouragement of creative and caring thinking;[4] engaging students in meaningful reflection upon their lives;[5] and the pedagogical significance of the social, political, aesthetic and ethical dimensions of 'the community of inquiry'.[6]

With the consolidation of Philosophy for Children, scholarship within the field has extended from issues of elucidation, application and legitimation (all of which remain important) to look outwards in the spirit of dialogical engagement with numerous philosophical and educational schools and practices, as a means of growth. As a form of philosophical practice, Philosophy for Children has consistently acknowledged its derivations in the Western philosophical tradition and the expertise of academic philosophy. More recently, it has conceived of its own philosophical practice as paradigmatic for education, philosophy, ethics and politics. If it is true that Philosophy for Children represents such a paradigm shift, then this new direction of scholarship is exciting not just for Philosophy for Children but the entire field of philosophical practice.[7]

Philosophy for Children *and* Philosophical Practice

Over the course of its evolution and adaptation, Philosophy for Children has retained some key elements which I will briefly mention before identifying similarities and differences between it and other approaches to philosophical practice.

The philosophical dialogue conducted in the name of Philosophy for Children often begins with a shared stimulus text. There is disagreement within the Philosophy for Children community as to specifications of the stimulus text but minimally its purpose is to give the students a common reference point for their inquiry.[8] Practitioners in the field use: the traditional curriculum, shorter stories modeled on the traditional curriculum, picture books, philosophical essays, music, paintings and so on. The stimulus text mediates between the individual and her culture,[9] and ensures that the inquiry upon meaning has a focal emphasis. This emphasis is less upon the text itself and more upon the text as both representative of the meanings we encounter in the world and a prompt to reflect, challenge, appropriate, reject and modify those meanings. The students are in a dialogical relationship with the text as much as they are each other. On the basis

of the stimulus text, the students develop questions which set the agenda for their discussion.

Students are encouraged by the teacher to see themselves as participants in a community of philosophical inquiry which entails that they also see themselves as involved in the ongoing improvement of their participation. Students in a community of philosophical inquiry readily learn that such improvement involves the community in balancing a set of different, but related, commitments. At any one time, the students are committed to: thinking well (considering alternative points of view, giving reasons and evaluating those reasons, identifying and correcting fallacious thinking and so on); the dialogue as being inclusive, respectful and honest (individuals listen to one another, try to understand one another's perspectives, are prepared to contribute without dominating and to self-correct); to the dialogue being worthwhile or meaningful for them, that is, deepen their understanding of the concepts or issues at hand.

In order to achieve a harmonious balance of the three commitments, Philosophy for Children encourages students to reflect upon, and evaluating the procedures of their own community of philosophical inquiry. This involves consideration of such questions as: 'How do we feel about what has been going on?'; 'Have we considered enough alternatives?'; 'Have we been fair?'; 'Is our assumption sound?'; 'Have we made a great enough effort to include others?'; 'Was Elizabeth's point overlooked?'; and 'How could we do better?'. From such reflection, students learn about their patterns of behavior and thought, by way of how others experience them, and such awareness enables them potentially to modify and diversify these patterns in light of communal engagement and a commitment to improvement. This process reflects the educational aim of the program which is to distribute responsibility for the procedures of philosophical dialogue (the logical, ethical and conceptual dimensions) to the students so that they can learn how to do it both together and – through a process of internalization – by themselves.[10]

Although distinctive in its own right, Philosophy for Children shares with other approaches to philosophical practice the following assumptions:

- Individuals, whether young or old, with or without a college education, are potential philosophers because implicit in their daily living are philosophies of life, relationships, happiness etc. that they may or may not be aware of.
- Philosophical reflection contributes to self-knowledge because our philosophical beliefs are as constitutive of our identity as is our psychology, neurology and biology, for example. Our philosophical beliefs form a lens through which we interpret the world and are the foundation for our values.
- The history of philosophy, in particular the schools of thought and theories that comprise it, is an invaluable resource for individuals to use in reflecting on their lives.
- Individual and communal living is improved by philosophically disciplined reflection.

Philosophy for Children is both radically more and less naïve, than Philosophical Practice. It is naïve in so far as it engages the very young child. Such engagement is an expression of faith in the child's philosophical abilities against many prevailing developmental models of children. But it also displays its lack of naivety through the same activity: engaging the very young child. The assumption of Philosophical Practice is as people are inherently reasonable, they will be persuaded by reason (assuming that they are not suffering from a severe mental illness). By contrast Philosophy for Children, on the other hand, assumes that in order to be persuaded by reason both adults and children need to be educated in reasonableness. This thinking is not that dissimilar from John Locke's view that individuals are not inherently reasonable but become so by virtue of being treated as reasonable. Having assumed Lev Vygotsky's theory that learning is a process of internalizing what one experiences as working externally, Philosophy for Children engages children in philosophical dialogue with their peers, early in their formative development, with a view to having them internalize its logical and procedural

principles. Its purpose is to distribute philosophical proficiency to as many individuals as possible, so as to render the expertise of professional philosophers less exceptional and ultimately less necessary.

Its purpose also, is to demonstrate to students the value of thinking through problems communally rather than individually. Instead of the fundamental relationship being that of the individual and philosophy (an individual employs philosophical methodology and/or theory to negotiate competing beliefs and belief systems, create new beliefs or modify old beliefs) it can be that of the community and philosophy so that the philosophical reflection is enriched by way of the different intellectual, emotional and imaginative strengths and perspectives of the students. Philosophy for Children conceives of philosophical engagement as communal, in large part because it originated in pragmatist epistemology and the idea that knowledge is not so much discovered as constructed socially by a community of scholars, and more recently because it has drawn from influences like Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative rationality and action, Hans-Georg Gadamer and the hermeneutical tradition, Emmanuel Levinas's privileging of the ethical, Michel Foucault's politicization of knowledge, Ludwig Wittgenstein's language philosophy, Vygotsky's learning theory and a range of feminist epistemologies. A key assumption in Philosophy for Children is that students in a community of philosophical inquiry learn to think for themselves as they learn to think with others. The acknowledgement of the inescapable grounds of knowledge in our relationality, sociability and corporeality that occurs (as evidenced in the dialogue itself) contributes to the priorities in a community of philosophical inquiry being fidelity or truthfulness (rather than truth itself), ongoing critique and reconstruction, fallibilism and provisionalism (rather than Cartesian certainty and omniscience), and a discourse of appreciation and reflection that contextualizes assertions and counter-assertions.

It is the inevitability of this emphasis on the relationship between meaning and the grounds for meaning that has inspired scholars in Philosophy for Children to represent the community of philosophical inquiry as an educational, political, ethical and philosophical ideal. Educationally speaking, it provides us with a pedagogical model useful in all school subjects, in which lecturing gives way to communal dialogue, absolutism is replaced by a commitment to fallibilism (but not crude relativism), and teachers become co-inquirers into the meaning of the central concepts of all disciplines. Politically speaking, the community of philosophical inquiry is able to serve as a model for democratic practice in its negotiation between the individual and the collective. Ethically speaking, the community of philosophical inquiry provides a model for an epistemology and pedagogy developed in the context of interpersonal relations. Philosophically, it creates new discursive and theoretical possibilities.

What has been said above applies irrespective of whether one is engaging in a community of philosophical inquiry with adults or children. Although Philosophy for Children is practiced with adults, its greatest contribution is the inclusion of children. I have already referred to the value of bringing philosophy to children in terms of honoring their humanity, providing them with the benefits of philosophical expertise, and acquainting them with their intellectual and cultural heritage. But what about the value to philosophy and adults of including children in philosophical inquiry? I suspect that Philosophy will change to accommodate children just as it has increasingly accommodated other marginalized groups such as women, gays, and indigenous groups. What this change will mean is impossible to predict.[11] Relatedly, the relatively small field of the philosophy of childhood may continue to grow and develop as we recognize its significance both for other fields in philosophy and for our treatment of children.[12] Finally, if it is true, as some have claimed, that adulthood is achieved only through the loss of childhood, then Philosophy for Children may enable us to discover the child in ourselves, as we direct our attention and reach out towards the venerable wisdom of the child.

ENDNOTES

[1] This is not because philosophy is the only discipline capable of producing such skills and dispositions in students, but because this is philosophy's principal focus and so are made more explicit and because these skills and dispositions in philosophy are connected with the search for meaning.

[2] Matthew Lipman, *Harry Stottlemeier's discovery* (Montclair: New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 1982).

[3] Matthew Lipman, "Philosophy for Children" in *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1976, pp17-39; Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp and Frederick S. Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the classroom* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1980) Appendix B "Experimental research in Philosophy for Children", pp 217-224.

[4] Matthew Lipman, *Thinking in education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2003)

[5] Megan Laverty, "Philosophy and pedagogy in Australian schools: the relationship between Philosophy for Children and VCE philosophy" in *Critical and Creative Thinking: the Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2002, pp 29-43.

[6] Some examples of these recent developments include: Ann Margaret Sharp, "The religious dimensions of Philosophy for Children" in *Critical and Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol. 2, Nos 1 and 2, March and October 1994, pp 2-14 and pp 1-18; Ann Margaret Sharp, "The community of inquiry: education for a democracy" in *Thinking: the Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp 42-51;

[7] I am grateful for Laurance Splitter's comments on an earlier draft of this Introduction.

[8] Whereas some feel that the stimulus text should, for pedagogical reasons, model philosophical inquiry and dialogue, others feel that while this might be ideal it is not always necessary. See for example, Matthew Lipman, "Where to P4C?" in *Thinking: the Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol. 16., No 2., pp12-13, form p 13, "The more propositional attitudes are included, the more the texture of the text becomes a mental one. As contrasting attitudes are depicted, the infrastructure of argumentation sets the stage for philosophical instruction. A page dense with mental acts is a nurturing environment for thinking."

[9] Matthew Lipman, *Thinking in education* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp101.

[10] Laurance Splitter, "Transforming how teachers teach and children learn" in *Critical and Creative Thinking: the Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp 40-56; an unpublished manuscript by Maughn Gregory and Megan Laverty on evaluating classroom communities of inquiry.

[11] David Kennedy, "Philosophy for Children and the reconstruction of philosophy" in *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 30, No. 4, October 99, pp 339-359.

[12] See for example: Gareth B. Matthews, *The philosophy of childhood* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996); David Kennedy, "Reconstructing childhood" in *Thinking: the journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol. 14, No.1, pp 29-37; "The roots of child study: philosophy, history and religion" in Teachers College Record, Vol. 102, No. 3, June 2000, pp. 514-538; "The hermeneutics of childhood", *Philosophy Today*, Spring 1992, pp 44-60; and *The well of being: childhood and postmodern subjectivity*, forthcoming 2005.

Teaching Philosophy vs Teaching to Philosophise

by Pablo Cevallos Estarellas[1]

If to do philosophy is to ask questions of a special kind about central human problems and then to grapple with them in a rigorous way, most people can in principle learn how to philosophise. This means that unlike most academic disciplines, philosophy has two legitimate manifestations: the *professional* practice of philosophical inquiry, with reference to the canon of historical philosophical works, and the *amateur* practice of philosophical inquiry, without reference to previous philosophy. In this article I'll distinguish between these two expressions of philosophical practice and explore their educational applications.

Two Manifestations of Philosophical Practice

We need to begin with a definition of philosophy. This is tricky, as it seems that there are as many conceptions of philosophy as there are philosophers. However, many philosophers work with a shared notion of what philosophy is, even if it is often left unarticulated: they conceive philosophy as an activity or a process, more than an accumulation of contents or products. This sketchy conceptualization of philosophy has at least two properties that are relevant to this discussion. The first is that philosophy is defined mainly in procedural terms, identifying it with the activity of philosophizing (what philosophers do, ie, the *method*) rather than with the products of philosophy (what philosophers have accomplished, ie, the results). The second is that it describes the philosophical method as the combination of two basic elements: (a) a specific kind of thinking (reflective, critical, creative, striving for understanding, etc) and (b) a specific kind of issues or questions (fundamental or conceptual ones, which cannot be solved by mere observation or calculation).

If this 'procedural' definition of philosophy is accepted, then one important implication that follows is that, as hinted, anybody can in principle practice it without having studied it at an academic level. This sets philosophy apart from many other academic disciplines, which can hardly be practiced in any meaningful sense without one having a substantive knowledge of the discipline's canon and without one keeping abreast with the knowledge produced in the field. For example, it is very difficult to conceive somebody who practices sociology nowadays and does not know anything about the works of, say, Max Weber or C. Wright Mills, or somebody who practices biology and ignores Darwin's theory of evolution by means of natural selection, and Stephen J. Gould's corollary of punctuated equilibrium. By contrast, philosophy *can* be practiced without knowledge of the academic tradition that exists behind it.

'Professional' philosophy. Philosophy *can* indeed be practiced without knowledge of its academic tradition, but *can* does not imply *must*. There is an extensive written record of the ways in which past philosophers have dealt with philosophical questions, and how successive generations of philosophers commented on their answers. Knowing that rich tradition has an intrinsic intellectual value, for as English philosopher Nigel Warburton has remarked, "without some knowledge of history philosophers would never progress: they would keep making the same mistakes, unaware that they had been made before" (*Philosophy: The Basics*). Thus, within the realms of academia, to philosophise means more than just grappling with philosophical questions from scratch; it involves arguing with the answers given to philosophical problems by other philosophers, in what can be seen as a conversation spanning many generations. According to this narrow view, a (Western) philosopher is somebody who continues the tradition started by the ancient Greek philosophers. Since universities are more or less the only institutions which pay people to philosophise, it follows that a professional philosopher is nearly always a university teacher of philosophy.

[1] Reprinted with author's permission from *Philosophy Now*, Issue 63 (Sept/Oct 2007), 12-15.

'Amateur' philosophy. While the professional model of philosophising has undeniable merits, the fact remains that the rich tradition of philosophical texts needs not be known (let alone mastered) in order to be able to *philosophise*. People who have no acquaintance with the philosophical tradition naturally struggle with philosophical problems. This is probably because these problems are grounded in everyday experience. As Thomas Nagel puts it, "the philosophical raw material comes directly from the world and our relation to it, not from writings of the past" (*What Does It All Mean?*). According to him this explains why is it that philosophical issues "come up again, in the heads of people who haven't read about them." (By the way, I use the adjective 'amateur' simply as the antonym of professional, ie, as the activity engaged in by those who philosophise without necessarily referring to the canon of philosophical works.)

The professional (academic) practice of philosophy has become the dominant and by far the most prestigious one. This might be due to the fact that at least since the late Middle Ages professional philosophy monopolized universities and other academic centres, where it eventually acquired, according to Kwame Anthony Appiah, "the highest-status label of Western humanism" (*In My Father's House*). In the contemporary world, philosophy as a professional practice enjoys great health, at least within the boundaries of universities. In his article "What is philosophy?", Barry Stroud argues that this is good because it protects the existence of philosophy as a relatively free activity, by isolating philosophers from the restrictive controls of society and government. But at the same time this is *bad* for philosophy, because the more it becomes professionalised, the more it becomes an esoteric activity to which amateur practitioners of philosophy have no access.

Philosophy's increasing professionalisation has had at least two lamentable consequences. The first is that as philosophy grows apart from society, philosophers' interests (and their publications) become increasingly abstract and less applicable to the real problems of regular people and societies. The second is that as society grows apart from philosophy, it becomes less philosophical, fostering an attitude that Martha Nussbaum has fittingly dubbed 'philosophical recalcitrance', which encourages simplistic answers to real life problems.

One possible antidote against the increasing public image of philosophy as an esoteric and elitist activity (and its resulting isolation) is the fostering of the amateur practice of philosophy. And yet, paradoxically, one consequence of the dominance of professional philosophy has been, precisely, the impairment and weakening of the amateur tradition, which was always predicated on the non-elitist assumption that everybody could learn to philosophise, an assumption that came under attack by professional philosophers. Especially during the heyday of philosophical professionalisation (which in the English-speaking world coincided with the dominance of the analytic movement during the 1950s and 1960s), some academic philosophers openly ruled out the possibility that the regular folk could practice philosophy – a contemporary equivalent of Plato's snobbish conclusion that only a tiny minority of intellectually advantaged individuals are able to philosophise.

However, there have always been dissenting voices among academic philosophers who questioned and severely criticized the 'elitist' tradition. For example, Arthur Schopenhauer publicly ridiculed the academic 'book-philosophers' who dedicate most of their time to the study of what other philosophers said instead of thinking for themselves. Later, John Dewey argued that philosophy had become a rarefied discipline infatuated with a quest for certainty, and thus he proposed a reconstruction of it. In his classic *Democracy and Education*, he says that although philosophical problems arise in everyday life, most people do not identify them as philosophical because philosophers have developed a specialized vocabulary that can only be understood by those who belong to the guild, so to speak. A more recent critic of the elitist tradition is Bryan Magee, a renowned populariser of philosophy, who says: "The notion that only those who have studied philosophy at a university can philosophise is on par with the notion that only those who have made an academic study of literature can read a classic novel" (*Confessions of a*

Philosopher). What unites all these criticisms of the exclusively professional (and elitist) tradition of philosophical practice is the conviction that, given the opportunity, laypeople are likely to philosophise. That takes us directly to the next topic, namely, the educational implications of philosophy.

Educational Implications of the Two Traditions of Doing Philosophy

When thinking about the educational implications of philosophy, the above distinction between the professional and the amateur traditions becomes extremely important. Under the predominance of professional practice, philosophy as a school discipline has become a quasi-arcane subject dedicated to the study and interpretation of texts written by famous philosophers of the past (or secondary sources referring to them), instead of engagement with pressing philosophical problems relevant to students' lives. The use of this educational approach, which I will term 'didactic', has the practical result of alienating many people from philosophy, not because they are incapable of studying it, but simply because they lose interest.

When academic philosophy is included in high school or university curricula, the courses usually take the didactic approach. Perhaps with the commendable purpose of having students learn to philosophise from being exposed to the inspiring ideas of academic philosophers, or perhaps with the less commendable one of making it easier for instructors to test students, these courses as a norm are limited to the teaching of the history of philosophy, either in chronological stages or according to the traditional problems of philosophy. In so doing, they fail to teach students how to philosophise, instead merely teaching them what the philosophers of the past said. This is a problem for two reasons.

The first is that even when executed well, the didactic approach does not help students to understand the world and themselves better. Only rarely are students new to philosophy in a position to fully appreciate what others have written about philosophical problems until they've engaged with those problems on their own. A similar criticism, expressed in stronger terms, is Schopenhauer's tirade in his essay 'On Thinking for Yourself':

"The man who thinks for himself becomes acquainted with the authorities for his opinions only after he has acquired them and merely as a confirmation of them, while the book-philosopher starts with his authorities, in that he constructs his opinions by collecting together the opinions of others; his mind then compares with that of the former as a automaton compares with a living man. ... This is what determines the difference between a thinker and a mere scholar. "

The second problem is that in many cases the didactic approach is not applied well, and then fails even to help students understand the philosophical ideas of famous philosophers, instead making them parrot ideas that they do not understand. It also confirms students' prejudice that philosophy is an inert subject, completely disconnected from their lives. When this happens – and unfortunately it happens a lot – not only is the original purpose of teaching philosophy absolutely nullified, but students are also likely to develop strong feelings against it.

In response to the elitist professional tradition and its 'didactic' educational approach, advocates of amateur philosophical practice have drawn on Socrates' example to propose a completely different approach to teaching philosophy. This alternative approach, which can be called 'dialogical' because of its emphasis on dialogue in the classroom, aims to teach students how to philosophise by doing it, even if that means that beginner students may not learn what the main philosophers of the past have said, or what the traditional philosophical problems are. In so doing, the dialogical approach recreates a significant aspect of philosophy's dialectical origins, whereby in order to philosophise it was not at all necessary to know what others had said about philosophical issues (mainly because there was no accumulated record to refer to). In emphasising method over content, the dialogical approach makes philosophy accessible to those not necessarily trained in the professional tradition of philosophy. Showing characteristically democratic leanings, this pedagogical approach is based on the

premise that every person is a potential philosopher.

How is dialogue used to teach to philosophise? The word 'dialogue' comes from the combination of two Greek words: *dia*, which means 'through', and *logos*, which means 'word'. Etymologically, dialogue suggests a movement or exchange of words between two or more persons. 'Dialogue' is sometimes used as a synonym for conversation, but they refer to very different types of communication. Matthew Lipman, the founder of Philosophy for Children, perhaps the most famous K-12 philosophy curriculum that uses the dialogical approach, observes that while dialogue is "a mutual exploration, an investigation, an inquiry," conversation is a simple "exchange: of feelings, of thoughts, of information, of understandings" (*Thinking in Education*). A philosophical dialogue, then, is a collaborative exchange of ideas and arguments among people, with the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the problem at hand. The dialogical nature of philosophy derives from the simple fact that, as the Spanish philosopher Fernando Savater explains, "philosophy does not occur as a revelation made by someone who knows everything to someone who knows nothing." On the contrary, philosophy ideally occurs when two or more people who see themselves as equals, to quote Savater again, "become accomplices in their mutual submission to the force of reasons and their mutual rejection of the reasons of force" (*The Questions of Life*).

To the extent that dialogue aims not at persuasion at any cost, but at understanding, it will take the form of philosophical investigation or inquiry. And because it presupposes fallibility of the interlocutors, who are nevertheless willing to go wherever argument takes them, philosophical dialogue is also a form of critical discussion. The term 'critical discussion' was coined by Karl Popper to refer to a model of dialogical interaction aimed at the resolution of disputes governed by what he called 'critical rationalism.' Under the influence of Popper and also of Jürgen Habermas' notion of the 'ideal speech situation', Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst defined a 'critical discussion' as an ideal communicative context in which arguments are used to resolve disputes, that is to say, differences of opinion. They explain that disputes can be either settled or resolved. *To settle* a dispute means setting it aside to go on with life. On the other hand, *to resolve* a dispute means that one or more of the participants in the discussion retracts her/his standpoint in the light of the other party's arguments. In what ways can the theory of dialogue have educational applications?

Many contemporary theorists of education have written extensively about the benefits of using discussion in the classroom, or what some of them call "dialogical education." While important, these contributions seem to be made from a purely educational/psychological perspective, and tend to miss the philosophical (ie, normative) dimension of dialogue, which has been so well explored by the philosophical tradition. The question is how the educational/psychological perspective and the philosophical perspective can be combined in a theory of dialogue that can be useful for the classroom.

Another way to ask the same question is to ask how dialogue can be at the same time philosophical *and* educational. That might seem like a simple question until one realizes that it is a variant of R.S. Peters' 'paradox of moral education'. If the educational goal is to construct rational and moral individuals, how can we educate them when they are too young to understand reasons? We are confronted with two apparently equally undesirable options: either we wait until they are old enough to understand reasons and only then teach them to be moral (at which point it might be too late), or we teach them to be moral when they are still very young, when we must inculcate those ideals in a way that seems contrary to reason – by indoctrination. This paradox is indeed very old, and I think it has been solved by Aristotle and Dewey, with the theory of the acquisition of habits. When children are too young to be persuaded by reasons, the only way to teach them to be critical is by developing in them the habit of being critical. But because this habit is non dogmatic – it can be questioned – we avoid indoctrination as much as we possibly can.

Building on the tradition of Socrates, it is possible to offer a theory of doing philosophy that has educational application.

In the Greek cradle of Western philosophy, dialogue was the communicative context in which both the practice and the teaching of philosophy took place, as illustrated by the interactions between Socrates and his interlocutors in Plato's dialogues. The 'Socratic method', as it is often called, is a misleading term because it seems to suggest that Socrates had just one method. A closer study of Socrates' behaviour in Plato's dialogues shows a more complicated picture. David H. Calhoun has made such a study (published in his article 'Which Socratic Method?'), and he concludes that the general opinion which identifies the Socratic method with a pedagogy "in which the teacher coaches and cajoles students to take an active role in the learning process by asking probing, leading questions and strategically guiding discussion", is incorrect. Plato's Socrates, as Calhoun explains, showed a range of pedagogical strategies, which makes it more accurate to speak about Socratic methods, in the plural. Calhoun identifies at least two main styles of teaching or pedagogical modes into which all of Socrates' acts can be categorized: transmission and inquiry. By the *transmission* mode, Calhoun refers to the act of "communicating a body of information ... to another person in a straightforward and unambiguous fashion." By the *inquiry* mode, Calhoun refers to a pedagogical relationship that "focuses on active learning by the student, and thus requires the teacher to structure the learning process in such a way that the student must take a heightened degree of responsibility for learning."

The transmission mode has a more authoritarian dynamic than the inquiry mode, but there are important similarities underlying them. What these two styles of teaching have in common, Calhoun argues, is that both aim at the same ultimate goal. As Calhoun puts it:

"Is there some identifiable object to which all of Socrates' activities are aimed? To what, if anything, does Socrates seek to convert his interlocutors? The best place to begin is with those methods for which Socrates clearly identifies objectives. As he insists, refutation is intended to instil intellectual humility, and to motivate further inquiry into the things that are most important for human life. . . . The same holds true for Socratic exhortation, which reminds interlocutor of the stakes of inquiry, and thus urges on the activity of philosophising about the most important things."

In other words, the final educational goal of all Socrates' methods is to persuade students of the importance of philosophical inquiry. As Calhoun reminds us, however, this does not mean that Socrates is valuing inquiry "for inquiry's sake, irrespective of its contribution to clarifying how human beings ought to live." Rather, the purpose is to use philosophical thinking in order to evaluate one's society and life. In Calhoun's words, Socratic methods intend "to seek truths about how to live, but to recognize that these truths, however firmly established by repeated argumentation, are always theoretically corrigible, and thus always subject to ... further inquiry."

The behaviours that characterize what I have called amateur philosophy are model behaviours that ideally should be found in *any* academic or scholarly inquiry, not just philosophy: conceptual analysis, identification of assumptions, careful reconstruction of arguments, attentive listening, striving for relevance, self-correction, and so forth. The reason why I call this kind of education *philosophical* is that philosophy is the paradigmatic activity (but certainly not the only one) that utilizes a critical, creative, and careful style of thinking. As Martha Nussbaum suggests in her article 'Public Philosophy and International Feminism', "philosophy in our culture has high standards of rigor and refinement in argument; debates on related issues in other professions often seem sloppy by comparison." In the educational environment that I am envisioning, students who are exposed to philosophical education share the abilities and dispositions *ideally* possessed by philosophical inquirers. Education is philosophical, then, to the extent that it is fundamentally dialogical, though in a wider sense – which might mean, for example, accepting some forms of lecturing as dialogical, provided that the instructors engage in self-correction and encourage students' reactions and questions. Pierre Bourdieu once famously protested (in *Acts of Resistance*) that "the logic of political life, that of denunciation and slander, 'sloganization' and falsification of the adversary's thought", had permeated all

discourse, even academic, instead of having "the logic of intellectual life, that of argument and refutation," to be exported to public life. Philosophical education aims at this latter goal.

The Five Communities

by David Kennedy[1]

Those of us who have experienced the joy and terror of the intensive formation of a philosophical community of inquiry (COI) over an extended period, understand intuitively that it is a process of development which has certain characteristic structures and patterns. These can be glossed in a number of ways, all of which will be metaphors, if only because any given moment within the life of the COI is an instant of vertiginous freedom.

A first assumption of the COI is that its form, which includes its characteristic structures and dynamic patterns, is not just fortuitous, or only one way of arriving at truth. It has the form it does because the world is so constructed that the individual cannot know reality adequately; therefore inquiry must be a communal venture. The truth, as Charles Saunders Peirce formulated it, is "what the unlimited community of inquirers will discover to be the case in the long run."[1] Truth which is adequate to us all is **only** arrived at in this way, through a long, often tortuous process of construction, reorganization, and re-articulation of the meanings which everywhere announce themselves inchoately around us.

The five structural dimensions of the COI which I am identifying could be perhaps be grouped differently, and called by different names. Furthermore, I am prying them apart in order to understand them better, but they are of course really all one thing, or at least inextricably overlapping, interdependent, and interactive. I call them **gesture, language**, **mind**, **love,** and **interest**. I want to call them "communities" because each of them is the expression of a communicative, interpretive process, converging on a common body of signs. Each is involved in a developmental process of change in which every member is determinative in some way of the group as a whole, yet the whole has an emergent character that transcends any one individual. Each community is uninterpretable in any complete sense apart from the others. Gesture and language have a certain primacy in that they are the exoteric systems through which the more esoteric bodies of signs of mind, interest, and love are expressed, but that expression is always only a translation, and both gesture and language may in a deeper sense be said to have their origins in the other three communities.

I also want to identify some dynamic patterns of intersubjectivity which run through each of these communities--ways our conversations seem to work, things we find ourselves thinking and saying and doing over and over again. One is **crisis**, which comes from the Greek word for judgment, and of which risk and opportunity are inseparable components. Other themes which I will characterize are **dialogue**, **play**, **teleology**, **conflict**, **and discipline**. But first to the five communities.

The Community of Gesture

This is perhaps the most obvious form of community, and yet the most ignored. I am referring to the fundamental somatic and kinaesthetic level of intersubjectivity "before" language, which grounds, frames, and comments on verbal and noetic levels of interaction. Even before we open our mouths we are making meaning together. Before the signs which represent ideas or even objects in the world, there are the more fundamental signs of the mental feeling states of the body--James Edie refers to this as "the physical appearance of meaning"--and this sign world, like the sign world of language, is a shared, interactive, one.[2]

The gestural is a sign world is one of intense, unremitting intervisiblity. We all sit facing each other at the table--we are all in each other's view, directly or peripherally . But the visual is only a sort of gateway for all the liminal and sub-liminal processes of what Howard Gardner has characterized as an intelligence unto itself--the bodily-kinaesthetic.[3] On this level, everything is happening simultaneously, and everything has an effect: shift of posture, lifting of arm, tension of back and neck, movement of head and eyes when talking, when listening, etc. This constant postural, kinesic dialogue

[1] Reprinted with permission from *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 15, No. 1 (November 1994), pp. 3-16.

is immediate, simultaneous, and completely unavoidable. The moment you are in my physical space, whether we are embracing, have our backs to each other, or anywhere in between, I feel and perceive my physical presence differently than when alone, and we are involuntarily in a situation of attunement or non-attunement, an interplay of mutual arousal regulation, in which, it is true, we can be more or less sensitive, more or less responsive, but never neutral. In all of our gestural interaction--proxemic, kinesic, facial expression, gaze, voice modulation, and timing of verbal response and delivery--we are continually both monitoring and acting to alter each other's vitality affects, which, especially in the COI, maintains and enhances our linguistic and noetic interaction. This dance is also gendered; each member brings both the body language characteristic of his or her sex, as well as the subtle gestural differences of inter- and intra-gender interaction to the discussion.[4]

Not only is there mutual regulation of arousal going on in the gestural community, but there is a co-construction of body images. When you, with whom I have spent hours sitting around a table together talking, agreeing and disagreeing, struggling to express ideas--when, as you talk, you raise your head, you meet my eyes in just such a way, a way which at the beginning was strange to me, but now I have come to expect and to understand as meaningful in just the way in which you, physically and gesturally, i.e. more or less unconsciously, mean--then I, in my own gestural accommodation to it, am affording you a new understanding of your own gesture. Thus, in our gestural dance we are revealed to ourselves anew. I think this is what Paul Schilder means when he says that "everybody builds his own body-image in contact with others," and his reference to it as a "continual constructive effort." He says that there is "a constant `unconscious' wandering of other personalities into ourselves. . . . a continuous movement of personalities, and of body-images towards our own body-image. . . ." In another place he refers to this process as a "dialogue" of body images.[5] We are located in this constant co-construction because our own body image is incomplete apart from an other; on a gestural level, the other knows more about us that we do about ourselves. So we are involved in an unending process of self-understanding on a somatic level through identification, projection, and other processes by which parts of us and parts of others interplay, communicate, and dance out both constructive and destructive, dominant, submissive, and egalitarian, inclusive and exclusive energies. What is always missing, however, from the encounter, what makes it forever incomplete, what makes of it a drama of the hidden and revealed, is the uneliminable residue of hiddenness, of opacity before you--my radical isolation--for there are aspects of who I am which are present in the natural sign world of my gestures, but are unknown either to you or myself. It is the interplay of the hidden and the revealed which creates the drama of our gestural dialogue.

What also makes of it an incessant constructive effort is its inchoate character. The dance which expresses this mutual entrainement, although it both grounds and comments on speech discourse, is in itself a speechless speech. It is nature speaking, what Dewey (170) called "natural" as opposed to "intentional" signs. So, as a cloud stands for rain but does not intend to stand for rain, a blush, a tightening of the mouth, stands for something in spite of our intentions. In it we are liable to all the involuntarisms of our social animal nature: synchronization of gesture, postural impregnation, gaze patterns, and various forms of affective attunement and contagion, through "motor mimicry"--mirroring, echoing and the like. It is experienced by us, as Merleau-Ponty described it, as magic, or "action at a distance." We experience a collective participation in what he refers to as "current of undifferentiated psychic experience . . . a state of permanent `hysteria" (in the sense of indistinctness between that which is lived and that which is only imagined between self and others)."[6] To deny our location in this space of contagion, involuntary transgression, "building," "melting," and "spreading" (Schilder's terms), of incalculable effects, is to deny a form of knowledge whose source we cannot identify or control, but which is no less a form of knowledge for all that. Nor can the linguistic discourse structure of the COI exist separately from it, for it is its ground

and its vehicle. "Speech emerges from the `total language' as constituted by gestures, mimicries, etc." says Merleau-Ponty.[7] Not just speech in general, but the functional elements of dialogue--elaboration, repair, timing, and attunement--are grounded here, in the body.

Is there a definable collective process building in the process of the COI, a gestural group gestalt? Schilder says there is no such thing as a collective body image, but only what he calls a "partial community of body images" going on, but one is tempted to claim that a collective gestural gestalt is a necessary analogue to the collective process of mind and language--i.e. the Argument--which is easier to see, because it leaves traces, it is not "dumb." Merleau-Ponty at least implies a group coordination of physiognomic perspectives when he claims that "In the activity of the body, like that of language, there is a blind logic, since laws of equilibrium are observed by the community of speaking subjects without any of them being conscious of it."[8] Perhaps we can approach this idea, again with Merleau-Ponty's help, through his idea of "style," which he defines as "a `manner' that I apprehend and then imitate" in other people, "even if I am unable to define it," through the "comprehending power of my corporeality."[9] Over time in the COI, as we understand each other with our bodies, and in coordination with the realities of language, mind, power, and desire, we build together a way of sitting at the table which is both the sum of all our postural, facial, gaze, kinesic manners, and also something which is greater than the sum. Like each of our body images in relation to each other, this whole is continually under construction, there is, as Schilder says of the dialogue of individual body images, "a continual testing to find out what parts fit the plan and fit the whole."[10] This unfinished whole both informs the movement of the Argument, and is informed by it, in the sense that when the moves are "good" it knits, there is a sense of shared excitement which is expressed gesturally. It is continually being altered as well by how well-rested people are, by the state of their health, and by the various energies of desire and interest--whether conflict, expansion, the subtleties of eros, dominance, intimidation, confusion, etc. When a "great one" addresses us--typically a master of language and mind (although that very mastery has a gestural counterpart)--we sit, we move, we gaze, differently. When a loose canon, a "rogue" (whether a chronic, momentary, or episodic one) irritates, confuses or infects us, our whole-group style changes. Those who are gifted bodily-kinaesthetically move us gesturally, with profound, if subtle effect, around the table. As a community of love, we instinctively work to assimilate individuals who are gesturally incongruent--who are over-expressive, under-expressive, who are less well-"timed" in the sense of the gestural aspects of conversational maintenance and repair--into our larger gestural style, which is building through continuous interaction, and which in turn is influenced by them. And as the community of inquiry practices other expressive forms such as sharing meals together, dancing, making music, making drama, drinking, exercising, gaming, travelling, spending individual time together, etc., that cumulative experience is brought, dumb but expressive, back to the table, where its subtle but inalterable changes add their effect. So the gestural community, like the others, develops over time in the direction of greater inter-activity and coordination, or loss of coordination, or some place in between.

The Community of Language

I have already quoted Merleau-Ponty as saying, "Speech emerges from the `total language' as constituted by gestures, mimicries, etc." He goes on to say: "But speech transforms. Already it uses the organs of phonation for a function that is unnatural to them--in effect, language has no organs. All the organs that contribute to language already have another function. . . . Language introduces itself as a superstructure, that is, as a phenomenon that is already a witness to another order."[11] It is of course as witness to that "other order" which gives the community of signs which is language its primacy in the COI. The gestural--a shrug, a trembling of the hand, a raising of an eyebrow, a blush or a pallor, a thrusting forward or backward of the head as a point is made, etc.--introduces a permanent element of ambiguity into any speech act. It can undermine speech acts--the trembling hand delivering confident

words--support them, or comment ironically on them. Gesture can gloss the linguistic even to the point of making words mean exactly the opposite of their usual meaning. Yet words, at least in the community of inquiry, are always lifting and pointing beyond gesture, towards thought. The paradox is that they can never grasp, map, or express thought completely, because they are an ineradicable part of thought, and cannot map, grasp, or express themselves.[12]

In spite of this weakness, both gesture and mind, which are respectively "below" and "above" words, are faced with the problem that they depend on words for their complete expression, even though complete expression is impossible. Gesture, as a natural as opposed to an intentional sign, is inchoate and frustrated apart from the word which emerges from it,[13] and mind, apart from its grounding in the involuntary feeling-world of signs which is gesture, and its more mystical iconography in the arts, only emerges at all through words. Words, at least in the practice of poetry, philosophy, and of real dialogue, are a boundary phenomenon. Speech and writing emerge in front of thought; they meet mind in mid air somewhere; they never know if they are finding and expressing mind, or making it.

These paradoxes of expression all point to the mediating, or translating function of language in the COI. It is true that all the communities are in a continual process of inter-translation, each seeking to become transparent in terms of the other. But words, as "witness to another order" are preeminently **between** the communities, struggling to translate the meanings of each into an ideal tongue. The community of language is always tempted into thinking that, whatever the subject, a formal proposition is just around the corner--some way to "say it all." This assumptive role of language as the objective sphere, the community where it can be said, often blinds us to the amount of translation which is constantly necessary **within** the speech community itself. Most obviously, translation is necessary between the variety of languages spoken within the community, each of which has a distinctive way of putting thoughts to words, as well as distinctive interlocutive protocols, and distinctive habitual ways of combining word and gesture. Each member of a language group must work to translate, not just the words, but these more fundamental characteristics of the other group's discourse. Whenever there are two or more languages present in a group, this becomes a critical task.

Among speakers of the same language there are different genres and vocabularies (philosophical, poetic, narrative, historical, etc.) which inform, often unconsciously, the way people talk, and require intertranslation. There are also expressive styles (circular, linear, aphoristic, systematic, elliptical, allusive, inspirational, ironic, etc.) which characterize, not only individuals, but the sorts of language necessary to express (while simultaneously influencing, in an incalculable mix) certain kinds of thinking.

Finally, there is the music of stress, pitch, contour and juncture, which acts as an even more essential ground for speech than the gestural. Imagine a voice on the telephone, or speaking from behind a screen: it can communicate independently from gesture, indeed often more intensely, uncomplicated as it is by the opacities and ambiguities of gesture and physiognomy. The musical element in speech is essential to meaning, from the most generic, e.g. the melodic contours which make questions, commands, warnings, reassurances, etc.; to the most subtly particular, for example the quality of the individual communicated by her voice. If, through a phenomenon known as "masking," we disguised the content of speech of the COI, and only heard the melodic, we would still have a record of a session, in the rising and falling, the rhythms, the pauses, the intensities, of the interlocutors. This musical level of language is in a relationship with gesture, with words, with thinking patterns, with love and power relationships, i.e. with all the communities; and as all the communities do for each other, it both expresses all the others, and is incomplete without them.

The Community of Mind

The community of mind operates on a continuum from the deliberate, disciplined thinking of Western logic, in voluntary submission to its laws; to the quality of mindedness of the whole, an emergent field of ideas, which finds itself moving eerily

beyond the law of contradiction and the excluded middle. The leading edge of this emergence is sometimes called the "argument," which, through a dialectical, dialogical process, seeks an infinitely receding horizon. The emerging edge implies a whole, which is apprehended by each individual as much aesthetically and emotionally as logically. I grasp it according to my capacity to integrate it, and its whole quality changes every time I act within it. It is vulnerable to the confusion of the argument "getting lost," but the very quality of emergence, of self-correctingly feeling one's way, is necessary to its advance. Perhaps more than any other, the community of mind demands a certain courage, or discipline of playfulness, a trust in the unfolding of the argument through the conflict and interplay of perspectives.

We all have the sense that mind, or thought, is to some extent outside of time; it is a system of signs--whether natural, intentional, iconic, enactive or linguistic--that brings it, however imperfectly in. But this doesn't mean it is pure, ethereal, or "spiritual" apart from language, for as Peirce points out, "the stuff of mind is feeling, ideas being nothing other than continua of living feeling." Because "vague feeling is the primordial state of mind," and feelings are vague thoughts, the COI is as much an emotional as a mental phenomenon. Both mind and feeling operate through association, spread, connections, weldings. The argument is always leading as much to a state of feeling as to some purely cognitive judgment. "The highest truths can only be felt"[14]; and strong, if vague, emotion always accompanies the most abstract sort of reflection.

The community of mind is like the community of gesture to the extent that, for one thing, thinking is specific. As Dewey puts it, "different things suggest their own appropriate meanings, tell their own unique stories, and they do this in very different ways with different persons." So a person's thinking style is as idiosyncratic, and as tied to the particular thing being thought about, as a gesture is tied to a specific person, moment, feeling, or postural and kinesic interaction.

Mind is also like gesture in that--again in Dewey's words-- "it is not we who think, in any actively responsible sense; thinking is rather something that happens in us." Like the gestural dance in which we are all engaged, the inexorable dialectic of thought plays itself out in us, individually and as a group. We are familiar with its double movement, from the finite, partial, confused given, to a whole which involuntarily suggests itself, which then calls forth additional cases which that suggested whole has directed our attention to. Group inquiry is bridging gaps, binding together, moving back and forth, by a process of analysis and synthesis, between the observed and the conditional. The drive is always, however inchoately or deviously, toward generalization, comprehending and uniting elements which were previously understood as isolated, disparate.[15] Thus ordinary logic--the logic of classes--is operating under what Peirce characterizes as the "lure" of a whole, which it vaguely senses as a meaning freed from local restrictions, and only understood through another kind of logic, which he calls the "logic of relations." The latter intuitively understands its own current position as moving from fragment to system, proceeding towards ever more comprehensive systems of relations.[16] Often this movement involves what Corrington calls a "leap beyond the current data, [in an] attempt to reach greater generic spread."[17] Ideas spring up spontaneously, spread, become affected by one another, and form more general ideas.

But though we are intuitively aware that no thought is isolated, and that any given noetic structure we are contemplating is a fragment of a greater whole, that whole lies beyond us. And because thought can only be expressed in signs, and any sign is determined by both what came before it and what comes after it, mind is intrinsically hampered in its movement; it is fallible, always contested, at risk. The direction of the argument emerges only through tentative probings, and is never more than partially visible. But what keeps us in a state of obscure excitement as we follow the argument, is the sense that what lures us is a **summum bonum**--a coordination of perspectives which is as much an emotional, gestural, and perceptual state as a cognitive one.

The Community of Love

The community of inquiry is a group romance, whose eros is both sexual, Platonic (in the sense of the eros of the Symposium), and agapic. The sexual eros of the COI is experienced as, not only various mutual attractions between individuals or combinations of individuals, apprehended at various levels of sublimation or desublimation, but as a group drive for unity on a somatic level, which is both initiated and sustained by the community of gesture. The telos of the community of love can be hypothesized as what Marcuse describes as the "transformation of sexuality into eros," through the emergence of "non-repressive sublimation."[18] This transformation is experienced by members of the group as a vivid sense of beauty, energy, and mutual affinity, as well as a drive for disclosure, vulnerability, and mutual care, which is where it assumes agapic proportions. It is the analogue of the drive of the noetic community toward the coordination of perspectives which is implicit in the apprehension of the whole, and of the gestural community towards the perfectly fulfilling kinesic, proxemic, haptic, and gaze dance. The risks which the community of love face include the ever-present possibility of personal and social disintegration through sexual and/or emotional exploitation, and emotions of jealousy, unrequited love, antagonism, excessive diffidence, etc., all of which are associated with the vicissitudes undergone within the community of interest. Also associated with the community of love is the "group illusion," i.e. the perception of a harmony which is as yet wishful thinking. But it is the community of love which offers the opportunity of healing, in the sense of making whole, of regaining a kind of emotional balance in which the individual experiences his identity as completed, by the group, and visa versa.

The community of love is no less a noetic than an emotional one. Reason may be understood as a form of love,[19] a hunger for which meaning and beauty are synonymous. All persons have a natural desire, like a form of curiosity, for a widening of their range of acquaintance with persons and things. We instinctively understand that we are not whole as long as we are single, that one person's experience is nothing if it stands alone.[20] This drive for association is the Eros which Freud called an instinct,[21] the creative, sympathetic force that impels us toward relationship as a form of self-realization, and connects us to each other even as it connects ideas to each other. In its agapic dimensions,[22] love sublates the more concrete, sensuous, sexual quality of the erotic, and is experienced as a mediating influence, which, analogous with the law of mind, both projects us into independency and draws us into harmony.

But it is through all the modalities of love--from the sexual to the agapic--that the community of inquiry comes together, is held together, works through conflict and undertakes discipline together, and grows in both unity and complexity. It is in love that we understand the COI as a "greater self" in formation. In the community of love, as Corrington says, "Individual horizons of meaning become open to each other so that horizonal plenitude may replace the narcissistic self-reference of pre-communicative life."[23] The COI is by definition a community of persons who are friends or in the process of becoming friends, who in the face of the powerful forces of self-interest and fear, undergo a growth of reasonableness which is as much ethical, aesthetic, social, and emotional as cognitive.

These relations are hard-won. There is an already existing connectedness in any group, in which love and interest are tangled up (nor are they ever completely untangled), and it is the work of the COI to forge relations of love out of this already existing connectedness. At a certain point in our formation, we face the developmental crisis of the "group illusion" mentioned above; at which point a "rupture" is necessary, something which breaks the false sense of harmony, and confronts us realistically with our differences, our distances, and the extent to which what appears as love is self-interest disguised. And that is not the only crisis. The success of the community of love is more often than not snatched from the jaws of what Corrington calls the "corrosive forces of solipsism and aggressive individualism,"[24] at the cost of conflict, careful self-discipline, and numerous acts of sacrifice, small and large. But this work, although it progresses through sacrifice, is ultimately in league with the community of

interest, because it is sustained by our intuitive understanding that love is not irrational; on the contrary, it is the highest logic, which, according to Peirce, "inexorably requires that our interests should **not** be limited. They must not stop at our own fate but embrace the whole community. . . . Logic is rooted in the social principle."[25]

The Community of Interest

The community of interest could also be characterized as the community of **self**-interest, or simply of **self**, or as the political community. It is the community of individuals who are seeking power and invulnerability through friendship, alliance, performance, influence, domination, hierarchy, special favor, etc. Each individual is driven to "be somebody," to count, to make a difference, and in order to do that, is continually, mostly unconsciously, negotiating influence and recognition both with the group as a whole, with various subgroups, and with each individual within the group.

The negotiation is socially constructed, with power relations always already, tacitly or otherwise, defined, but always in the process of change and shift. This is necessary to the extent that to be a self is to undergo a continuous series of interpretations that are partly derived from the communal structure, and so my self-understanding depends in large degree on how the group understands me. On the other hand, it is a tragic necessity, because what makes it necessary at all is my radical finitude, an involuntary solipsism that grounds the "narcissistic self-reference of pre-communicative life" mentioned above. I am trapped in my own horizon, and that horizon is rooted in what Corrington calls the "unbridled and unguided will to live. . . . found in all beings, [which] forces them to struggle against each other for domination. . . . [giving] rise to a tragic struggle that, in its extreme, makes community impossible."[26]

This tragic finitude makes for the pathological and dysfunctional elements which so easily beset the COI--individuals or subgroups who hold too much or too little power, or who are struggling with resentment or exclusion; individuals involved in personality struggles, or with needs or ambitions that have a disruptive effect upon the group, etc. In such an atmosphere, distortion of the community's drive towards semeiotic transparency is inevitable. It manifests, not only in the sorts of struggles and tensions just mentioned, but in a politicalization of the hermeneutic process itself, resulting in individuals, groups, or the whole group not so much following the argument where it leads, as unconsciously orchestrating the argument to validate prior ideological structures, or to glorify themselves even more directly. Given this tragic situation, full of unconsciousness and ambiguity, the task of a true coordination of perspectives appears as an infinite and arduous one, for it involves the crucifixion of the solipsistic elements of one's own horizon.[27] It is also the case, however, that the greatest gift to the COI is the individuality of each member, in all his or her finitude; and it could be that interest is the force which drives the development of the community from one end, while love "lures" it from the other. My ineradicable individuality is both my tragic flaw, through which I find myself in a state of horizonal fragmentation, and also my "happy fault," for it goads me to overcome my separation through dialogue. The argument, which promises to overcome the distortions which selfhood creates, is in our ultimate interest to follow, because it promises the overcoming of division and distortion, and thus represents the completion of self.

The COI takes very seriously the task of developing towards a community which includes all, favors none, and limits the tendencies of dominant or disruptive individuals. The closer a group gets, the more the danger of such disruption is present, through each individual's drive for affirmation and power. This is because love draws us toward self-disclosure, but that self-disclosure includes the disclosure of our radical finitude, the darkness and abjectness we all carry, our particular forms of self-ishness. The more we see into each other, the more we need to tolerate. But there are also things in each other we need, not just to tolerate, but to forgive: conditions of moral and intellectual isolation which, to the extent that the COI is a transformative process, must be overcome, or the whole group is compromised. The isolated individual is brought back/in through both sacrifice and confrontation. But the outcome is never

assured, and the process of the transformation of the isolated and disruptive individual through the love of the group is rife with ambiguities and blind spots. Just as what we judge to be the argument losing its way might actually be where we need to follow it; so an individual's disruption, apparently solipsistic, might be just what the whole needs in order to overcome a collective solipsism; nor does that fact necessarily mitigate the solipsistic origins of the disruptive individual's behavior. What does seem clear is that the COI moves most genuinely forward through acts, small and large, of self-discipline and sacrifice, which break the spell of interest, and point to the omega point of the community of love--every individual merging his or her individuality in sympathy with his or her neighbors.

Some Inter-relationships

Now I want to explore some of the analogical relationships, expressive attunements, and mutual influences between the five communities; not forgetting that these relationships are always only described "in a manner of speaking," given that in experience the five communities are inseparable.

Gesture and language are always in some relationship of direct entrainement, although the modalities of that entrainement may be ironic, contradictory, or ambiguous. Gesture also interacts with mind, in the form of mirroring, or expressing its generalizing and dialectical movement within us and between us, in a natural semeiotic whose more intentional form is the dance.[28] So thought moves us: our faces brighten, contract, we are electrified posturally by an idea; a contribution which pulls the argument together also pulls us together around the table.

Love and interest inform the most fundamental energies and modalities of the gestural, in that, biologically, movement is rooted in desire and fear (we move **toward** or **away from**) which play themselves out in the goals, cathexes, antipathies, securities and insecurities of the ego and its relations. Interest and desire are also reflected and expressed in the intersubjective dancing that goes on between individuals and sometimes between subgroups, whether the dance is erotic, diffident, aggressive, playful, abstract, ambiguous, formal, indecisive, etc.

Language, just because it is a translation of mind, is already a distortion, if a coherent one. This is also true for its effect on the other communities. In each case, the cost which it extracts for translating things into words is the very dimensionality which makes the community it is translating what it is. Although the poetic, to the extent it is a disordering of language, breaks this hold of the logic of grammar, it only allows glimpses of "pure" mind, desire, interest, and not systematic translation, for that would end one back in a linguistic system again. Besides, the COI cannot long sustain the poetic as a form of discourse, because the latter is a transgressive, asymmetrical, individualistic discourse, and thus inimical to the community's need for the building up of a universe of common signs.

Mind, language and gesture are stages, or screens, or expressive spaces, where the dissimulations of eros and agape, of the ambiguities of individual selfhood and the will to power, are represented and played out. As you come to know me through my ideas, through the characteristic way I talk about my ideas, and through my postural and kinesic presence, you increasingly understand all these to point to a characteristic quality of self, a way I have of bearing my identity through time; which in turn is connected with characteristic forms of interest and desire, i.e. a way of reaching (or not reaching) beyond myself for you, or for an other, and for the community as a larger whole of which I feel myself a part. What am I really after? What am I willing to give up in order to get it? How am I a part of this group? How am I using it? How am I allowing it to use me? What sort of love am I capable of, finally? This is true for the characteristic forms of love and interest, not only of individuals, but of subgroups, and of the group as a whole. The interplay between love and interest is complex and fraught with vicissitude and self-dissimulation, and it is their intersection which makes of the COI a community of justice or injustice, of real democratic impulses and practices, or subtle tyrannies. This becomes particularly problematic when justice issues in the school, the community, or the larger society become so pressing that the COI, in order to

maintain its ethical identity, must assume them as one of the elements of its inquiry.[29]

In addition to the relationships between the communities, there are characteristic dynamic, interactive patterns that run through the whole developmental process of the COI, which we see playing themselves out again and again. The extent to which any given COI stays together, and grows, and reaches judgments that are meaningful, depends to a great extent on how its members undergo these patterns--how they endure them, are obedient to their constraints, master them, learn to take a direction (or avoid one) by them. I have identified six.

Crisis

It has become almost a cliche of developmental theory that forward movement in any dialectical process involves a falling out of a previous balance in order to establish one on a higher level. Inquiry progresses through continual disruptions; Lipman compares it to walking, "where you move forward by constantly throwing yourself off balance."[30] Doubt and belief--a complex web of instinctive beliefs and assumptions, mostly vague, many of them at any given point in time altogether unconscious[31]—stand in constant state of dynamic tension. It is when these belief-habits come into crisis, are thrown by experience into a state of perplexity, that the act of search, of investigation begins. As Dewey says, "Thinking begins at a forked-road situation."[32] Like the need to put the other foot down, the drive to come back into balance, to a state of belief, is irresistible.[33]

The quintessential experience of the COI is of a dramatic sense of heightened meaning through being confronted by a problem which is not a mere exercise, but is genuinely compelling. The COI is a place apart, where we have come together to experience this crisis of meaning. It is the space of problematization, of wonder and reversal, where the lack of understanding, the partial absence of meaning which inhabits even the most familiar and commonplace, is no longer routinely suppressed, but elevated into what we notice most.[34] This requires a certain courage, abandon, and ability to endure. It makes of the epistemological, psychological, and social space of the COI an extraordinary location, a place of **agon** from which we emerge changed.

Dialogue

It is through an other that the crisis is precipitated. Dialogue begins in the realm of Peirce's "secondness," where experience offers contradictions to our perspectives, which in turn requires mediation, which process results in judgments which lead to an increasing coordination of perspectives. So dialogue begins in what Gadamer calls a "moment of negativity,"[35] of contradiction by an other, through which complexity deepens. Because it is a process in which some elements of my perspective are confirmed and some are rendered doubtful, to undergo it requires loyalty to the belief that the experience of contradiction, undertaken in good faith, will lead to a strengthening of my own perspective and a further coordination of perspectives among us; so, according to Peirce, the direction of evolution is towards an increase in variety and diversification, **and** an increase in regularity, of lawfulness. "Even as `the homogeneous puts on heterogeneity' these diverse elements are drawn into harmonious relationship on another level, and become coordinated within some more general system of relations. From this perspective variety is never mere chaos, the simple disruption of order; it is, most essentially, a necessary catalyst for the growth of reason." The COI may be thought of as a larger person, and the growth of persons is never just addition, but "continual diversification and the harmonization, one with another, of ever more complex systems . . ."[36]

Dialogue has the paradoxical character of "traveling apart toward unity."[37] The argument finds its way forward through entanglement in contradiction. This is inevitable, in that communication is asymmetrical--the very reception of a sign by another is its irrevocable transformation into another sign, and it is impossible to return to its original meaning before interpretation. The argument takes its way through this endless process of interpretation and reinterpretation, through which meanings come to be truly shared by the community.[38] Although each member's perspective, in its finitude, is irreducible to

each other, yet each perspective can become part of a larger perspective, which is forever emergent through the continual reformulation of positions as a result of the interplay of perspectives.

Play

As a moment of negativity, of the undergoing of contradiction, dialogue is a most profound kind of work, even what Socrates referred to in the Phaedo as a "practicing death." From the point of view of the field of emergent meaning it creates, dialogue is profoundly playful, because it breaks the spell of the instrumental, the "unbridled and unguided will to live." In opening ourselves to the perspective of the other, we are released into a space of emergence and transformation, where the argument no longer comes from any one person, but from the interplay of persons. Through what Peirce called "interpretive musement," we "allow signs to unfold in creative and novel patterns,"[39] and it is often the unexpected, the chance combination which allows the argument to move forward.

It is the principle of Peirce's notion of "tychism" (Gk. **tyche**, chance) that chance begets order, for in its spontaneity, its difference, its variation, it acts as a catalyst in the production of higher levels of uniformity, through breaking up old habits, and stimulating the development of new laws of behavior.[40] Tychism is a function of the logic of relations, which operates through association of apparently unlike elements, which are then found to be related within ever larger frameworks. It is through an allowance of the play-impulse in the community of language, mind, and even gesture, that these larger patterns become visible. For if, as Peirce said, "emotion is vague, incomprehensible thought,"[41] play is the feeling-response to ideas, to the unity of a horizon of meaning beyond us, which acts as a lure, for the very meaning of playing is entering and responding with our whole being to something larger than us.

Both Peirce and Dewey associate the "purposelessness and disinterestedness" of the play impulse with the scientific attitude.[42] The ideal mental attitude is "to be playful and serious at the same time," in that "free mental play involves seriousness, the earnest following of the development of the subject matter," while "pure interest in truth coincides with love of the free play of thought."[43] When we are playing with ideas in the COI we are allowing the structure of the community of mind to crystallize and articulate beyond us, from between us and among us.

The release of ourselves to the intrinsic play of the relations ever-emergent in the community of mind requires the courage to take, in Dewey's words, "a leap, a jump, the propriety of which cannot be absolutely warranted in advance, no matter what the precautions taken."[44] It takes discipline to suspend judgment, and to cultivate a variety of alternative suggestions without settling on one prematurely. We learn to balance our focus between the inquiry as it flows from moment to moment, and as it promises a culmination, an outcome. We know we are at play when we find ourselves noticing the beauty of the internal relations of the emergence of mind in the logic of relations, all the while sensing its ultimate direction as a horizon, imminent yet infinitely far. Through the moves which carry us along, we have an aesthetic sense of its structure as it forms just beyond us, a thread of continuity binding together the successive stages. This gives us the strength and trust to follow the argument where it leads through apparent chaos, avoiding what Dewey called "fooling," which, as an excess of playfulness, leads to dissipation and disintegration of the inquiry.[45]

I have been concentrating on the play of the community of mind, but play is certainly present as well in language, which loves to play with sound, sense, and structure; in gesture, where imitation and unconscious commentary of posture, movement, and expression engage in constant interplay; in interest and love, which both seek, spontaneously and mostly unconsciously, playful expression in erotic, compassionate, dominance-submission and intrigue relations with others. All these forms are, not just analogues but elements of the play of the community of mind, in that each community is a dynamic, reflective translation of each other.

Teleology

We are able to give ourselves up to the play of dialogue in the COI because we trust

implicitly that there is an immanent formation and unfolding of both thought and relational structure among us. We sense that we are embarked together on a movement toward a coordination of perspectives through which our universe of meaning will be transformed, including the fundamental relationship between the individual and the group, i.e. the ontic structure of the community itself. This telos presents itself as what Corrington calls an "unconditional source of value" which both drives us from within and lures us from without. It promises a state of perfect reasonableness, inclusive unity, and radical openness,[46] i.e. the overcoming of the tragic finitude which blunts and distorts our inquiry, as well as our relationships. So each individual interpretive act points beyond itself to a whole-in-formation, an encompassing perspective in which all signs are located in relation to each other. Each interpretive act is ultimately judged by that infinite horizon, that felt promise of a whole truth, or "infinite long run which guarantees the validation of interpretive acts."[47]

Although we cannot help but operate under the lure of this infinite horizon, it always exceeds the horizon of what can be present to us at any given time; so we have only partial truths, glimpses of the truth as it displays aspects of itself in human discourse; nor can we deduce in advance what it will look like. As Corrington puts it, "no [sign] series will reach totality, yet no series will be free from the longing for full encompassment." Something like a "generic hunger animates each series as it drives toward the Encompassing itself."[48]

Conflict

Conflict in the COI is usually associated with the community of interest--with ego battles, or ideological divisions, or insensitive, presumptuous, backbiting, etc. attitudes or behaviors. But in that reason necessarily involves itself in contradictions in order to develop, conflict is a universal theme of the COI. The experience of inquiry always bears a negative element, a necessity that one be refuted in order to learn what one does not know. The **dia** of dialectic stands for the process of differentiation, of a going-through in which there is implicit a taking things asunder, which always involves a certain degree of conflict.

Conflict is a result of the resistance by secondness, the non-ego, the particular and disruptive, to our expectations. This resistance is a key element in the progress of the argument, for through it, reality resists the claims of any theory which becomes presumptive, and attempts to explain more than it really can; thereby false paths are eliminated.[49] But the fact that conflict is a necessary, central aspect of any dialectical process does not reduce the great risk it represents for the COI. This risk is only increased by the fact that we tend to hold implicitly to a homeostatic or "order" model of group process, which understands conflict to be inherently demonic and disintegrative, and therefore to be avoided or suppressed at any price. But as cognitive conflict transforms the community of mind, so social conflict transforms the communities of love and interest, and produces moral awareness. When conflict is undergone with a humility which comes from the awareness that it is potentially transformative, individualism is tempered, and the individual-group relation is gradually altered.

What causes social conflict in the COI? All persons experience themselves as parts of a greater whole, but we also experience a fundamental, irreducible dimension of discontinuity, because each of us occupies a horizon which both connects and separates us from others. We rarely attempt to probe and articulate our own horizon--in fact, as Corrington says, "It is part of the logic of horizons that it forgets it is a horizon." In addition, there is a drive from within each individual horizon to become all in all; Corrington calls it "the hunger of each horizon for generic expansion and encompassment, its desire to become identical to the world itself."[50] This hunger is in fact connected to the "happy fault" mentioned above--the drive for unity which, combined with the lure of the "encompassing," impels us toward the coordination of perspectives. It is always an ambivalent drive, but only becomes demonic when it persists in the otherness, the independency which is the source of its drive for unity. In Peirce's formulation, "individuality is the locus of evil if it is construed as the terminus rather than as a

moment or phase of the circular movement of love.[51]

This forgetfulness of my own horizon--or even that I occupy a horizon--typically leads less to wickedness than to various forms of rigidity and inertia, or to ideological commitments which "blunt the open movement of sign articulation."[52] My forgetfulness can not be overcome from within my own horizon, but only through its being humiliated in one form or another: it is the shocks, the ruptures which I experience through dialogue which serve to clarify my horizon for myself, and thereby allow further coordination with the horizons of others. My horizon will never be fully transparent to myself--that seems to be an ontological impossibility. But when it collides with an alien horizon, what's hidden in it is revealed, and it is forced into a new self-reflectiveness.[53]

The irrevocable character of our finitude makes for an inexpungable element of hiddenness of individuals from each other. This "ultimate recalcitrance on the part of horizons to reveal all of their idiosyncratic and demonic traits"[54] is a tragic element in communal life. But from the point of view of the dialectical movement which we sense we are involved in as a community, this radical surd of individuality appears as the necessary negative moment in love's creative development.[55] The tension between the irreducible obscurities of our own horizon and the horizon of horizons which lures us forward, calls for a discipline of which, through love, we find ourselves to be capable.

Discipline

Discipline is the operative virtue of the COI, in that it implies the minimal level of individual and collective self-control which makes it possible to undergo the conflicts and vicissitudes, not only of the argument, but of the group's social process without losing heart, turning inward, striving to dominate, becoming entangled in ideological conflict, expecting more of the community than it is able at any one moment to give, and so on. Each COI demands its particular form or expression of this virtue, depending on the individuals involved, but what seem to be generic to all its modalities are self-restraint and perseverance.

The community of mind demands the discipline of the logic of classes, and also the larger, more rigorous discipline of enduring the psychological suspense which critical thinking requires. In the realm of the expression of ideas, there is a discipline made necessary by the phenomenon that, in Dewey's words, "direct or immediate discharge or expression of an impulsive tendency is fatal to thinking. Only when the impulse is to some extent checked and thrown back upon itself does reflection ensue."[56] This is true not only for the individual, but also for the group, for in following the argument where it leads there is a holding to a course which often demands of us that we restrain a thought or contribution when there is no obvious or intrinsic reason to do so, except that at any one moment in the COI there are as many contributions possible as there are members, and each one has a claim to being the one which could move the argument along, even (remembering the principle of tychism) if it appears to be a digression. The discipline required of me to withhold my contribution in the interest of another's is rendered even more rigorous when the other's contribution appears to my understanding as confused, obfuscatory, off the point, or even if it just seems to be taking the discussion away from a point that I do not understand us to have finished with. In order to be able to practice this discipline, I must believe in the evolutionary character of the COI--that though "reason loves to hide," the argument, like water seeking its level, will eventually overcome all obstacles to its advance.

In the areas of love and interest, the same discipline is necessary to protect the spirit of inquiry from the pitfalls of monopolization, aggressiveness, competitiveness, seductiveness, timidity, intimidation, overexcitement, dissipation, negativism, paralysis, trivialization, and so on. In addition, any given discussion will generate its own logic and rhythm, which cannot be brought to closure by a mechanical method. Understanding must wait upon the **kairos**, the opportune moment, and not force the dialogue into predetermined patterns.[57] Each member of the COI must come to understand and practice the sacrifices, large and small, that are necessary to foster and protect this

opportune moment. This sacrificial ability is expressed in very concrete ways as members learn to withhold a contribution because they sense some larger emergence on the discursive horizon, or to phrase a contribution as a question rather than as a positive statement, or to give up the opportunity to continue an exchange that limits the contributions of others. This discipline is under the Christian sign of crucifixion, or the principle that nothing is transformed without a death, or loss--in this case, the little death of our own potential contribution. It acts to undermine the more extreme forms of individualism, and to progressively purify the individual of subjective hermeneutic distortions,[58] which in turn increases her acuity of judgment, and thereby her discipline. The better the sense I have of the argument's overall movement, the easier it is for me to suppress my own contribution for the moment, for I'm intuitively aware of more than one place I can contribute. Thus Dewey said that when discipline is conceived in intellectual terms, it is "identified with freedom in its true sense." So the discipline of the COI becomes less onerous and more joyous as the community develops. The excitement of following the argument where it leads rewards our patient, tenacious efforts, and our continual skirmishes with confusion and delay. That excitement reminds us that we are being transformed, individually and in terms of our relation to each other, by an unceasing dialectical process.

Conclusion

Even before it is a community of natural and intentional signs, the COI is a communicative context, a field of dynamic intersubjectivity, which is always growing, changing, busy being born or busy dying. Its inquiry is not just cognitive, but linguistic, personal, social, emotional, political, erotic, agapic. If it is developing well, it is open on all these levels to the emergence of something, in a dialectical, self-correcting movement which appears infinite. What keeps it going is the erotic drive for wisdom, and it is this eros which makes possible the sacrifices it demands. The lover of the whole sacrifices his exclusive claims in the interests of a transformation of the group which will also transform him. This principle runs like a red thread through all the dimensions of the COI. In the community of mind, we must accept the dismembering of our claim, the giving up of a temporary closure in order for the argument to continue, and to come together on a higher level. The very nature of dialogue involves this wandering in the interests of getting there. In the community of gesture the stronger ego learns, in the exchange of vital affect, to hold back and allow the other to initiate, so that we reach a common plenitude. In the community of language, we learn to question rather than declaim, to clarify rather than proliferate points. In the community of interest, we learn that our own personal empowerment, the recognition by the group of who we are and who we want to be, depends ultimately on our own recognition of the unique, irreplaceable individuality of the other, and on our honoring of that individuality as having its source in something even beyond that individual. In the community of love, we discover the complex affective and erotic disciplines which lead to a capacity for deeper levels of mutual friendship.

These sacrifices seem worth it to us, because we sense the connection between them and the Socratic notion of philosophy as "practicing death." We sense that nothing advances, is transformed, without death. The tragic relation between the individual and the group is resolved through sacrifice, on the other side of which the individual finds himself again in a larger context. The risk is that the sacrifice leads nowhere--that one holds back for a truth that never emerges, or is sabotaged by those (including oneself) who are too self-interested, or lack the discipline, to hold back. But as unavoidable as is the risk, the drive for individual and collective transformation is even greater, and its promise beckons eternally.

ENDNOTES

---

[1]Michael L. Raposa, Peirce's Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 154.

[2]James M. Edie, "Foreward," in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the

Acquisition of Language. Translated by Hugh J. Silverman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. xiii-xiv.

[3]See Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

[4]These fundamental mutual arousal regulation patterns can be traced to the primal interlocutive situation of the infant and mother. The mother and infant are one person to the extent the infant lacks the ability to regulate her own vitality affect, and therefore depends on the mother for self-regulation. The way the mother "dances" with the infant in order to do this is internalized by the child, and becomes a framework of gestural expectations, a particular style of dancing, which can be more or less inhibited, more or less attuned, etc. See Daniel Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant, (New York: Basic Books, 1985), especially Chapter 7, where he describes what he calls "affect attunement ."

[5]Paul Schilder, The Image and Appearance of the Human Body: Studies in the Constructive Energies of the Psyche (New York: International Universities Press, 1950), pp. 235,273.

[6]Merleau-Ponty, pp. 45-46.

[7]Ibid, p. 12.

[8]Ibid, p. 95.

[9]Ibid, pp. 42-43.

[10]Schilder, p. 286.

[11]Merleau-Ponty, p. 12.

[12]This seems to be related to the paradox pointed out by Russell, of the class which cannot include itself--e.g. the class of chairs is not itself a chair.

[13]I have always wanted to conduct a session of the COI without words--gesture only.

[14]Raposa, pp. 38, 131.

[15]John Dewey, How We Think, (Buffalo NY: Prometheus Books, 1991 [1910]), pp. 39, 34, 79, 80, 211.

[16]Raposa pp. 18, 25.

[17]Robert S. Corrington, The Community of Interpreters (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), p. 3.

[18]Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), Chapter 10, "The Transformation of Sexuality into Eros."

[19]See Ann Sharp, "Peirce, Feminism, and Philosophy for Children," Analytic Teaching (14,1), p. 58.

[20]Raposa, p. 83.

[21]Peirce identified it as more than that. For him it is in fact the principle of "evolutionary love," for which both nature and mind, or thought, tend towards unity and wholeness. Given Freud's metaphysics, "instinct" may have been the only thing he could call it.

[22]I am deliberately refusing any sort of final distinction between eros and agape. I consider them to forms, modes, or dimensions of the same thing.

[23]Corrington, p. 43.

[24]Ibid, p. 17.

[25]From Collected Papers 2.654. Quoted in Raposa, p. 103.

[26]Corrington, p. 26.

[27]Ibid, pp. 47, 67.

[28]In the latter, gesture moves ahead of mind, and leads it.

[29]For an example of this dilemma, see Marguerite and Michael Rivage-Seul, "Critical Thought and Moral Imagination: Peace Education in Freirean Perspective," in McLaren, P. & M. Lankshear, Eds. The Politics of Liberation (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1994).

[30]Matthew Lipman, Thinking in Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 232.

[31]Raposa 96. On p. 104 he refers to "a whole system of opinions, habits of thought that may be regarded either as instinctive or, in Peirce's words, as `due to infantile training and tradition.'"

[32]Dewey, p. 11.

[33]This point is made by Raposa, p. 95. He distinguishes this form of doubt from the Cartesian zero-belief doubt, which is a sort of intellectual pathology, or at least a fanaticism.

[34]In How We Think, Dewey says, "No object is so familiar, so obvious, so commonplace, that it may not unexpectedly present, in a novel situation, some problem." (p. 120)

[35]Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1975), p.318.

[36]Raposa, pp. 78 and 83.

[37]For a brilliant phenomenology of the dialectic, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). For a summary of his arguments, see my "Hans-Georg Gadamer's Dialectic of Dialogue and the Epistemology of the Community of Inquiry," in Analytic Teaching 11,1 (1990): 43-51.

[38]Corrington pp. 41 and 42.

[39]Corrington, p. 8.

[40]Raposa 32, 74; Corrington 126.

[41]Raposa, p. 131. He also said, "The highest truths can only be felt." (Ibid).

[42]Ibid, pp. 218-219.

[43]Dewey, p. 219.

[44]Ibid, p. 75.
[45]Ibid, p. 217.
[46]Corrington, p. 12.
[47]Ibid, p. 47.
[48]Ibid, p. 66.
[49]Ibid, p. 4.
[50]Ibid, p. 64.
[51]Raposa, p. 90.
[52]Ibid, p. 57.
[53]Ibid, p. 64.
[54]Ibid, p. 66.
[55]Raposa, p. 89.
[56]Ibid, p. 64.
[57]Corrington, p. 43.
[58]Ibid, p. 77.



Helping children develop the skills & dispositions of critical, creative & caring thinking

by David Kennedy[1]

Young children are quite capable, once they've learned how through participating in conversations with those who do it regularly, of carrying out the basic logical operations of critical thinking, and of developing the dispositions which make them possible. You can build conversations around the stories in this curriculum which teach these skills and dispositions through using them repeatedly, and, at the start anyway, pointing them out when you and other teachers or children do.

The following is an annotated list of critical conversational operations or "moves," listed in the order in which they might usefully be emphasized in a sequence of group conversations. For example, "Asking a question" is a cognitive move which comes naturally to young children, but which may not have been emphasized at home; or, even if it has, it may not have been consciously distinguished from a statement. Once young children can make such a move consciously they are in a much better position to use it as a tool in a conversation. And since when we think together about the world we're most interested in questions rather than already formed propositions—for it is the question which leads to critical, creative and caring thinking—we place it first on the list.

All the moves listed here may be emphasized and reinforced by you through pointing them out when they happen spontaneously, as well as emphasizing them over the course of one or more sessions. Some stories might lend themselves better to practicing one or more of these moves, but any of them can be applied to any story, since they are the basic moves of reasoning.

Asking a question. The question is at the center of the critical, creative and caring thinking. Besides soliciting questions about the stories, you might even devote whole sessions to developing—and of course recording, as a powerful "language experience" exercise in pre-reading—questions. And you might follow these sessions with discussions of how each question might be answered, and whether some of these questions have no answers at all, or would be answered differently by different people.

Agreeing or disagreeing. Young children sometimes acquire the misconception that disagreeing is either disrespectful or dangerous—a hostile act. On the other hand, they might have the notion that to agree with someone's idea is to relinquish one's own ownership of it, and therefore needs to be resisted. But once they get the hang of how agreeing and disagreeing are used in a group dialogue, they quickly see that it forms the basis for moving the conversation forward, and that it acts just as powerfully to build on other people's ideas as to discount them. Again, be sure to model the move yourself, to call for it (e.g., "James, do you agree or disagree with what Alicia just said?" or "Does anyone agree or disagree with what Alicia just said?") point it out whenever it happens ("So you are agreeing with Leroy, is that right?"), and indicate its significance through paralanguage.

Giving a reason. This move follows naturally from agreeing or disagreeing, and should always accompany it. The felt-responsibility to give reasons may be the single most important disposition of reasonable discourse and reasonable people. So if James, for example, says he disagrees, immediately ask him, "Why? What is your reason for disagreeing?" And when you give a reason in the course of the discussion, be sure that you either announce that you are going to do so before you do it, or emphasize afterwards that you have just done so.

Offering a proposition, hypothesis or explanation. A proposition is a statement which claims to be true—for example "All dogs are brown," or "My mother is always right." If it's offered as a hypothesis it doesn't make a truth claim, or just makes a tentative one. Young children make

[1] Reprinted from *Analytic Teaching* Vol. 15, No. 1 (November 1994), 3-16.

propositions all the time, as does everyone else. The idea of doing philosophy is to learn to make propositions tentatively, and to develop the habit of examining them and determining if they need to be changed to better reflect the way the world is.

Statements of this kind can be divided into three types—"All" statements ("Dogs are brown"), "Some" statements ("Some dogs are brown") and "No" statements ("No dogs are brown"). One way to begin working on a statement is to try to identify whether it is an "all" statement. You might ask James, for example, whether he means to say that *all* mothers are always right, or is he speaking just of his own? (This is a clarifying move. Young children do not make them so easily, so it is up to you to model them abundantly.) In young children's discourse, propositions or hypotheses are often couched in **explanations**, which are often implicitly hypothetical—for example, if asked, Samantha might go into a lengthy explanation of how money and goods work in the exchanges that happen in a grocery store. In this case she is giving her theories about what happens there. In this case, there are a series of implicit "all" or "some" or "no" statements in what she is saying, e.g. that there are *no* cases in which money is given without an exchange for something else, or (if she has made a common and understandable mistake) that in *some* cases you can get more money back in change, or (another mistake, as a result of recent technology) that in some cases no money is necessary if you use a card, etc. . . It is the facilitator's job to find those more basic propositions, bring them out, and help children question them.

Offering an example or counterexample. Giving a counterexample (i.e. an example which implicitly contradict some proposition—that is, if James makes the proposition that all dogs are brown and Alicia says that her dog is white) are arguably the first critical move that young children make, for they tend to rise spontaneously to mind. As with all other moves, they should be identified as such in group. Giving examples is the most immediate and concrete way to explore an argument. Like the majority of the moves in this list, you can orient whole sessions towards exemplification, as a kind of play exercise.

Often you will find that young children think completely in examples—when you ask them a general question, they will respond with a story about something which happened to them or something they know. It is the facilitator's job to translate that example into a more general proposition and feed it back to the group for a response. For example, after James makes the proposition that mothers are always right, Jorge might tell a story about one time when his mother was wrong (counterexample) and Samantha may follow with a story about going to the mall, getting lost, asking directions, making several mistakes, etc. If you allow it, examples will continue without any move toward unpacking their implications—i.e. what they are proving or disproving about the proposition that mothers are always right. So it is the facilitator's job to bring the group back to the more general question under discussion by helping children analyze the abundant examples they are offering and unpack their implications.

Classifying/Categorizing. Classifying and categorizing start from birth on the perceptual level, perhaps with the distinction between what is my mother and what is not. No one can make even the most basic sense of the world and how to survive in it without putting people, things, events, phenomena, qualities, etc. in classes and categories. Therefore, young children don't have to be taught how to classify, and in fact optimal human development could be said to reside in the progressive width, depth, clarity, flexibility and complexity of our categories, or what Piaget called "schemes"—because the more adequate our schemes, the better we can handle what the world brings. Unless they are blocked by fear of some kind, young children work on this all the time. They are working, for example, on classifying teachers—good ones, poor ones, friendly ones, dangerous ones, helpful ones, genuine or hypocritical ones, etc., as well as on houses, neighborhoods, stores, television shows, parents, friends, siblings, dreams, foods, etc. etc.

Engaging in collaborative inquiry about key issues in one's life and in the world is one powerful way of pursuing this work, for the only way—apart from further experience—in which our ideas will grow and become more adequate is through

examining them critically. Examining them in a group speeds up the process and makes it more intense, as well as teaching us to do it by ourselves. There are many ways you can encourage this and make it visible in the group, but one of them is to begin to picture classes of things through Venn diagrams. If, for example, you made one circle which represented all the dogs in the world, and another circle which represented all the brown things in the world, what relationship would you put those circles in? And of course it can be continually reinforced verbally by using the words "all," "some" and "no" in your questions and clarifications.

Making a comparison. This move might be better put before classifying and categorizing, since it is the basis for grouping things into classes, and operates through making **distinctions and connections** between things. I have to decide what something is *not* in order to determine what it is. If I decide that it is more like something else than not, I have to decide what criteria I'm going to use to group it with that other thing—its physical appearance, the way it acts, etc. If young children are classifying and categorizing as a matter of course, they are making distinctions and connections, i.e. they are comparing. If we engage them in conversation and really listen, we will see that a large part of their reasoning (like ours) is done through **analogy**—a bird is like an airplane or visa versa, a tree is like a human body in certain ways, a house can be like a person, etc.

This kind of reasoning, which involves evaluating the similarities and differences or connections and distinctions between things on the basis of chosen criteria, can be directly practiced through playful exercises (e.g. "How is a _____ like a _____" or "What is the difference between _____"). Of course it can also be practiced by pointing it out when it is done—when, for example, Samantha says "Dolls are not people"—or by calling for it, for example asking an individual or the group as a whole, "How are dolls and people the same?" As with all of the skills and dispositions in this list, it is best taught through learning to recognize it when it happens spontaneously in the course of the conversation, then taking advantage of that recognition by naming it and then repeating it consciously.

Offering a definition. Most thinking dialogues, whether among groups of young children or adults, quickly come to a point where a definition of terms is necessary for everyone to be on the same page. In order to use any term, one has to be assuming *some* kind of definition of it, however implicit. Stating these definitions is not an easy thing, even among adults—what, for example, is the definition of "justice"?—and often a definition will change as in inquiry moves forward. You can be watching for those opportunities in young children's conversation to introduce the concept of "definition" and try it out—starting with simpler things, like "dog" or "doll" or "father," and moving gradually toward more complex concepts like "friend" or "fair."

Identifying an assumption. Every proposition or claim rests on a set of assumptions—things we consider to be true either by definition—e.g. "All dogs are four-legged creatures"—or by what we have noticed through experience—e.g. "Some dogs are dangerous to humans." These beliefs about things and the world underlie the way we classify and categorize things, and therefore the judgments we make. It could be claimed that the most important and useful thing about thinking critically together is that it leads us to identify those assumptions, many of which are either wrong or over-generalized, and to correct them by thinking more carefully and responsibly about them. This is difficult work even for adults, for many of our most influential assumptions lie below the level of our awareness, and are most often emotionally charged and invested.

The best way for a facilitator (or anyone else) to learn to identify underlying assumptions is to work on identifying his or her own. Meanwhile, there are opportunities to introduce an awareness of underlying assumptions to young children through simple examples, which can be identified either in the course of conversations or through exercises. If we assume, for example, that some dogs are dangerous to humans, how will that effect the way we approach a dog we don't know? If we assume that friends always share, what should we share with our friends? Our money? Our food? Other friends?

Making an inference. Assumptions lead us naturally into inferences, because an inference is a judgment that follows from something else, or a reasoning from something known or assumed to something which follows from it. For example, if I see dark clouds in the sky, I infer that it is likely to rain; or if I see a blush on someone's face I infer that they are feeling embarrassed. If someone says to me, "Friends shouldn't act like that," I infer that they have certain assumptions about how friends should act. If we watch and listen carefully, we will see that young children are, like the rest of us, constantly making inferences. Although the value of teaching them the word "infer" or "inference" is doubtful, we can, when we notice an inference being made, either ask for or point out the basis on which it is made. If a child says to us, for example, "She's not my friend," we might respond with the question "What makes a person a friend?" and thereby encourage her to reflect on what the basis of her inference is.

Making a conditional statement ("if/then"). Conditional statements are inferences, as for example, "If it rains today, the streets will be wet," or "If you fight you might need to go to the hospital," in which the second statement follows logically from the first. Young children use these all the time. You can follow up on these kinds of statements by exploring their logical implications. For example you might answer "If you fight you might have to go to the hospital" with "Do people who fight *always* have to go to the hospital?" Or, "Is fighting the *only* reason that people go the hospital?" Young children often make conditional statements as normative judgments, meaning what one *should* do in any given situation—for example, "If you hurt your friends feelings you should say 'I'm sorry'." This statement could be explored by asking if it's necessary—if you "have to" say you're sorry, and also by what else you could do if you hurt your friend's feelings, which puts us in the realm of exploring possibilities.

Reasoning syllogistically. A syllogism is a statement in which there are two premises which lead to a conclusion—for example Premise 1: If you fight you will go to the hospital. Premise 2: You fought. Conclusion: You will go to the hospital. Again, young children reason this way all the time—it is embedded in the way we talk—but often it is hidden away or unstated. Consider a second grader's statement in a discussion about conflict. "Well yeah, but like, it's life. So I think you have to have it." If the statement is "unpacked" we see that it is syllogistic: Premise 1: Life always involves conflict. Premise 2: You are alive. Conclusion: You will be involved in conflict.

Self-correcting. Self-correction can happen both on the individual and on the group level. A group thinking conversation which is developing is always self-correcting. This happens mainly through the use of examples. If someone makes the "all" statement "Friends never say mean things," and another person gives an example of a friend who said a mean thing to her, and yet she still considers her a friend, then the "all" statement must be corrected by reconstructing it as a "some" statement, i.e. "Friends sometimes say mean things." Of course this will involve deciding together whether it is generally agreed upon by the group that being a friend absolutely excludes saying mean things to each other, which is a matter of definition. It is this kind of group reflection about the criteria we use to judge something to be this or that which is of tremendous value both to young children and adults. Facilitators should both model self-correction themselves—or offer stories about times they have self-corrected—and assure children that self-correction is a very positive thing.

Restating. This is a skill based on the most important disposition to be cultivated through dialogical group thinking—listening. Other listening skills and dispositions are listed in the Appendix, but this one is included in the checklist because it shows the most direct evidence that children are in fact listening to each other, and because it is a skill that can easily be practiced. The facilitator should model it continually, and also make a regular practice of asking children to restate what other people have said before they add another contribution to the discussion. It can also be practiced through exercises—for example warm-up games in which one child makes a statement and the other restates it in different words, or some variation on that pattern.

Some of the skills and dispositions just listed are addressed directly in exercises

and discussion plans. And although all the stories lend themselves to these skills, some might lend themselves to one skill or another more specifically—for example, both "They are all the Same and Different" and "Big Lion, Little Cat" involve the direct use of comparison, and so could be supplemented by the use of exercises used either before or after the presentation of the story. Most importantly, the skills associated with making comparisons—distinctions, connections and analogies—can be modeled and emphasized by the facilitator during the discussion of the story. More exercises can be found in the other IAPC manuals devoted to early childhood—most specifically *Getting Our Thoughts Together*, the manual to accompany *Elfie* (Second Grade), and *Making Sense of My World*, which is the manual to accompany *The Doll Hospital (*Kindergarten/First Grade). Simple exercises can also easily be developed by the facilitator. Finally, this list is not complete. We have placed a longer list of skills and dispositions in the Appendix.

The following list can be used either as a worksheet or an evaluative checklist. If facilitators work in pairs with groups of young children, one member of the team can take notes, in particular writing down statements or questions in order to evaluate them later, since the logical move which a child is carrying out can often be hidden, given that it is not made consciously, but only as a part of a common language exchange, which is the same in the case of adult conversation. In this way, analyzing young children's reasoning after the fact represents an educational opportunity for teacher/ facilitators. It might be said that the largest part of learning to facilitate critical thinking dialogues—whether among children or adults—is knowing what to listen for.

Some Skills & Dispositions of Critical, Creative & Caring Thinking

	student can perform … with prompt	/ without prompt
	√	√
• Asking a question		
• Agreeing or disagreeing		
• Giving a reason		
• Offering a proposition, hypothesis or explanation		
• Giving an example or counterexample		
• Classifying/Categorizing		
• Making a comparison		
○ Making a distinction		
○ Making a connection		
○ Making an analogy		
• Offering a definition Identifying an assumption		
• Making an inference		
• Making a conditional statement ("if/then")		
• Reasoning syllogistically		
• Self-correcting		
• Restating		
• Entertaining different perspectives		